As noted in the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", the Soviet people and their Armed Forces under the leadership of the Communist Party not only defended the freedom and independence of the socialist Motherland, defended the cause of October, but also " made a decisive contribution to in the liberation of the peoples of Europe from fascist slavery, in the salvation of world civilization, they honorably fulfilled their patriotic and international duty. " 1
The results of the war, the changes that took place on the globe as a result of the collapse of fascism, still cause irritation and anger in the reaction camp. In an effort to denigrate the USSR, to hold it responsible for the Second World War created by imperialism, and to whitewash its true perpetrators, bourgeois historiography distorts the foreign policy of the Soviet state in the pre-war years and at the beginning of World War II. This also applies to the history of Soviet-Romanian relations, the falsification of which is used to justify not only the participation of military-fascist Romania in the war against the USSR, but also the attack of Hitler's Germany on our country. Soviet historical science paid much attention to the problems of Soviet-Romanian relations on the eve and at the beginning of World War II. The works of Soviet historians note the anti-Soviet foreign policy of the Romanian bourgeois governments, reveal the real reasons for the participation of military-fascist Romania in the war against the USSR .2
In recent years, in the context of the international situation that has become more acute due to the American reaction, the imperialist missile defense system has-

1 Pravda, 17. VI. 1984.

2 Cm.: Lebedev N. I. Romania during the Second World War. Foreign and domestic political history of Romania in 1939-1945, Moscow, 1961. The Fall of the Antonescu Dictatorship, Moscow, 1966. "The Iron Guard", Karol II and Hitler (from the history of Romanian fascism, the monarchy and the foreign policy "game on two tables"). Moscow, 1968; his. The collapse of fascism in Romania. M. 1976 (ed. 2-E. M. 1983); Yazkova A. A., Romania on the eve of the Second World War 1934-1939. M. 1963; Kopansky Ya. M., Levit I. E. Soviet-Romanian relations 1929-1934 (from signing the Moscow Protocol to establishing diplomatic relations). M. 1971 Kolker B. M., Levit I. E. Foreign policy of Romania and Romanian-Soviet relations (September 1939-June 1941). Moscow, 1971; Lazarev A.M. Moldavian Soviet statehood and the Bessarabian question. Kishinev 1974; Kopansky Ya. M. International solidarity with the struggle of the workers of Bessarabia for reunification with the Soviet Motherland (1918-1940). Kishinev. 1975; Shevyakov A. A. Soviet-Romanian relations and the problem of European security in 1932-1939, Moscow, 1977; Levit I. E. Participation of fascist Romania in the aggression against the USSR Origins, plans, implementation (1. IX. 1939-19. XI. 1942). Chisinau. 1981; his own. The collapse of the policy of aggression of the Antonescu dictatorship (19. XI. 1942-23. VIII. 1944). Chisinau. 1983; and others.

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paganda intensified attempts to falsify the history of Soviet-Romanian relations. Reactionary bourgeois historiography, when covering the reasons for the entry of fascist Romania into the war against the USSR, operates mainly on two theses: on the "Russian threat" and on the desire of Romania to "regain" Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The myth of the" Soviet threat " to Romania became an integral part of the notorious thesis, widely propagated to this day in the West, about the alleged "preventive" nature of the war of Germany and its allies against the USSR .3 Bourgeois falsifiers try to present the liberation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by Soviet troops in June 1940 as an event that determined the turn in the policy of not only royal Romania, but also Hitler's Germany.

The legend of the" Soviet threat " to Romania is not new. It was invented by Hitler's propaganda to justify a treacherous attack on the Soviet Union. One of the heads of Goebbels 'department, G. Zundemann, later wrote that he was assigned to" develop a general argument for the reasons for the attack on the USSR" and recommended that they "also put the thesis that Germany is also fighting in defense of small allied peoples, in particular the Romanian (refer to the events of June 1940 related to Bessarabia) "4 . In post-war bourgeois historiography, the versions about the "Soviet threat" and the defense of Romania's "national rights" in the war were persistently promoted by former political and military figures, journalists and other people from Romanian bourgeois-landowner circles who fled the country. It was they who set and continue to set the tone in the West in covering the history of Soviet-Romanian relations .5
The "concept" of Soviet-Romanian relations fabricated by former figures of royal Romania on the eve and at the beginning of World War II was adopted by reactionary historians of the West in order to discredit the foreign policy of the Soviet state, to create the impression that the Soviet note of June 26, 1940 of Romania pushed the latter "into the arms of Hitler", and it was Russia " was forced to become an ally of Germany in the war against the USSR. This" threat "and" anxiety for the fate of Romania "allegedly caused Hitler to" turn his armies to the East " 6 . Of course, not all of them

3 For a critique of the "theory" of "Soviet expansionism" and "preventive war", see Zhilin P. A., Yakushevsky A. S., Kulkov E. N. Critique of the main concepts of Bourgeois historiography of the Second World War, Moscow, 1983, pp. 92-109.

