Klaus Buchenau
Religion and Nation in Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania: Three Eastern Orthodox Models
Klaus Buchenau - Professor for Southeastern and Eastern European History at Regensburg University (Germany). klaus.buchenau@geschichte.uni-regensburg.de
According to many analysts, there is a general affinity between Eastern Orthodoxy and nationalism, especially in Southeastern Europe. The present article aims to draw a more differentiated picture and shows that in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia religious nationalism developed with different intensity and along different paths. Among the three countries compared, Bulgaria has the weakest tradition of Orthodox sacralization of both nation and politics. This feature is rooted in the fact that Orthodoxy in Bulgarian history has frequently functioned as a frame of transnational belonging to the "Orthodox world" or as an instrument of Greek dominance, but also in its institutional weaknesses. In Romania, the influence of the Orthodox Church in society has been traditionally stronger than in Bulgaria or Serbia - a difference which can be traced back to the lower burden of Ottoman rule and a stronger historical continuity of Orthodox learning in the Danube Principalities. Here, intense Orthodox influence in society caused the secular elites to integrate elements of Orthodoxy into the national program. The Serbian case is the most contradictory one: it reveals a heavy disparity between a modest level of church influence on everyday life with a pervasive presence of national symbolism, due to the fact of Serbia's being at the perennial geopolitical fault line and therefore in permanent conflicts with non-Orthodox powers.
Keywords: Orthodox Church, nation, nationalism, sacralization of nation, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, history.
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For post-socialist states, the SACRALIZATION of public space means something quite specific. This is not just a return of" religions " from the private sphere to the streets and squares. First of all, we are talking about the desire of churches that previously had a monopoly status to regain, at least in part, the status that most closely resembles the period of 1917-1945. We are also talking about politicians who, appealing to religious traditions, consider themselves the true representatives of the needs of the majority. Politicians refer to values that have existed for many centuries. This is especially important in societies where people have little trust in government institutions and politicians themselves. In addition, after the fall of the communist ideology, society had to find a new pole of identity. Usually such a pole is the "nation", whose unity replaces class solidarity - something that actually already happened everywhere in the period of late socialism.
The revival of the national can be observed both in the titular nations and in national minorities. In some cases, religious elements are also used as a support. In this case, the decisive criterion is whether religion can serve as a basis for contrasting a given nation with other nations or States. Most often, this is possible if the nation is religiously homogeneous, and the religious tradition is sufficiently standardized, rooted, socially significant and prestigious; and also when there is religious differentiation in relation to antagonistic collectives, or when something similar can be constructed. The factor of "religious differentiation" is also important, when nations want to separate from existing state associations (a typical situation for Modern Eastern Europe). If these state associations (empires, multinational states) have a formal or de facto state religion that differs from the religion of the group seeking secession, then there is a possibility of a religiously colored understanding of the nation both among the Irredentist minority and the titular imperial nation1.
1. On the prerequisites for the emergence of religious nationalism, see also Spohn, W (2002) " Nationalismus und Religion. Ein historisch-soziologischer Vergleich West- und
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The sacralization of the public sphere is determined by a number of factors. But are there factors that are dictated by the religious tradition itself? Is there a special connection to the nationalism of Orthodox Christianity, Sunni Islam, or Calvinist Protestantism? This very formulation of the question is due to the fact that many researchers, often on a subconscious level, proceed from the idea that religions themselves carry "prerequisites" for or against nationalism. In the case of Orthodoxy, for example, there is a clear predestination to nationalism, due to the national nature of ecclesiastical ecclesiology, as well as the sacralization of the state that has existed since the time of Byzantium2.
The answer to the question of which factors were initial and which were acquired in the process of the emergence of Orthodox religious nationalism should be determined by a comparative analysis. The objects of comparison should, in fact, be comparable, but also differ from the point of view of the religious component of nationalism. For example, it does not make much sense to compare Russia with small Orthodox states, since Russian Orthodoxy played the role of an imperial religion in vast territories, and therefore the process of state formation and the formation of nations took place in a different way. However, a comparison within South-Eastern Europe is quite possible, since Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania achieved state independence at approximately the same time; the political program of secular elites had obvious similarities, including on religious issues; a national-religious consciousness was clearly formed within the church; and in the twentieth century, the state of the country was divided into two groups. for all three countries, the key dates were the same: 1918, 1945, and 1989.
Comparative approach to Orthodox traditions
Berlin historian Holm Sundhaussen identifies eight structural differences that characterize the Balkans as a historical region. A special role among them is played by Orthodoxy, more precisely, " vi-
Osteuropas", Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 33: 323 - 346.
2. This thesis is presented very simply in Frangois Thual (Thual, F. (1993) Geopolitique de l'Or Thodoxie. Paris: Dunod/IRIS). A more differentiated approach, although with similar arguments, is presented in Olivier Gillet (Gillet, O. (2001) Les Balkans, Religions et Nationalisme. Bruxelles: Ousia).
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Zantian-Orthodox heritage", as well as "Ottoman-Islamic heritage"3. Despite being Orthodox, Sundhaussen does not refer Romania to the Balkans, primarily because the Danubian principalities were never directly under Ottoman rule. Serbia and Bulgaria, by contrast, represent a typical break in the Balkan tradition: With the Ottoman conquest, representatives of the autochthonous elites were destroyed or expelled, the peasant majority became isolated in local self-government, and "professional Ottomans"4 and merchants of non-Slavic origin began to dominate the cities. Different historical paths, as will be shown below, have also affected religious culture, which still has its consequences today.
Despite the fact that there have long been little-known individual comparisons of various Orthodox churches, today scientific comparative studies in the study of Orthodox Christianity are still poorly developed. A rare exception is a chapter from a book by sociologists of religion Paul M. Tsuleiner, Miklos Tomka and Inna Naletova 5 and an article by Bulgarian anthropologist Nonka Bogomilova 6. Tsuleiner and his co-authors are not so much concerned with the phenomenon of nationalism as with the overall picture of religious beliefs and practices in the post-socialist period. Perhaps it makes sense to briefly summarize the results of their research, so that further discussions about nationalism can be conducted in the context of sociology.
This study is particularly valuable from the point of view of methodology. So, in a representative Aufbruch survey in 14 post-
3. Sundhaussen, H. (1999) "Europa balcanica. Der Balkan als historischer Raum Europas", Geschichte und Gesellschaft 25: 626 - 653. Among other characteristic features, Sundhaussen highlights the instability of migration processes and ethnic interlacing in a relatively small space, the loss and late reception of the ancient heritage, the Ottoman-Islamic heritage, social and economic "backwardness" in Modern times, special problems in the formation of national states and nations, mentality and myths, as well as the role of the Balkans as a sphere of interests. the great powers.
4. We are talking about representatives of the Balkan elites who converted to Islam or Turks who are in the service of the Ottoman Sultan. - Note. perev.
5. Zulehner, P.M., Tomka, M. und Naletova, I. (2008) "Orthodoxie", in Religionen und Kirchen in Ost (Mittel) europa, ss. 138 - 179. Ostfindern: Schwabenverlag.
6. Bogomilova, N. (2005) "The Religious Situation in Contemporary Bulgaria, and in Serbia and Montenegro. Differences and Similarities", Religion in Eastern Europe 25 (4): 1 - 20.