4 Sundermann H. Tagesparolen. Deutsche Presseweisungen 1939 - 1945. Hitler-Propaganda und Kriegsfiihrung. Leoni-Starnberger See. 1973. S. 167.

5 Gafenco G. Preliminaires de la guerre a l'Est. De l'accord de Moscou (21 aofit 1939) aux histolites en Russie (22 juin 1941). Fribourg. 1944; Cretzianu A. The Soviet Ultimatum to Remania. - Journal of Central European Affairs, January, 1950, vol. IX, N 4; ejusd. La politique de paix de la Roumanie a l'egard de l'Union Sovietique. P. 1954; Chirnoaga P. Istoria politica si militara a razboiului Romaniei contra Rusiei Sovietice. 22 iunie 1941 - 23 august 1944. Madrid. 1965; Aspects des relations russo - roumaines. Retrospective et orientations. P. 1967; Sturdza M. The Suicide of Europe. Memoirs of Prince Mishael Sturdza, Former Minister of Rumania. Boston-Los Angeles, 1968 (also available in the London edition of 1971); Dim a N. Bessarabia and Bucovina: The Soviet-Romanian Territorial Dispute. Boulder (Col.). 1982.

6 Westphal West etc. Fateful Decisions, Moscow, 1958, p. 59; Fabry P. W. Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939-1941, Fin Beitrag zur Methode sowjetischer Aussenpolitik. Darmstadt. 1962, S. 224 - 225, 278 - 279; ejusd Die Sowjetunion und das Dritte Reich. Eine doku-mentierte Geschichte der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen von 1933 bis 1941. Stuttgart. 1971, S. 233; Gustawson K. Europe in the World Communitv since 1939. Boston. 1971, p. 160; Weber H. Die Bukowina im zweiten Weltkrieg. Volkerrechtliche Aspekte der Lage der Bukowina im Spannungsfeld zwischen Rumanien, der Sowjetunion und Deutschland. Hamburg 1972, S. 27; Olshausen K. Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkati. Die deutsche Politik gegenuber Jugoslawien und Griechenland von Marz bis Juli 1941. Stuttgart. 1973. S. 54; Allard S. Stalin und Hitler. Die sowjet-russische Aussenpolitik 1930 - 1941. Bern-Munchen. 1974, S. 212; Sudosteuropa-Handbuch. Bd. II. Rumanien, Gottingen. 1977. S. 200.

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bourgeois historians, for all their tendentiousness, interpret the events of 1940-1941 in this spirit. In the face of the irrefutable facts presented at the trials of the main war criminals in Nuremberg, Bucharest, etc., as well as contained in the collections of diplomatic and military documents published after the war, some of them are forced to admit that the Nazis and their allies have anti-Soviet plans, to assess Germany's policy in the Balkans in a different way, the essence of"Romania, etc. But this article is not about them, but about the failure of the" concepts " of Gafencu, Kretsyanu, Kirnoaga, Fabri, Allard, Sturdza and other anti-Soviets.

At one time, V. I. Lenin emphasized:: "War is the continuation of politics by other means. Every war is inseparably bound up with the political system from which it flows. The very policy that a certain Power, a certain class within that Power, conducted for a long time before the war, inevitably and inevitably continues during the war, changing only the form of action. " 7 After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the exploiting classes of Romania, frightened by its impact on the Romanian workers, actively joined the conspiracy of Western imperialists and the Russian counter-revolution against the young Soviet state. As Lenin pointed out at the beginning of 1918, there was a close alliance of "the Ryabushinskys" with "the capitalist gentlemen of France and England, and with the Rumanian king." 8
Having long harbored plans to seize Bessarabia, the Royal Rumania, instigated by the Western imperialists, in collusion with the counter-revolutionary Russian command of the Rumanian Front, the leaders of the Sfatul Tsarii and the Ukrainian Rada, was the first among the capitalist states to undertake a military intervention against the Country of the Soviets. It brutally suppressed the revolutionary actions of the Russian soldiers of the Romanian front, invaded the territory of Bessarabia and, despite the protests of the workers who came out with weapons in their hands in defense of the gains of October, at the beginning of 1918 occupied this region, eliminating Soviet power on its territory .9 In this connection, on January 13(26), 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR decided to break off diplomatic relations with Romania .10 At the end of 1918 , ignoring the will of the Ukrainian laborers, 11 who made up the majority of the population of Northern Bukovina, Royal Romania occupied this region as well. The troops of Royal Romania tried to penetrate to the left bank of the Dniester, but in February 1918 they were repulsed by Soviet units in the area of Ribnica-Soldanesti.

The fear of complete defeat, the energetic measures of the Soviet government, and the incessant struggle of the working people in the occupied areas forced the Romanian government to sign an agreement on March 5-9, 1918, according to which it pledged to withdraw its troops from Bessarabia within two months, and "not to take any military, hostile or other actions against the All-Russian Federation of Soviet Republics of Workers and Peasants and don't support it-

7 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 32, p. 79.

8 Ibid., vol. 35, p. 296.

9 For more information, see: Antonyuk D. I. et al. Victory of Soviet Power in Moldavia, Moscow, 1978; Melnik S. K. Struggle for Soviet power in the Danube Region and reunification with the Ukrainian SSR (1917-1940). Kiev - Odessa. 1978; and others.

10 Dokumenty vneshnoi politiki SSSR (DVP SSSR) [Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR (DVP SSSR)].

11 See the decision of the People's Veche of 3. XI. 1918 in Chernovtsy. В кн.: Боротьба трудящих Буковини за соціальне и національне визволення і возз?еднання з Українською РСР. 1917 - 1941. Док. і м-ли. Чернівці. 1958, pp. 125-126.

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such actions taken by other States"12 . Foreign authors prefer to keep silent about this treaty or pass it off as a manifestation of the" peacefulness " of the government of Royal Romania, headed by the reactionary General A. Averescu.

Meanwhile, the Romanian oligarchy did not even think about its implementation. Taking advantage of the occupation of Ukraine by Austro-German troops, it took the path of annexing Bessarabia and turning its territory into a springboard for an attack on the Country of the Soviets. Using the staged "vote" of the self-styled counter-revolutionary Sfatul Tsarii, first for the conditional (April 9, 1918) and then for the unconditional (December 10 , 1918) annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania, 13 the royal government proclaimed the incorporation of the captured Bessarabia into Rumania.

The Soviet government, of course, could not recognize the self-styled "Sfatul tsarii", this "wreck of a nationalist organization", as one of the Soviet notes says, as the right to decide the fate of the region, could not "remain deaf to the groans of the population of Bessarabia, suppressed by a foreign yoke." The statements and numerous notes of the governments of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR addressed to the Royal Rumania and Western countries expressed a strong protest against the occupation of Bessarabia, indicating that the decisions of the "Sfatul tsarii", as well as the so-called Paris or Bessarabian Protocol signed by England, France, Italy and Japan on October 28, 1920, recognizing the annexation of Bessarabia Romania, are devoid of any international legal force and are not recognized by the Governments of the Soviet republics .14 In a note dated May 1, 1919, addressed to Romania, the Government of the Ukrainian SSR demanded that the workers of Bukovina be granted the right to self-determination and that Romanian troops be withdrawn from the occupied territories .15
The ruling circles of royal Romania were not averse to seizing other Moldavian and Ukrainian lands. Late 1918-early 1919 they provided the territory of Romania and Bessarabia for the intervention of the Entente troops in Ukraine and in the left-bank regions of Moldova. Together with the French troops, Romanian units also moved to the left bank of the Dniester, but were repulsed by the Red Army. In 1919-1921, Royal Romania provided assistance to Denikin, Petliura, Wrangel and other anti-Soviet forces, provided shelter to their defeated gangs, and staged provocations on the Dniester. In the notes of the Governments of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR addressed to Royal Romania, protests were repeatedly expressed against these hostile actions, and their incompatibility with normal relations between the two countries was pointed out .16 Anti-Sovietism continued to be the most important feature of Royal Romania's foreign policy. Repeated attempts by the Soviet country to resolve all disputed issues peacefully were met with stubborn resistance by Royal Romania, supported by the imperialists of the West. When its diplomats sat down at the negotiating table, they conditioned the normalization of relations between the two countries on the recognition of Romania's annexation of Soviet territories. This, in particular, led to the disruption of the Soviet-Romanian conferences in Warsaw (1921) and Vienna (1924), as well as the negotiations on the independence of the Soviet Union.-

12 DVP SSSR. T. I. p. 210.

13 For more information, see: Antonyuk D. I., Aftenyuk S. Ya., Esaulenko A. S., Itkis M. B. The treacherous role of Sfatul Tserii. Chisinau. 1969.