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In the socialist countries (of which 6 are traditionally Orthodox), 7 questionnaires were developed in 2007 that took into account the specifics of religious practices and beliefs typical of Orthodox regions (for example, icon worship in homes 8). The authors note a certain "religious optimism" and at the same time dissatisfaction with official churches, which do not always meet the expectations placed on them. At the same time, Orthodox Christians " rate the competence of their own Orthodox Church higher than Catholics do the competence of the Catholic Church."9. Orthodox Christians are more convinced of the "truth" of their own faith than Catholic believers. Although this gives the impression that they do not fully know what these "truths" are - this is expressed in the fact that their practices are a combination of elements of Orthodoxy, esotericism and paganism. The authors conclude that the "absence" of Western influences associated with the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and modernization played a crucial role in the Orthodox tradition.10
The authors note the presence of similarities in the analysis of South-Eastern Europe, which are particularly noticeable when compared with the East Slavic regions.11 For example, in post-socialist South-Eastern Europe, only a small minority of respondents declare that they do not belong to any denomination (2% in Romania, 3% in Bulgaria, 10% in Serbia), while in Ukraine this figure is about 50%, and in Belarus about 43% 12. This difference suggests that since state atheism in the former Soviet Union lasted much longer, its consequences were much more profound. However, this does not affect religious practice in any way. Serbia and Bulgaria - despite the high percentage of formal identification with the national form of Orthodoxy-are countries with NCDs-
7. Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine and Belarus are analyzed.
8. For the formation of the questionnaire, see Tomka, M. and Zulehner, P. M. (2008) Aufbruch 2007. Tabellenband (mit den vergleichbaren Daten von Aufbruch 1997, Wien/Budapest 2008.
9. Ibid., s. 107.
10. Ibid., s. 176.
11. Belarus and Ukraine are considered here, but data for Russia are also provided.
12. Ibid., s. 145.
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people who are extremely religious, rarely attend church, have little knowledge of church teaching, and have even less "obedience" to the church.
One of the most striking contradictions was revealed in the study of religious practices in two neighboring countries - Bulgaria and Romania. In Bulgaria, as in Belarus, there is a tendency to interpret "happiness" in the spirit of modern secular values; here the authority of science is usually higher than that of religion 13. The opposite situation is in Moldova and Romania, where "almost the entire population is religious: 98% and 96%, respectively, "believe in God", which is higher higher than the average for Eastern and Central Europe as a whole (81%). In Bulgaria and Belarus, this percentage is significantly lower. The majority of Orthodox Christians in Romania and Moldova demonstrate a good knowledge of theology and at least accept the official church teaching about Christ as the Son of God without reservation (72% of Orthodox Christians in Romania and 64% in Moldova) .14 In Bulgaria and Belarus, such people are much smaller (31% and 36%, respectively). In Bulgaria, the growth of Orthodox self-awareness "did not lead to an increase in church membership: 70% of Orthodox people have never taken communion, 60% have never observed fasting, and 20% have never prayed." Also, the accompanying rites here in Bulgaria are much less common than in other Orthodox parts of Europe: there are fewer candles placed and priests are less likely to ask for a blessing. Instead, there is a strong interest in religious healing in Bulgaria, including among the educated and urban population. "This means, first of all, that a non-ecclesiastical or less institutionalized religion is less susceptible to secularization... and also that some cultures in Eastern and Central Europe are more susceptible to secularization pressures than others." 15
When comparing the data of the sociology of religion with the political profile of the three national Orthodox Churches, the discrepancy is immediately apparent. In religious practice, Orthodox Bulgarians and Serbs show clear similarities (in contrast to Romania); however, in political terms, the differences between Bulgarian and Serbian Orthodoxy are significant, whereas
13. Ibid., s. 163.
14. Ibid., s. 176.
15. Ibid., s. 177.
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as between Serbia and Romania, there are obvious similarities in many points. Orthodoxy in Serbia has played a central role in the national discourse since the late 1980s, shaping the concept of national identity and collective messianism. In Bulgaria, this trend is much weaker; in recent decades, the church has attracted attention primarily due to a serious church schism, as a result of which it has been largely paralyzed and limited in its influence, including political one. But even without a schism, it would not be easy to use Bulgarian Orthodoxy for nationalistic purposes. Nonka Bogomilova believes that, unlike Serbia, where Orthodoxy is equated with the preservation of identity, Orthodoxy in Bulgaria is, on the contrary, a marker of belonging to a certain community-to the "Christian east", the Slavic world, Russia. Messianic, ground-based ideology in Bulgaria is based not on Christianity, but on neo-paganism, that is, something specifically Bulgarian here, as a rule, is associated with pre-Christian religious traditions. In general, the fundamentalist trends in Bulgarian Orthodoxy are weaker than in Serbia, and new generations are more open to connections with people belonging to other ethnic communities and religions.16
Bogomilova's conclusions may be slightly exaggerated, but in many respects they coincide with both my own observations and the position of the Russian scientist Anastasia Mitrofanova, who was engaged in modeling the phenomenon of "political Orthodoxy" in a transnational perspective. Mitrofanova described groups (both in Russia and in Serbia, Greece, and Romania) that rely on Orthodoxy to justify the Manichaean "friends-enemies"scheme. This pattern is most pronounced in Serbia, and the main theme is "Serbia-NATO-Orthodox Martyrdom". Among the followers of a similar scheme in Bulgaria, Mitrofanova mentions only a couple of people (for example, the founder of the national radical party Ivan Georgiev), but, in her opinion, political Orthodoxy is not held in high esteem here.17
The mentioned similarity between Serbia and Romania consists in the tendency to present Orthodoxy as the only Legi-
16. Bogomilova, N. "The Religious Situation", pp. 4, 2 - 4, 6 - 8, 17.
17. Mitrofanova A. Politization of the "Orthodox world", Moscow, 2004, pp. 175, 259.
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a powerful spiritual force within the Serbian or Romanian nation. This trend can be observed both in the interwar18 and post-communist period19. Of course, there is a similar tendency in Bulgaria to claim that Orthodoxy is the only religion of Bulgarians.20 Here, too, there is a juxtaposition of pro-Western intellectuals to the "Orthodox nation." The peculiarity of the Bulgarian case is that here intellectuals repeatedly criticized Orthodoxy as an insufficiently national religion. In this regard, in the first half of the 20th century, there were calls for strengthening the national character of Orthodoxy, as well as open sympathies towards anti-Orthodox heresies of the Middle Ages (for example, bogomilism). Even the idea of converting to other faiths is sometimes supported - for example, conversion to neo-Paganism, union with Rome, or Anglicanism. Bulgarian historian Nina Dimitrova sees a connection between the position of nationalists critical of Orthodoxy in the interwar period (Naidy Sheitanov, Yanko Yanev, Dimitr Sesslov, etc.) and the current attempts of the New Age movement to find a special Messianic role for Bulgaria in the world21.
18. See the writings of Serbian Bishop Nikolai Velimirovich and Romanian theologian Dumitru Staniloae: Velimirovic, N. (1983) "Nacionalizam Svetoga Save" (1935), Sabrana dela, vol. 9, ss. 305-313. Himelstir; For Staniloae, see, for example, the anthology Constantin Schifirnef (Schifirnef, p. (2003) Nafiune si Cretinism. Bucharest: Elion), which contains brief speeches by Staniloae for the Orthodox newspaper Telegraful Roman between 1930 and 1945.
19. Flora, G., Szylagyi, G. (2005) "Church, Identity, Politics, Ecclesiastical Functions and Expectations in Post-1989 Romania", in V. Roudometof, A.Agadjanian, J. Pankhurst (eds) Eastern Orthodoxy in a GlobalAge. Tradition Faces the 21st Century, pp. 109 - 143. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press; Buchenau, K. (2005) "From Hot War to Cold Integration? Serbian Orthodox Voices on Globalization and European Integration", in Ibid., pp. 58 - 83.
20. This position also had political consequences, such as, for example, the forcible crossing of Muslim Slavs in Rhodopia (Pomaki) in 1912-1913. See: Eldrov S. Pravoslavieto na voina. Българската православна църква и войните на България 1877_1945, София 2004. С. 103 - 105.
21. Dimitrova N. Religion and nationalism: Ideas for religion in the interwar period in Bulgaria. Sofia, 2006. pp. 39, 64, 191. The discussion about joining Catholic Rome or the Anglican Church unfolded during the conflict with the Orthodox neighboring states of Serbia and Greece in the 2nd and 3rd Balkan Wars. The Union of Bulgarian Orthodox Priests participated in it. See Eldrov S. Pravoslavieto, pp. 126-137.
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All this significantly distinguishes Bulgaria from the characteristic hostility of Romania [22] and Serbia [23] to changing their faith and seceding from Orthodoxy. Despite this difference, we can say that there is a tendency to sacralize the nation in all three countries. And the point here is not that it was Orthodoxy that led to the sacralization of the nation, but that it is precisely in Orthodox theology that the national is somehow distinguished in a special way. The nation is a relatively recent phenomenon that Orthodoxy has had to put up with. In addition, Orthodox theology is mostly conservative. As a rule, it did not seek to actualize the Christian mission in a new historical context. Its most basic idea is the opposite - to achieve an early Christian ascetic ideal image of a person close to the teachings of the Church fathers. For the theological conceptualization of modern social phenomena - for example, nationalism - Orthodoxy is fundamentally not ready. If this were not the case, it is likely that nationalism would have emerged not in Western, but in Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, it is indisputable that many Orthodox Churches have adopted some nationalist values since the nineteenth century. From my point of view, this is an unforeseen effect, although it will be less surprising if we take into account the historical context. The link between Orthodoxy and nationalism in this case resembles the link between Protestantism and "Protestant ethics." Max Weber suggested that the Protestant ethic that leads to capitalism is not a direct consequence of theological postulates, but rather an indirect product of it - more precisely, compensation for the uncertainty that Calvin's image of God caused among believers. 24 Similarly, "Orthodox nationalism" can be considered an indirect consequence of certain features characteristic of Eastern Christianity. Newly created hpe-
22. Maner, H. -C. (2007) "Multikonfessionalitat und neue Staatlichkeit. Orthodoxe, griechisch-katholische und romisch-katholische Kirche in Siebenburgen und Altrumanien zwischen den Weltkriegen (1918 - 1940)", Spiegelungen. Zeitschrift fur deutsche Kultur und Geschichte Sildosteuropas 4 (58).
23. Aleksov, B. (2002) "Videnje verskih preobracenja u formiranju srpske nacionalne svesti", in Bremer, Th. (ed.) Religija, drustvo i politika. Kontroverzna tumacenja i priblizavanja, ss. 143 - 167. Bonn: Zentralstelle Weltkirche der Dt. Bischofskonferenz.
24. Weber, M. (2004) Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus. Munich: C. H. Beck Verlag (edited and introduced by D. Kaesler).
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This Orthodox predisposition to the sacralization of the nation was prepared, first, by the idea of a "symphony" of Church and state inherited from Byzantium, and, secondly, by the ecclesiological principle of conciliarity.
Church and State: Principles of Symphony and Conciliarity
To date, there is no consensus on what model of relations between Church and state in Orthodoxy was inherited from Byzantium. You can imagine two leading positions. The first is the "Western" point of view, which points to the subordination of the Eastern church to the Byzantine emperor, which made the church a tool for political purposes, primarily in the sacralization of the empire; in turn, the state provided the church with a virtual monopoly status in society. In general terms, this position is expressed in the concept of "caesarepapism" 25.
Those who view this phenomenon more moderately - many Orthodox theologians, as well as their Western colleagues - emphasize the concept of "symphony"26. Symphony means the cooperation of church and State in the creation, preservation and improvement of a Christian society. The state and the Church must support each other, and in fact they are supposed to be two autonomous institutions with different functions. 27 There are other terms as well. Thus, Hans-Georg Beck uses the concept of "political Orthodoxy" 28, which recognizes that the church has more freedom of action than is generally considered by supporters of the Caesarean model-
25. Among German authors, this position on Byzantium has a long tradition, see, for example, Schaff, Ph. (1869) Geschichte der alten Kirche. Von Christi Geburt bis zum Ende des sechsten Jahrhunderts. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. A similar interpretation in recent publications is found, for example, in: Pirson, D. (2008) Gesammelte Beitrage zum Kirchenrecht und Staatskirchenrecht, Vol. 1, s. 65. Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck. Michael W. Weithmann in his popular science book Balkan-Chronik. 2000 Jahre zwischen Orient und Okzident (1995, p. 47) characterizes Byzantium as a Caesarepapist and theocratic state.
26. Nikolaou, T. (1994) "Die Rolle der Kirche in Byzanz und in der Balkanlandern", Orthodoxes Forum 8 (1): 22.
27. See on the concept of" symphony " in the work of the Russian church historian Anton Kartashov (1875-1960) as presented by N. V. Somin: A.V. Kartashov on the relationship between church and state [http://chri-soc.narod.ru/Kartash. htm]. On the understanding of the symphony in the Russian legal tradition, see the works of E. V. Belyakova.
28. Beck, H. -G. (1978) Das byzantinische Jahrtausend, ss. 87 - 108. Munich: Beck.
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However, it is stated that the religious here is perceived through the political.
The concept of symphony has the advantage of being derived directly from the Byzantine tradition. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that only the ideal of a truly Christian ruler in a truly Christian society is meant. At the same time, cases of sacralization of rulers who, upon closer examination, turn out to be bad Christians or even not Christians at all are ignored. Therefore, it should be borne in mind that what is declared a symphony in many Orthodox states can really be understood as Caesarepapism.
In this context, it is important that the later states of the Byzantine commonwealth of nations inherited not only the close relationship between church and State, but also the conflicts between them. Medieval Serbia and Bulgaria, like the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, sought to copy each other's model of church - state relations, creating a church within the country that was independent of external centers, but closely connected with political power. The question of whether this was a "symphony" or a "caesarepapism" has always remained relevant.29
Despite the radical discontinuities in the historical process, there is some continuity in the symphony's ideal itself. In the Danubian principalities, even during the period of the greatest Ottoman pressure, Christian elites persisted, who appealed to the "symphony". In the European provinces in the center of the Ottoman Empire, this was not possible, since the symphony presupposes the presence of Orthodox secular rulers, which could not be the case under the sultans; however, even here monasteries preserved this popular ideal of the symphony-primarily in the form of images of rulers on icons and frescoes.
In the process of the formation of new states in the XIX century, the "symphony" in the narrow sense of the word was practically not in demand anywhere. The elites were guided by the European liberal model of the nation-state, primarily by France. Yet the Byzantine model also played a role. The symphony's ideas were similar to those of the clergy.-
29. См. Caraba, V. (2012) Ausdrucksformen der byzantinischen Symphonia am Beispiel des Hofzeremoniells, in Grigore, M. -D., Dinu, R. H., Zivojinovic, M. (Hg.) "Herrschaft in Siidosteuropa. Kultur- und sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven", ss. 135 - 154. Gottingen.
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At the age of 30, the new elites needed an alliance with the clergy. The elites, because of their Western European education, had no influence on the peasant majority. The new state project, the bureaucracy, and the developed modern legal system were alien to the peasantry, and therefore the danger of strong peasant resistance remained.31 Priests were important intermediaries in this situation, since they were the elite in the countryside, even with their modest education, and were considered the bearers of the peasant system of values.32 Therefore, priests, from the point of view of the new elite, were absolutely necessary both as clergy and, above all, as leaders of the "national project" in the countryside.
The clergy, in turn, depended on the new national elites. These latter, in the face of the fall of Ottoman hegemony, were natural allies of the lower clergy, who, in the person of the Greek (Phanariot) episcopate, encountered an "alien element" and thus experienced a kind of era of foreign dependence.33 Therefore, it was relatively easy for the first generations of the new elite to act as protectors of the local clergy, without having to make any special concessions to the church. The Alliance was based on an agreement to fight together for freedom, for the overthrow of foreign rule.34 In addition, the clergy expected that the leading church positions in the future would be occupied by "their own people".