14 DVP SSSR. Vol. I, p. 242, 248-249; vol. II. m. 1958, p. 64, 148-151; vol. III. m. 1959, p. 312; vol. V. M. 1961, p. 208, 301, 366, 401, 672; vol. VI. Moscow, 1962, p. 346.

15 Боротьба трудящих Буковини, с. 172 - 173.

16 See DVP SSSR. Vol. III, pp. 340-341, 383-384; vol. IV. Moscow, 1960, p. 16, 57, 89, 269, 541 - 545; Foreign policy of the USSR. Sb. dokl. T. P. M. 1944, p. 4, 8.

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non-aggression Pact (1932) 17 . The harassment of the Romanian ruling circles was always met with a proper rebuff by the Soviet government.

The international situation that developed in the early 1930s, which increased, especially with Hitler's rise to power, the threat of a new world war, and the latter's open calls for revising the Versailles treaty system forced France and the states of Central and South - Eastern Europe, including Romania, following in the wake of its policy, to look for ways to establish relations with the Soviet Union, the international prestige of which has grown from year to year. In July 1933, Romania, together with other States, signed the convention on the definition of aggressor proposed by the USSR in London. On June 9, 1934, after 17 years of persistent unwillingness of the Romanian oligarchy to recognize the Soviet state, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and Romania. The Soviet Government, as well as when signing in February 1929 with the participation of Romania the Moscow Protocol on the early entry into force of the Briand - Kellogg Pact, stipulated that the London Conventions and the exchange of letters on the establishment of diplomatic relations did not resolve existing territorial disputes between the USSR and Romania.

This did not prevent some bourgeois historians, jurists, and politicians from interpreting the aforementioned documents as an indirect recognition by the Soviet Union of Bessarabia as a Romanian territory. Meanwhile, it is known that after the signing of the London Conventions, M. M. Litvinov, speaking at the fourth session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on December 29, 1933, said:"The fact that this act was committed despite the fact that old disputes with one of these countries - Romania - have not yet been resolved, only increases its significance." As for the conditions under which diplomatic relations were established, they can best be described by an entry from Litvinov's diary, which says that the Romanian Foreign Minister N. Titulescu tried to get "promises that we would never raise the Bessarabian issue, and I had to give him a decisive rebuff in the presence of Benes"19 .

After June 1934, there was a definite improvement in Soviet-Romanian relations. Titulescu supported the idea of creating a collective security system in Europe with the participation of the USSR. Along with the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance pacts concluded in May 1935, the proposed mutual assistance pact between the USSR and Romania was to become one of its links.

But from the very beginning, this political line met with sharp resistance from the Romanian fascist parties (the Iron Guard, the National Christian Defense League) and other extreme right-wing forces. From the rostrum of the parliament and from the pages of the reactionary press, voices were heard saying that only Hitler's Germany "can satisfy the interests of the economy and defense of Romania in the event of a conflict", that it is necessary to imitate the "Polish example" 20, that is, to take

17 Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. II, pp. 173-182; DVP SSSR, vol. VII, Moscow, 1963, p. 4. 164 - 169, 172 - 174, 176 - 179; For more information, see: Kopansky Ya. M., Levit I. E. Uk. soch., pp. 75-115.

18 Tatarescu Gh. Evacuarea Basarabiei si a Bucovinei de Nord. Craiova. 1940, p. 22; Mosely Ph. Is Bessarabia Next? - Foreign Affairs, April, 1940, vol. 18, N 3, p. 559; S uga A. Die volkerrechtliche Lage Bessarabiens in der gesehichtlichen Entwicklung des Landes. Bonn. 1958, S. 5.

19 Litvinov M. Foreign Policy of the USSR. Ed. 2-E. M. 1937, p. 68; Archive of Foreign Policy of the USSR. From the diary of M. M. Litvinov. For more information about the position of the Soviet government and the failure of the claims of bourgeois authors, see Kopansky Ya. M., Levit I. E Uk. op., p. 38 - 46, 137 - 140, 169 - 173.

20 Cuza A. S. Indrumari de politica externa. Discursuri parlamentare rostite in ami 1920 - 1936. Bucuresti. 1941. p. 11; Axa, 1.X.1933.

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a course of rapprochement with the Reich. Although at that time the old pro-French course remained in Romania's foreign policy, influential political figures (G. Bratianu, O. Goga, A. Vaida-Voivode, I. Dzhigurtu, etc.) and the king began to strongly advocate friendship with nazi Germany, trying to enlist its support in Romania's territorial disputes with its neighbors. The Romanian reaction was particularly attracted by the anti-communist and anti-Soviet appeals of the Nazis. The consequence of this was the refusal of the Romanian rulers from the course of creating a collective security system in Europe. In August 1936, a supporter of this policy, N. Titulescu, was removed from his post. Opponents of improving relations with the Soviet Union prevailed.

The internal political development of Romania followed the path of increased fascization. The activities of fascist parties and anti-Soviet emigrant organizations intensified in the country, and a wave of repressions hit the democratic forces. In the field of foreign policy, the Romanian oligarchy, after the removal of Titulescu, took a course of rapprochement with Hitler's Germany and fascist Italy, as well as with the reactionary Yugoslav government of M. Stojadinovic and especially with Poland.

All this could not but cause concern in the USSR. In letters and telegrams to the Soviet plenipotentiary in Bucharest, M. S. Ostrovsky, dated October 13, 1936 and February 22, 1937, the NKID drew attention to the readiness of Romania "for a broad rapprochement with Germany", and to the fact that rapprochement with Poland "should be considered as directed against the USSR, because this rapprochement should pursue no other goals." it can't"21 . In conversations with the Romanian Prime Minister G. Tatarescu, the Minister of Internal Affairs and. Inculets and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Antonescu Soviet diplomats repeatedly and with concern spoke about the excessive closeness of the Romanian leadership with the pro-fascist governments of Yugoslavia and especially Poland, pointed out that "Romania has firmly taken the path of Polish, and therefore anti-Soviet policy", that the activation of the Romanian-Polish alliance, accompanied by anti-Soviet political and military demonstrations, is beginning to turn into a threat to the cause of peace"22 . Soviet diplomats also drew attention to the growing anti-Soviet hysteria in Romania, the use of the rostrum of the parliament for this purpose, the open anti-Soviet attacks of the Romanian authorities, including by members of the government, the resumption of provocations by the Romanian military on the Dniester, etc .23.

By hypocritically declaring to Soviet diplomats that Romania wished to "maintain relations of friendship and cordial good-neighborliness with Russia," 24 the reactionary Romanian rulers were in fact strengthening the anti-Soviet orientation of their policy every day. Romanian-Soviet relations deteriorated especially sharply with the coming to power on December 29, 1937 of the government of O. Goga, one of the leaders of the fascist National Christian Party, who set out to achieve the conclusion of friendship agreements with Hitler's Germany and fascist Italy .25 In this situation, the Soviet government recalled its envoy from Bucharest, considering it inappropriate to have a diplomat of this rank in the Romanian capital.

21 DVP SSSR. T. XIX. M. 1975, p. 478; t. XX. m. 1976, p. 93.

22 Ibid., vol. XX, p. 94 - 100, 377 - 379, 420 - 423, 736 - 737 etc.

23 Ibid., vol. XIX, pp. 576-578; vol. XX, pp. 53, 94, 99, 333.

24 Ibid., vol. XIX, pp. 433, 438, 455, 496; vol. XX, p. 52, 99, 100, 420, 719, 736, 737 etc.

25 See Kolker B. M. Foreign Policy of the Gogi Government (December 1937-February 1938). In: Balkan Historical Collection. III. Chisinau. 1973.

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The Goga government cleared the way for the establishment of a royal dictatorship in Romania. In an environment of increasing international tension, the Romanian oligarchy, maneuvering between the Anglo-French and Italo-German blocs, contributed to undermining the efforts of the USSR aimed at creating a system of collective security. In September 1938, by refusing to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack on it by Germany, Royal Romania objectively contributed to the implementation of Hitler's plans to dismember its ally in the Small Entente .26 The Romanian envoy to Rome, A. Zamfirescu, in conversations with the Italian Foreign Minister, repeatedly characterized the refusal to allow Soviet troops to help Czechoslovakia as proof of Romania's services to Germany and Italy .27 Karol II, who paid a visit to Hitler in November 1938, declared that "Romania has always been against Russia" and promised to continue "never to allow the passage of Russians through the territory of Romania" 28 .