30. A well - researched example is Metropolitan Mihajlo Jovanovic of Belgrade, see Petrovic-Milojevic D. Russian Slavophiles, St. Andrew's Liberals and the Serbian Orthodox Church (Based on the correspondence of M. F. Rayevsky and Metropolitan Michael) / / Balkan Studies. 1992. 16. pp. 63-75.
31. Sundhaussen, Н. (1998) "Eliten, Burgertum, politische Klasse? Anmerkungen zu den Oberschichten in den Balkanlandern des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts", in Hopken, W, Sundhaussen, H. (eds) Eliten in Sildosteuropa. Rolle, Kontinuitaten, Brilche in Geschichte und Gegenwart, p. 13. Munich:_Siidosfeuropa-Gesellschaft.
32. Radic, R. (1994) "Uticaj razvoja Srpske pravoslavne crkve na modernizacijske procese u Srbiji i Jugoslaviji", in Perovic, L., Obradovic, M., Stojanovic, D. (eds) Srbija и modernizacijskim procesima XX. veka, pp. 349 - 353. Belgrad: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. VBS 6.
33. See research from the history of everyday life in Serbia: Radosavljevic, N. (2006) " Episkop, mirski svestenik, monah. Obelezja svakodnevnog zivota", in Stolic, A., Makuljevic, N. (eds) Priuatni ziuot kod Srba и deuetnaestom ueku. Od kraja osamnaestog veka do pocetka Prvog svetskog rata, pp. 711 - 736. Belgrad: Clio.
34. Belov M. V. Serbian insurgent statehood and its ideological justification / / Volkov V. K. (ed.) Dvosti let novoy serbskoi gosudarstvennosti. To the anniversary of the beginning of the First Serbian Uprising of 1804-1813, St. Petersburg, 2005, pp. 39-56.
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people" and that with further territorial expansion, the sphere of influence of the new national church will also grow.
Under Ottoman rule, the Orthodox Church was the most important institution of self-government of the Christian population, with extensive powers in the field of civil law. From this point of view, the liberal project of forming a nation meant painful changes for the church. They did not consist in the separation of church and state, which occurred only later, under socialism, and in a special, non-Western liberal sense. Even the transfer of church functions to the state, primarily in the area of legal proceedings and education, was not explosive, as it was in the Catholic part of Europe. After all, first of all, the claims of Orthodoxy to active intervention in public life were relatively modest at that time; and second, the transfer of previously ecclesiastical functions to a new state in South-Eastern Europe was, in fact, a completely different process: here the education and judicial systems were not so much secularized as simply created from scratch. The new states did not so much "appropriate" church schools or courts, of which there were not many and which could hardly be converted into modern institutions; the modern public sector was built almost anew and was for the church an unknown area to which it could not claim 35.
The real problem was the cultural sphere. The new elites had new authorities, primarily in science, while the religious environment was seen as a source of backwardness. The churches initially reacted to this painful defeat by copying secular elites, seeking education and foreign degrees. It was the lower clergy who sought to adopt from the bourgeoisie a new system of values, an attitude towards social mobility in a society that was becoming more dynamic and differentiated. By the beginning of the 20th century, a part of the clergy had already caught up with the secular elite in this sense, and now they could openly criticize the vector of modernization according to the Western European model, and look for alternatives based on religious beliefs.
After Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania achieved independence by 1878, the Orthodox Church was proclaimed everywhere.-
35. См. Mayer, M. (1995) Elementarbildung in Jugoslawien (1918 - 1941), ss. 316 - 319. Munich: R. Oldenbourg.
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at the state level. The reason for this was not so much pressure from the church itself - the influence of the clergy on the first secular Balkan elites due to the limited Orthodox education at that time was still very limited. On the contrary, secular nation-builders themselves came to the conclusion that religious heterogeneity can be a threat to the nation. In addition, Orthodox value orientations - anti-Ottoman sentiments and widespread prejudices against other religions-intersected with Western liberal prejudices about the" backwardness "of Islam and the" ultramontanism " of Catholicism. Conversely, the Western model of anti-clericalism and religious pluralism was perceived by the secular elite rather as a threat to their own identity. 36 Therefore, the motto of local elites, regardless of individual religious beliefs, was to trust only Orthodoxy.
As a result, the new nation-states, of course, did not create any symphony, in the narrow sense of the word. What Orthodoxy has managed to achieve during this time and up to the interwar period is formally a preeminent position in relation to other religions. This advantage was "bargained for" thanks to the willingness of the higher clergy-as it was in Russia under Peter I-to become part of the state apparatus, under systematic control and as an instrument of politics. Such relationships can be characterized as Caesarepapism, if there were no parallel attempts on the part of theologians to put religion above politics in the form of a meta-discourse. In the 1930s, this trend became increasingly important, especially in Serbia and Romania, and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria.37
The symphony between church and state is part of the Orthodox tradition, but not of Orthodox dogma. In this regard, the ways of further development remain open in principle. The fact that Orthodox churches can perfectly exist without the symphony is evident from the example of Orthodoxy in the Diaspora. So, for example, Orthodoxy in the Czech Republic initially followed
36. For the ambivalence regarding the perception of the Western model in Bulgaria, see Daskalov, R. (2004) The Making of a Nation in the Balkans. Historiography of the Bulgarian revival. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press.
37. О Сербии см. Buchenau, K. (2011) Auf russischen Spuren, Orthodoxe Antiwesteler in Serbien 1850 - 1945. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. For Romania, see Maner, H.-C. "Multiconfessionalitat und neue Staatlichkeit".
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following their own path without relying on government support, 38 the same applies to the English-speaking Orthodox Church of America39 and many others.
Orthodox self-awareness is based on the idea of the advantage of collective decisions over individual ones. No Orthodox bishop, including even the Patriarch of Constantinople, has the right to independently interpret the doctrine of faith. "Orthodoxy" refers only to what the bishops collectively, that is, collectively, recognize as the truth. Periods when a particular hierarch (or secular ruler) imposes his will on the church in theological matters, if they happen, then the collective consciousness is rejected and perceived negatively. An example is the church reforms of Patriarch Nikon of Moscow (XVII century), who wanted to correct the Russian liturgical books according to Greek models: despite the theological justification of the reform, he met with little understanding 40. Along with this, there is a tradition, although not quite in accordance with Orthodox ecclesiology and church law, that the people themselves are the bearers of Christian truth, and even bishops should obey them in controversial cases. Here, as an example, we can cite the Greek mass protests after the Uniate Council of Ferrara-Florence in 1439, which led to the fact that the union already concluded between the Latin and Greek bishops was not ratified. In the same row, we can put the Russian Slavophiles of the XIX century, the Macedonian autocephalists of the 1960 - ies. and various groups of "Old-timers" in our time.
The principle of conciliarity is based on the idea of a direct connection between the human collective and God. This is reflected in the idea of the church as the "body of Christ", where everyone occupies their own special place, and all work together to jointly achieve a sacred goal. The transfer option is included here
38. Marek, P., Bureha, V. (2008) Pravoslavni v Cehoslovensku v letech 1918 - 1953. Pfispevek k dejinam Prauoslaune cirkue и ceskych zemich, na Slouensku a na Podkarpatske Rusi, s. 123, 137. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury..
39. Meerson, M. A. (1988) "The Orthodox Church in America", Ramet, S. P. (ed.) Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century, pp. 116 - 134. Durham & London: Duke University Press.
40. Halem, F. (2003) "Eine Skizze uber Gesetz und Wertordnung in Ost und West. Von der Antike bis zur Moderne", Forum fur osteuropaische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte 7 (1): 15 - 51.
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This principle applies to the collective, which is not in the narrow sense a community of believers. This idea was most clearly formulated in the first half of the 19th century in the circle of Russian Slavophiles and, above all, by Alexey Khomyakov (1804-1860), who saw a reflection of the early Christian community in the Russian peasant community.41 This is a direct road to the sacralization of the nation, especially if the nation is understood as consisting mainly of peasants. Khomyakov found many friends among Orthodox theologians in Serbia and Bulgaria.42
Romanians, who in the 19th century remembered their Latin roots, were less likely to accept Khomyakov's teaching about conciliarity. Khomyakov tended to associate the "people of God" with one particular ethnic group - the Slavs, thereby calling into question Christian universalism. According to Khomyakov, the Slavs allegedly had a special religious gift even before Christianity, which they eventually embodied in an ideal Christian community, while the Romanesque peoples were initially imbued with the spirit of formalism, legalism and coercion. 43 Despite this, Khomyakov's theories also found fertile ground in Romania. The concept of conciliarity entered the theological discourse under the term sobornicitate, and the most famous Romanian theologian of the 20th century. Dumitru Staniloae adopted the theses of the Slavophiles, presenting the Romanian national character as the most favorable for the embodiment of true Christianity.44
The common heritage helps explain how Orthodox churches, both in Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania, tend to present themselves as State-forming national churches with special, historically inherited rights. Other historical arguments are also attached to this. Thus, Orthodoxy is presented as the only form of Christianity that, unlike Catholicism, is originally a Christian religion.-
41. Schulze Wessel, M. (2007) "Rechtglaubigkeit und Gemeinschaft. Ekklesiologische und politische Bedeutungen des 'sobornost' - Begriffs in Russland", in Holscher, L. (ed.) Bauplane der sichtbaren Kirche. Sprachliche Konzepte religioser Vergemeinschaftung in Europa, ss. 198 - 211. Gottingen: Wallstein Verlag.
42. Buchenau, K. Auf russischen Spuren, ss. 119 - 128.
43. Riasanovsky, N. (1952), Russia and the West in the Teachings of the Slavophiles, pp. 69 - 75, 100 - 110. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
44. Staniloae, D. (2001) Reflecfii despre spiritualitatea popolurului roman. Bucharest: Anul Editiei.
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but it was ready to adapt to national peculiarities; the importance of the church in the process of medieval statehood formation is emphasized; it is noted that it was the church that preserved a special "national identity"in the Ottoman era (or the Habsburg era).
This is not to say that these arguments are completely untrue, although some of them can be argued. For example, can the Church Slavonic tradition really be the basis for Bulgarian or Serbian nationalism, since it was also common to other Slavic nations, and the language of the liturgy itself was, no doubt, incomprehensible to many? Or is it even possible to talk about the "national significance" of the church in the times preceding the emergence of modern nationalism? The discussion on these issues is still relevant, but we will not go into it here. Of course, we can assume that nationalism did not arise out of nothing, that it was preceded by certain ethno-differentiating processes in which Orthodoxy also played a role. But how then can we explain the obvious differences between the strong Orthodox component of nationalism in Serbia and Romania and the relative religious pluralism of Bulgarian nationalism? On the other hand, why are the paths so diverged between Serbia and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Romania, on the other, from the point of view of the social roots of religion, so that even today the socio - political role of Orthodoxy is very different? Below we will try to explain these differences, taking into account a number of factors - geopolitical, institutional, and also the factor of features of the ethno-religious structure that developed in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania in the XX century.
Geopolitical factor
Let's start with Serbia. Its borderline position reinforces the desire to distance itself from Islam and Catholicism. The territories inhabited by Serbs include border regions where religious affiliation has always marked the front of armed confrontation (Kraina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo). In this regard, the image of the enemy with a clearly different religious affiliation was formed in the collective memory of the Serbs, and this image of the enemy in the form of ancient myths became part of the national epic. These myths (such as the myth of Koso-
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vo) express the idea of the absolute equivalence of collective identity with confessional affiliation; the Christian value system is primarily associated with heroism and martyrdom.
Identification with Orthodoxy in Serbia was reinforced by the fact that even in the Ottoman period Orthodoxy was represented by a special corporation - the Patriarchate of Pec (1557-1766). Even if the Patriarchate of Pec could not always be described as a Serbian national institution, 45 nevertheless, it was perceived as an autochthonous organization, which, thanks to the use of Church Slavonic, clearly separated itself from the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Archdiocese of Ohrid. The claim of later nationalists that it was Orthodoxy that preserved the Serbian collective identity during the Ottoman period exaggerates the Pec Patriarchate's contribution to preserving national homogeneity. Nevertheless, the thesis of Orthodoxy as a defense against assimilation in the Serbian case is hardly worth rejecting altogether.
The geopolitical factor is Serbia's special relationship with Russia, which is based on persistent myths about brotherhood, despite weak social contacts. Orthodox Russia is being idealized. It is far enough away to dream about (at least much further away than Austria), it has no territorial claims to Serbia, which makes it possible to present its position as purely altruistic. Russia, however, has not always made an effort to keep Serbia as its own "outpost" and not lose it to Austria.46
Let us now turn to Bulgaria. In medieval Bulgaria, Orthodoxy is what it has in common with its powerful Byzantine neighbor. Up to the Slavic mission of the disciples of Cyril and Methodius, Christianity was introduced under the great influence of Byzantine priests, who often treated Bulgarian customs with arrogance. The Bulgarian elite was strongly interested in removing the state from the authority of the Byzantine Church. In Orthodoxy, they saw prestige and progress, but also a threat to the Byzantines.-
45. In the sixteenth and twelfth centuries, the Patriarchate also had jurisdiction over territories outside the Serbian State, such as large parts of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Albania.
46. Buchenau, K. Auf russischen Spuren, ss. 65 - 76.
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legal guardianship. The Bulgarian Church formally seceded in 927, but it was almost immediately exposed to a new danger: turning into a feudal lord, it provoked protests from the peasants, which eventually resulted in the Bogomil "heresy" 47. Serbia reacted to the events taking place in the neighboring state by brutally persecuting the Bogomils, so that they could not gain a foothold in Serbian lands, but in Bulgaria it was no longer possible to eradicate the "heresy": until the Ottoman conquest, Bogomilism played an important role, and many authors see this as a manifestation of authentic Bulgarian religiosity.48
During the Ottoman era, Bulgarian Orthodoxy was under the jurisdiction of the Archdiocese of Ohrid (until its fall in 1767). The latter enjoyed formal independence from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, although only relatively, since both structures were run by Greeks. This means that Bulgarian (proto -) national aspirations could not be based on the highest ecclesiastical structures (although later nationalists insisted on the Bulgarian character of the Archdiocese of Ohrid49).
Russia is also Bulgaria's" big Orthodox brother", but the role of the empire was not overestimated, unlike the Serbs; the Bulgarians had stronger direct contacts - many young Bulgarians studied in Russia 50 - and besides, Russia more clearly claimed hegemony.
Those who emphasize the Orthodox component of the Bulgarian identity emphasize numerous similarities with Russia and do not pay much attention to specifically Bulgarian features. Those who seek to find such Bulgarian specifics,
47. Browning, R. (1975) Byzantium and Bulgaria. A Comparative Study across the Early Medieval Frontier, pp. 145, 161 - 166. London: Temple Smith.