The extremely reactionary forces of Romania, which rightly regarded the policy of Western powers 'refusal to create a collective security system and connivance with Hitler's invaders as the beginning of a broad anti-Soviet alliance, were preparing to become participants in a" crusade " against the USSR. Insemnari sociologice magazine, published by the ideologist of Romanian fascism T. Breileanu, published an article with an unambiguous title: "Romanian imperialism as a national ideal". It said: "Romania should orient its policy towards the east. To do this, it is necessary to enlighten the popular consciousness in the direction of imperialism to the east and to organize our army so that it will be able to advance to the east when the moment comes."29 It is no coincidence that in the second half of the 1930s, the fuss over the issue of the so-called Trans-Dniester Romanians intensified. Books, pamphlets, articles were published, magazines were published, such as" Transnistria"," Tribuna Romanilor transnistrieni", etc., on the pages of which a slanderous campaign was waged against the USSR, and in particular the Moldavian ASSR, the concept of the" historical space of Romanians " was developed, the borders of which were defined up to the Bug, the Dnieper and beyond. N. Smokine, a White immigrant who found shelter in Bucharest, called for " patience on the way to spiritual unification with the Transdniestrian brothers "and assured that all this "will lead to victory" 30.

Meanwhile, when, after the capture of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis, the threat of German aggression also loomed over Romania, it was the Soviet Government that on March 18, 1939, proposed to convene a conference of representatives of the USSR, Britain, France, Poland, Romania and Turkey to discuss the issue of providing assistance to Romania in the event of fascist aggression, moreover, in a telegram to NK. On the EID, the Soviet envoy to England was told that " it would be best to meet in Romania, which would immediately strengthen its position." However, the rulers of the west-

26 See: Yazkova A. A. The Small Entente and Munich. - New and recent History, 1967, N 4; Kolker B. M. The Romanian government and the Munich conspiracy. In: Balkan Historical Collection, I. Kishinev. 1968.

27 Historical and Diplomatic Archive of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter-IDA), f. Microfilms of Romanian documents. Dosarui: Italia. Telegrama Legatiunei din Roma N 2237, 27 Decembrie 1938; Raportul N 4051 din 25 Julie 1939.

28 Documents on German Foreign Policy (1918 - 1945) (DGFP). Ser. D. (1937 - 1945). Vol. VIII. Lnd. 1954, p. 339.

29 Cit. by: Gall E. Sociologia burgeza din Romania. In Studii critice. Bucuresti. 1958, p. 253.

30 Smochina N. P. Republica moldoveneasca a sovietelor. Bucuresti. 1938, p. 30.

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Some countries rejected this constructive proposal, citing Romania's refusal to receive assistance from the USSR .31 A few days later, on March 23, 1939, yielding to pressure from Germany, Royal Romania signed an economic agreement with the Nazis, which became a milestone on the way to losing the country's national independence. Its conclusion was rightly regarded in the USSR as a serious step not only in the economic and political subordination of Romania to German imperialism, but also as an increased threat to the security of the USSR in the south - west .32
Together with its ally Poland, Royal Rumania contributed to the disruption of the Anglo - Franco-Soviet negotiations held in Moscow in March-August 193933 . Romanian Foreign Minister Gafencu, who was in Berlin on April 18-20, assured the German rulers that Romania would not agree to participate in any pact together with the USSR. 34 In his memoirs, Gafencu later admitted that the British government "was happy to highlight the objections of Poland and Rumania in order to limit the obligations that the Soviet Union could assume"35, in other words, to delay negotiations until they could reach an agreement with the Nazis behind their backs.

The conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939, caused confusion in the Romanian ruling circles. Their calculations for the anti-Soviet crusade of the united imperialist forces were not justified this time. By declaring "neutrality"at the beginning of World War II and continuing the old" two-table game " policy, the rulers of Royal Romania hoped to maintain their borders established by the Versailles treaty system. In words, they called for the normalization of relations with the USSR, but in reality they did not take any measures in this direction. They continued to build their relations with the imperialist powers on the same anti-Soviet basis, strenuously seeking the support of both the Italian-German and Anglo-French blocs in the Bessarabian question, ran around with the idea of creating a "neutral bloc" from the countries of South - Eastern Europe under the auspices of fascist Italy, directed against the USSR, incited anti-Soviet hysteria, called on political leaders to leaders of the belligerent powers to conclude peace in the name of fighting communism and the "Soviet threat" 36 .