48. Dimitrova, N. Religija i nacionalizam, ss. 87 - 95.
49. The nationalized point of view is also found in the Bulgarian Wikipedia [http://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9E%D1%85%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B4 %Dl%8l%Do%BA%Do%Bo_%Do%Bo%Dl%8o%Dl%85%Do%B8%Do%B5%Do%B F%Do%B8%Dl%8l%Do%BA%Do%BE%Do%BF%Do%B8%Dl%8F]. The Bulgarian perception of the Archdiocese of Ohrid in Western historiography is particularly strongly criticized, see Riis, P. (2002) Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria. New York: Columbia University Press.
50. Parushevad. Правителственият елит на Румъния и България втората половина на XIX и началото на XX век. Social history. Sofia, 2008. pp. 106-124; Trgovchevih L. Planirana elita, O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim universitettima u 19. veku. Beograd, 2003, p. 212.
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on the contrary, they refer to the pre-Orthodox heritage expressed in the Pagan-Slavic, Proto-Bulgarian substratum.
Finally, let's turn to Romania. Romanian Orthodoxy in the Ottoman period was even less able to rely on church structures than Bulgarian Orthodoxy. With the advent of the Danubian principalities in the 14th century, a rather ephemeral pre-Ottoman state was formed, for which the Patriarch of Constantinople appointed a metropolitan. But since neither state nor ecclesiastical independence was achieved in reality, the principalities remained in the zone of influence of Constantinople/Istanbul. Until the beginning of the 18th century, the official language in the metropolitan areas of Moldavia and Wallachia was Church Slavonic, then for a whole century it was replaced by Greek.51 In Transylvania, the situation was no better - the Romanian majority had virtually no political rights, and until 1864, Romanian Orthodoxy was dominated by the Serbian Karlovac metropolis.52
When the church is subordinated to external structures, this does not contribute much to its ability to" sacralize the nation " (as was the case in the Bulgarian case). In addition, the emerging nation, at least in Transylvania, was divided in confessional terms, and at first the Uniate Church was more based on the national theme, rather than the Orthodox one. The fact that Uniate intellectuals persistently pointed out the Latin character of Romanians made a unified model of Romanian religious nationalism difficult to achieve.53
The geopolitical factor, as we have seen, explains why the religious component of nationalism is more pronounced in Serbia than in Bulgaria. However, he cannot explain why the nation was strongly sacralized in Romania, although here, as in Bulgaria, the geopolitical factor should have caused the opposite trends. In this case, a special role is played by the question of the prestige of Orthodoxy, or rather its representatives. The secular elites in the Balkans in the 19th century had specific models before their eyes, most often they were
51. Tomow, S. (2005) Was ist Osteuropa? Handbuch der osteuropaischen Text- und Sozialgeschichte von der Spatantike bis zum Nationalstaat, ss. 166 ff, 182. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
52. Turzczynski, E. (1976) Konfession und Nation. Zur Fruhgeschichte der serbischen und rumanischen Nationsbildung. Dusseldorf: Schwann.
53. Fritsche, M. (1983) "Die rumanische Nationalbewegung", in Reiter, N. (ed.) Nationalbewegungen auf dem Balkan, ss.372, 375. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
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western politicians or university professors they met while studying in the West. The Orthodox Church in both Serbia and Bulgaria lagged far behind in education. The new elites, of course, wanted to win the respect of the village priests, but they could hardly imagine the clergy as a real partner for running the nation. In fact, no one listened to the position of the clergy when it came to ways of nation-building. The probability that contacts with the elite could lead to the penetration of religious ideas into a secular national project was insignificant. On the contrary, the co-optation of the inferior clergy in terms of education into secular elites was more likely and actually extended over the entire nineteenth century; that is, the clergy were constrained in the political struggle and often lost their religious authority.54
It is sometimes said that an Orthodox monastery is the model by which a society should be built. 55 If the monastic community really is such a social and ethical resource of Orthodoxy, then in Serbia and Bulgaria this situation was bad. Medieval monasteries were created according to the Byzantine model, but they could not always acquire spiritual charisma. In addition, they were too closely connected with the process of state formation and the formation of feudalism. The small elites of the medieval Balkan states were generally pragmatic and multi-functional.56 In such circumstances, it was unlikely that monasteries could develop as strong, significant alternative communities.
After the Ottoman conquest, Serbia and even more Bulgaria formed an integral part of the Ottoman territories. This meant that Orthodoxy per se was reduced in status to the religion of the peasantry. Where Christianity still persisted in the cities, it had a Greek form. Part of this Greek life was the episcopal sees, where the Greek episcopal bishops lived. -
54. At the end of the 19th century, this trend was actively criticized primarily by Russian conservatives, see, for example, K. Pobedonostsev. The most comprehensive report of the Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod K. Pobedonostsev on the Department of Orthodox Confession for 1884. St. Petersburg, 1886.
55. Florovsky P. Christianity and civilization [www.fatheralexander.org/booklets/ru ssian/florovsky_different. hrtm].
56. Gil D. (2005) Prawoslawie - historia - narod. Miejsce kultury duchowej w serbskiej tradycji i wspolczesnosci, ss. 60 f., 149. Krakow.
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Ospreys often created significant libraries, the wisdom of which was often not available to rural priests because of the language barrier.57 The rural clergy did not have the opportunity to raise the level of education, and most often they were practically no different from ordinary peasants. Monasteries, which in the Middle Ages were often run by upper-class abbots, soon lost their luster. They were deserted, and often there were only a few monks left, to whom few people paid any attention. The activities of the Serbian Patriarchate in Pecha brought some improvements in this area, but since it was abolished in 1766 by the decision of the Ottoman authorities, the church began to be discredited, and with it the departure of the Serbian elite.58 The peculiarity of the Romanian case is that the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were not directly subordinate to the Ottoman authorities, but had to "only" pay tribute. This meant that the autochthonous elites were not affected and that the Orthodox Church still, as in the Middle Ages, benefited from a close relationship with this elite.59 Continuity in monastic life was particularly important. Romanian monasteries were better prepared for the role of educational centers than monasteries in Serbia or Bulgaria. It is known about their close cooperation with Mount Athos and about the strong influence that spread from the Moldavian monasteries further to the Eastern Slavs.60 The tactics of the Romanian boyars and their long-standing alliance with pro-Ottoman Greek elites contributed to the relative political stability that allowed the church to devote itself to its flock. 61 This was in complete contrast to the ever-recurring wars in the Western Balkans, where priests were sometimes better at weapons than at words. The new national elites in Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria generally did not recognize this difference; they had their own secular agenda
57. Radosavljevic N. Pravoslavna crkva u Beogradskom pashaluku 1766-1831 (pravda Vaseljenske patrijarshije). Beograd, 2007. pp. 167-197.
58. Slijepcevic, D. (1980) Mihailo, arhiepiskop beogradski i mitropolit Srbije, ss. 187, 201. Miinchen.
59. Iorga, N. (1935) Byzance apres Byzance. Continuation de l'Histoire de la vie Byzantine. Bucuresti, 1935.
60. Henkel, J. (2006) "Aufschwung in Rumaniens Klostern seit 1989", G2W34 2: 16 - 19.
61. See Hitchins, K. (1996) The Romanians 1774-1866, pp. 36-42, 114-124 for a study of the complex relationships between the lower and higher clergy, as well as between the clergy, Phanariots, and Boyars. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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an act in which the church was supposed to be only an instrument. Nevertheless, there were prerequisites for different paths of development, while the balance of power between the clergy and the secular elite remained different. In Romania, the centuries-old continuity of highly cultured Orthodoxy provided the basis for religion to influence the education of the bourgeoisie (see the example of the 19th-century Romanian conservatives, 62 or the example of the historian Nicolae Iorgu, 63). In Serbia, the church was perceived as a symbol of national continuity, but, in fact, it dragged out, as in Bulgaria, a rather miserable existence. Even the most famous medieval monasteries were usually inhabited by a small group of monks, whose authority was low among both the secular elite and the peasants.64
Institutional factor
So, the Orthodox Church had to first gain cultural prestige among the secular-educated elites, and only in this case would it have the opportunity to "sanctify" nationalism with Christian ideas, to "sacralize the nation." On the other hand, it is obvious that it is easier to gain prestige if there is an institutionalized status. The churches in question did not belong to the old patriarchies. They were all created by separation from the mother Church (from the Patriarchate of Constantinople or, in the Transylvanian case, from the Archdiocese of Karlovy Vary). Until now, there are no clear rules for obtaining autocephaly in the Orthodox world. However, when new national states arise, and the church, according to the symphony principle, acts in concert with them, then there is usually a difficult situation in which the mother Church first refuses autocephaly and proclaims a new church-
62. Hitchins, K. (1994) Rumania 1866-1947, p. 10. Oxford.
63. For the controversial attitude of the Romanian Orthodox thinkers of the 1930s to Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940), see Muller, D. (2005) Staatsburger auf Widerruf. Juden und Muslime als Alteritatspartner im rumanischen und serbischen Nationscode, Ethnonationale Staatsbilrgerschaftskonzeptionen, 1878 - 1941, s. 292. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
64. For Bulgaria, see the travel notes of the Russian pan-Slavist Ivan S. Palmov from a journey through the Greek-Slavic lands. Report on scientific studies abroad on the history of Slavic Churches from June 1883 to June 1884. St. Petersburg, 1890. p. 12. About Serbia: Buchenau, K. Auf russischen Spuren, ss. 199 - 205.
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the "schismatic" sermon, which is also ignored by all other Orthodox churches. At this stage, the new church must first act with caution, establish external contacts, create lobbies in order to get out of isolation. In these cases, it is nationalism that is the best support - after all, in fact, it is the formation of a new nation that is the basis for the claims of the new church. But at the same time, the new church had to avoid excessive ideologization, so as not to frighten potential partners - especially outside the Orthodox world, in the Vatican, or among Protestants. Therefore, it is unlikely that an open and intelligentsia-supported sacralization of the nation could take place at this moment. In addition, institutionally insufficiently protected churches often do not have any clear system of theological education and, thus, they do not have personnel that could systematically justify the idea of sacralization of the nation.
Let's return to our comparative approach. As can be seen, the institutional development of Serbian and Romanian Orthodoxy since the end of the XIX century. it went in parallel. The Archdiocese of Bucharest declared autocephaly in 1865 (nine years after independence) and had to wait 20 years for recognition from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Archdiocese of Belgrade became autocephalous in 1879, after almost 50 years of having to settle for an autonomous status. After the First World War, both churches were granted the status of patriarchies in the greatly enlarged states and established theological faculties. Only then did active work on the "sacralization of the nation" begin. A decisive role was played by the fact that it was no longer necessary to spend so much effort on the diplomatic struggle for autocephaly, and it became possible to train the necessary personnel.65
Bulgaria is a tragic exception in this respect. Its church was forced to fight for autocephaly for much longer than the other two, since the Bulgarian national project was more directed against Greek interests. In this case, we are referring to both the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the new Greek national state centered in Athens. The Ecumenical Patriarchate proclaimed the Bulgarian exarchate, founded by Bulgarian nationalists, ras-
65. Ibid., ss. 290 - 329.
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kolnicheskim. Only in 1945 was the disgrace lifted, and only in 1953 was the Bulgarian Patriarchate established. Up to this point, the Bulgarian clergy suffered because of their unclear status, especially when communicating with clerics of other recognized churches. The metropolitan of a "schismatic organization" could not be perceived on an equal footing with the metropolitans of existing churches.66 During the interwar period, when Serbian and Romanian theologians worked intensively to sacralize the nation, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was more concerned with survival issues.
Even the elevation to autocephaly and the status of patriarchy after the Second World War turned out to be a "double-edged sword". The fact is that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church became dependent on the Communist leaders: they promised help, and in fact it was thanks to Soviet pressure that Constantinople agreed to surrender in 1945. Even promotion to the Patriarchate in 1953 was possible only thanks to state support. Bulgarian Orthodoxy thus found itself in the grip of dependence, without any leverage of its own. The Communists used the autocephaly of the Church as a means of propaganda to demonstrate their alleged favor for religion. First of all, they needed legitimate church bodies in order to be able to use them for foreign policy purposes.67 This state of affairs was reflected in the post-communist era-in the form of numerous schisms against the background of constant reproaches to the Orthodox hierarchy for making too many concessions to the Communists. Thus, the "institutional factor"for the Bulgarian Church is still extremely relevant, and this significantly reduces the possibilities of sacralization of the nation. 68
66.The extent to which the Bulgarian public hoped for international recognition is illustrated by the example of Patriarch Barnabas of Serbia's visit to Sofia in May 1933. The Bulgarian public reacted with enthusiasm, while Yugoslav newspapers, on the contrary, reported very sparingly about this diplomatic step (Diplomatic Mission Belgrade, 23-5-1933, Albert Dufour, Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry, ed. II b, R 73 196). Before 1917, the Russian "sister church" also showed a painful distance on the issue of schism. See: Dopmann, H.-D. (2006) Kirche in Bulgarien von den Anfangen bis zur Gegenwart, s. 60. Munchen: Biblion Verlag.
67. Kalkandzieva, D. (2010) "The Bulgarian Orthodox Church", in Leustean, L. (ed.) Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, pp. 79 - 98. New York: Routledge.
68. Broun, J. (1993) "The Schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church" (Part 1 - 3), in Religion, State & Society 21 (2): 207 - 220; 30 (4): 365 - 394.
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Features of the ethno-religious structure
The national and religious composition of the new state entities in which the three churches found themselves since 1918 also had a significant impact on the model of national Orthodoxy.
Bulgaria in 1918 was the smallest but most homogeneous of the three countries. The Orthodox population was an absolute majority, and with this balance of power, there were few confessional contradictions.69 Bulgaria's territorial claims were mainly directed at territories within neighboring Orthodox countries (Macedonia, which was ceded to Yugoslavia, and Southern Dobrudja in Romania). In this situation, the "militant" Orthodox identity could not play a significant role. When the Communists came to power at the end of World War II, they did not have much need to "deal" with the church; it could hardly be accused of having fascist tendencies. Due to the relative national homogeneity of the country, the logical choice of the new authorities was a national-communist course, which step by step rehabilitated the national heritage. Within the framework of this policy, the church also found an unremarkable place for itself - nationalism had an obvious ideological connection with communism, while at the same time the church was deprived of the need to present itself as the "mother of the nation"70.
On the contrary, Greater Romania emerged in 1918 as a nation-state with strong national minorities who did not belong to the Orthodox Faith. 71 In addition, in the new state formation were together Uniate
69. As a percentage of the population in 1934, 84.4% were Orthodox and 13.5% were Muslim (Norre, H.-J. (1979) Bulgarien - Hitlers eigenwilliger Verbundeter. Eine Fallstudie zur nationalsozialistischen Sudosteuropapolitik, s. 13. Stuttgart).
70. Riis, C. Religion, Politics, and Historiography, pp. 99-120. See also the study of the Serbian historian D. Slijepcevic, in which he attempts to compare Serbian Orthodoxy in Tito's Yugoslavia (Slijepcevic, D. (1957) Die bulgarische orthodoxe Kirche 1944-1956. Munich: R. Oldenbourg). A large-scale and detailed study of the early stage of relations between the state and the church in socialism was made by the Bulgarian historian Daniela Kalkandzieva (Kalkandzieva, D. (2002) Balgarskata pravoslavna carkva i "narodnata demokracija", 1944-1953. Silistra: Demos).