Steps were also taken towards rapprochement with fascist Italy, which is not yet at war. G. Tatarescu, who again headed the Romanian government from November 24, 1939, in his "Note" entitled "Our foreign Policy", which he submitted to the archive of the Romanian Academy in 1943, noted with satisfaction that Italy at the end of 1939 "did not abandon its anti-Bolshevik positions on any issue. Therefore, the negotiations were conducted within the framework of frankness." Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano approved the anti-Soviet position of the Romanian rulers, calling on them to fight "with weapons in their hands" in the name of "pan-European interest"37 .

31 The USSR in the struggle for peace on the eve of World War II (September 1938-August 1939). Doc. Moscow, 1971, pp. 246, 257.

32 Ibid., pp. 283-284.

33 See for more details: Parsadanova V. S. Soviet-Polish and Soviet-Romanian relations on the eve of the Second World War. Voprosy istorii, 1984, No. 3.

34 Hillgruber A. Hitler, Konig Carol und Marschall Antonescu. Die deutschrumanischen Beziehungen 1938 - 1944. Wiesbaden. 1965, S. 51.

35 Gafenco G. Derniers jours de l'Europe, un vojage diplomatique en 1939. P. 1946, pp. 165 - 166.

36 For more information, see Kolker B. M., Levit I. E. Uk. soch., pp. 16-55.

37 IDA, F. Microfilms of Romanian documents. Memoriul d-lui Tatarescu, "Politica noastra externa"; Dosarul: Italia. Telegrama N 7343, 24 Decembrie 1939.

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Inspired by the hostile position of Italy towards the USSR, the news of the Anglo-French expeditionary corps being sent to help the White Finns, and the concentration of the army of French General M. Weygand in the Middle East, near Baku, the rulers of Royal Romania turned to open anti-Soviet provocations. In early 1940, Karol II made a demonstrative trip to occupied Bessarabia, where he made a belligerent speech, declaring that the territory between the Prut and the Dniester "will forever be Romanian." Similarly demonstrative were the visiting meeting of the Romanian government held in Chisinau at the end of January and Tatarescu's statement that" The Prut today unites, not divides " Bessarabia and Romania .38
At the same time, the royal authorities intensified the fascization of domestic life. With each change in the composition of the Romanian government, the positions of politicians known for their sympathies and connections with the Nazis were strengthened. This was to inspire the confidence of the fascist states in the regime of Karol II .39 In March 1940, after a hypocritical "repentance", members of the "Iron Guard" who had previously been arrested for terrorist acts and speeches against the king and his Camarilla were released from prison. At the same time, repressions against Communists and all democratic forces that called for normalization of relations with the USSR became more frequent. The liberation movement in the occupied Soviet territories was particularly severely suppressed.

The Romanian reaction was deeply disappointed by the signing of the peace treaty between the USSR and Finland on March 12, 1940. Hopes of turning the Soviet-Finnish war into a crusade against the Soviet Union were dashed. At the same time, the belief of the Romanian rulers in the possibility of obtaining effective support from England and France, which failed to prevent the defeat of the White Finns, was undermined. Soon after, the Romanian oligarchy had to be convinced of the illusory calculations for the help of Italy, which supported the territorial claims of the chortists to Romania. It would seem that in this situation, the rulers of Romania should have abandoned their anti-Soviet policy and looked for ways to improve relations with the USSR. However, they continued their adventurous course. As L. Patrascanu, a prominent figure of the Romanian Communist Party, wrote: "the anti-Soviet policy of the (Royal) dictatorship, culminating in the bellicose statements made by Karol II in Chisinau and Constanta in the winter and spring of 1940., deprived Romania and the support of the Soviet Union. By providing the territory of the country for all sorts of anti-Soviet intrigues and international machinations, the Karolist dictatorship did everything possible to maintain the most tense relations with the neighboring republic. " 40
In Royal Romania, military preparations were actively made against the USSR. Tens of thousands of reservists were conscripted under the guise of retraining. The requisition of transport began. All this put a heavy burden on the shoulders of the people, causing deep discontent. The workers of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina suffered especially, as the Romanian authorities ' military preparations were carried out mainly on the Dniester. At that time, Romania received large quantities of weapons from both Germany and the Western powers. On March 16, 1940, speaking on the radio, Tatarescu announced the opening of a new "emergency loan" for the needs of the army in the amount of 30 billion rubles. and Romania's readiness to "defend itself" from any attack. Three days later