71.According to the 1930 census, Greater Romania was home to 72.5% Orthodox, 7.9% Uniates, 6.8% Roman Catholics, 4.2% Jews, 3.9% Calvinists, 2.2% Lutherans, and 1% Muslims. Romanians made up 71.9% of the total population, Hungarians -
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Romanian elites from Transylvania and Orthodox Romanian elites from Romania proper. Orthodox nationalists sought to overcome the confessional division of the titular nation and stop the activities of the Uniates, who also claimed to become the "national church". The Romanians wanted to look like a whole, homogeneous nation, especially when it came to Jews. Unlike in Yugoslavia, where the Central European traditions of the Archdiocese of Karlovac were marginalized in comparison with the Old Church traditions of the Kingdom of Serbia, in Greater Romania Transylvanian Orthodoxy played a more significant role. This state of affairs has developed primarily because the Church has obtained privileges from the state that it never had in the Danubian principalities. Relying on the myth of pressure from national and social enemies (including communists and non-believers), the Church used these privileges for internal mission and national religious activities. 72 Some Orthodox ideologists later came to the creation of a religiously-tinged fascist "Legion of the Archangel Michael" 73.
After the war, communist Romania initially settled scores with anti-modern Orthodox christians, but as the government increasingly distanced itself from Moscow, it eased pressure on the church. In Romanian national communism, which was established by the 1960s, there was, as in Bulgaria, a general state tendency to build a cult of the nation. However, since Romanian Orthodoxy was much stronger institutionally than Bulgarian Orthodoxy, the development took a different path. Despite still maintaining strict control, the Romanian Orthodox Church has become, in a sense, a "state within a state" and has gained a high parallel authority in the eyes of society, preserving its own, different picture of the world and embodying an alternative, religious one.
7.9%, Germans-4.1%, Jews-4%, Ruthenians-3.2%, Russians-2.3%, Bulgarians-2%, Gypsies-1.5%, Turks-0.5% See Maner, N.-S. "Multiconfessionalitat", s. 359.
72. Zub, A. (2002) "Die rumanische Orthodoxie im ideen- und kulturgeschichtlichen Kontext der Zwischenkriegszeit", in Maner, H. -C. und Schulze Wessel, M. (eds) Religion im Nationalstaat zwischen den Weltkriegen 1918 - 1939, ss. 179 - 188. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
73. Iordachi, C. (2004) Charisma, Politics and Violence. The Legion of the "Archangel Michael" in Inter-war Romania. Trondheim: Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures and Societies.
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way. Thus, thanks to the policy of the Romanian Communists, the Orthodox component of nationalism was weakened, but not lost.74
After Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown in 1989, the Romanian Orthodox Church held a much stronger social position than any other Orthodox Church in former communist countries. The Church tried to unite with the" new " secular elite and use active nationalist rhetoric to hide its own collaboration with the old regime. On the other hand, Romanian Orthodoxy, like no other, was able to offer a disoriented society recipes for solving new problems, since the church managed to preserve its intellectual potential since the interwar period. The position of the Church is relatively well understood and extremely conservative, and yet it is trying to take part in the course of the country's integration into the European Union. As in the case of Serbia, Western Europeans watch with surprise bordering on horror as the anti-pluralist attitudes of the 1930s and 1940s are used to justify Romania's path to a European future.75
Finally, let's look at Serbia. For the Serbian elite, Yugoslavia was a territory that exceeded their wildest dreams, but it was too large for their goals to be realized. Along with the triumph of 1918, there was a fear that the country would be dominated by non-Serbs and non-Orthodox, who in total were the majority and who had their own influential elites. 76 To prevent this, attempts were made to prevent this from happening.-
74. См. анализ у: Gillet, O. (1997) Religion et nationalisme, L'ideologic de l'eglise orthodoxe roumaine sous le regime communiste. Bruxelles: Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles.
75. Flora, G., Szylagyi, G. "Church, Identity, Politics". For a radically different view of the role of the Orthodox Church among religious and secular intellectuals today, see Marga, I., Sander, G., Sandu, D. (eds) (2007) Religion zwischen Kirche, Staat und Gesellschaft. Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac. (see the pro-Orthodox article by Irimi Marg and the text clearly criticizing Orthodoxy by Monika Vlad and Nicoleta Kostea).
76. In the interwar census, there was no question of nationality. According to 1921 data, 46.7% of Orthodox Christians, 39.5% of Catholics, 11.2% of Muslims and 1.8% of Protestants lived in Yugoslavia. According to the combination of features of the native language and religious and territorial affiliation, Holm Sundhaussen provides the following data on the largest national (ethnic) groups: 41.1% of Serbs, 1.6% of Montenegrins, 23.1% of Croats, 8.1% of Slovenes,
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ai to strengthen your own superiority. Part of this strategy was to support the Orthodox Church. Orthodoxy would not only build a defensive wall against Catholics in the west, but also become a tool for achieving internal homogeneity, while also opposing other Orthodox Christians (in Macedonia).77.
The revenge of the belittled Yugoslav nations followed during World War II and took horrific forms-especially in the Croatian Ustashe state. In the Serbian Orthodox community, the persecutions of the Second World War were perceived as trials sent by the Lord for "his" people, as martyrdom - the highest proof of faith. Tito's socialism in the first post-war years was also considered alien to the rule of his arch-enemy, the Croat, and the national-neutral cult of partisans was rejected as a deceptive maneuver. Although the Serbian Orthodox Church in socialist Yugoslavia was better off than the Catholic Church, which was constantly under suspicion, there was no question of a stable agreement like in Bulgaria or Romania. Many Serbian communists would also be happy to choose the path of "national communism", in which there would be a place for the church. But this was hindered by the socialist national policy, which over time was increasingly directed against Serbian hegemony. Thus, a national-Communist-Orthodox union was impossible. Among the Serbs, under a conformist cover, often dictated by the realization of their own weakness, emotions were seething. Alternative images of "holy" and "united" Serbia were popular in dissident circles. This explains why the clergy have been actively involved in national and religious mobilization since the late 1980s. What was perceived as aggression was based on an underlying suspicion that the Communists intended to continue the dismemberment of Serbia and its church. Decommunization, therefore, should have meant that Serbia would take its obviously dominant position, that is, the status of the most worthy, and the investigator-
5.3% Bosnian Muslims, 4.6% Macedonians, 3.6% Germans, 3.4% Albanians, 2.5% Turks, etc. (Sundhaussen, H. (2007) Geschichte Serbiens. ig. - 21. Jahrhundert, s. 491. Wien, Koln, Weimar: Bohlau Verlag).
77. Buchenau, K. Auf russischen Spuren, pp. 173 - 221.
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but, and the most influential nation 78. This is exactly what the church, or at least its most influential representatives, called for when the country's disintegration was accompanied by military conflicts. At the same time, the external threat scenario became so firmly embedded in the Serbian consciousness that Serbian armed actions were almost always interpreted as defensive actions.
Let's sum up the results. The strong sacralization of power in Romania and Serbia had sometimes common and sometimes different prerequisites. An important similarity lies in the fact that the" national " states created in 1918 caused considerable rejection among Orthodox Christians. In both Romania and Yugoslavia, the claims to hegemony of the largest nations have been challenged by culturally and economically strong minorities (religious or national). While the sacralization of Serbs became possible primarily during the wars, in the context of polarized historical memory, the sacralization of Romanians can be interpreted as a consequence of a strong, developed Orthodox tradition.
Against this background, the Bulgarian example can be considered the most moderate. This was due to the combination of a weak church and a homogeneous state, both in the national and religious sense. The sacralization of the nation here was also hindered by the fact that Bulgaria fought longer and harder than others against the Patriarchate of Constantinople for its own recognition and was heavily dependent on Greek Orthodoxy as an instrument of imperial power.
Translated from the German by Taisiya Belyakova
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