38 Universul, 10, 29.I.1940.

39 See Lebedev N. I. The Collapse of fascism in Romania, pp. 258-259.

40 Patrascanu L. Sub trei dictaturi. Bucuresti. 1970, p. 186.

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Foreign Minister Gafencu, in his speech to Parliament, clarified that it was a question of "protecting the rights" obtained by Romania as a result of the "free expression of the will of historical assemblies" in Chisinau and Chernivtsi in 1918.41 and the reactionary bourgeois press pointedly marked the 22nd anniversary of the illegal decision of the Sfatul Ceri to annex Bessarabia to Romania. with great pomp.

The Soviet government could not ignore these provocative actions of the leaders of royal Romania. On March 29, in his report on foreign policy at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, V. M. Molotov recalled the existence of "an unresolved question, the question of Bessarabia, the seizure of which by Romania the Soviet Union never recognized, although it never raised the question of the return of Bessarabia by military means."42
The Romanian ruling circles now relied heavily on nazi Germany, believing that thanks to its interest in Romania's oil and other raw material resources, and in maintaining the status quo in the Balkans until the end of hostilities in the West, they would be able, with the support of the Reich, to maintain the borders established by the Versailles treaty system. March 30, 1940 Tatarescu met with the German envoy in Bucharest, V. Fabricius, and said that Romania considers it its most important task to achieve friendship with Germany - the only one who "is able to influence Moscow." The German envoy informed Berlin that the Romanian Prime Minister had declared his country's intention to continue arming itself and asked for German help. The next day, Fabritius reported on the assurances of Romania's Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Military Minister that they would orient its policy towards Germany, which should take on the responsibility of "defending" Romania from Russia. On April 15, the closest associate of Carol II, the Minister of the Royal Court E. Urdareanu, informed Fabricius that at a government meeting, the king announced his intention to "join the political line" pursued by Germany. Hinting that the latter might become master of the Danube estuary, the minister tried to convince Hitler's diplomat that "now and in the future it is important for Germany that the Danube estuary does not fall into the hands of a great power"43 , referring to the Soviet Union.

On May 16, 1940, Karol II received Fabricius. Admiring the German victories in the West, he stressed that " the future of Romania depends only on Germany." On May 25, Gafencu informed Fabricius of the King's desire to cooperate with Germany "in all areas." He also asked Berlin's advice on what kind of policy Romania should pursue with regard to the USSR, 44 in other words, he made it clear that his government was ready to follow German instructions in everything. On May 28, after Karol's meeting, where it was decided to "adapt to reality"45 and offer Berlin "friendship", Tatarescu, in the presence of Gafencu and Urdareanu, made an official statement to Fabricius that the Romanian government supports close cooperation with Germany "not only in the economic sphere, but also in all other areas." During the dinner, Fabritius reported to Berlin, Urdareanu once again stressed that " the king is no longer talking about neutrality, but is leaning towards Germany."46 Gafencu, who represented the former balancing policy, resigned, and was replaced by the fascist I. V. Yushchenko. Dzhigur-

41 Universul. 18. 21.III.1940.

42 Izvestiya, 30. III. 1940.

43 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. IX. Lnd. 1957, pp. 49, 61, 62, 167.

44 Ibid., pp. 349, 435.

45 GafencoG. Preliminaires de la Guerre a l'Est, pp. 330 - 333.

46 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. IX, pp. 466 - 467.

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tu, known for its pro-Hitler orientation. On the same day, May 28, 1940, the "oil pact" was signed, according to which the Romanian government pledged to meet all the demands of the Nazis regarding the supply of Romanian oil to Germany, moreover at prices much lower than world prices .

On June 20, 1940, i.e. two days before France signed the act of capitulation to nazi Germany, Tatarescu handed over a memorandum to the German envoy, which stated: "The government considers this cooperation (between Romania and Germany. - I. L.) dictated both by the geopolitical position of Romania and by the new order being established in Europe, essential in all areas. The Romanian government believes that the identity of interests that bound the two states in the past also determines their relations today and will determine them even more strongly tomorrow, and requires the rapid organization of this cooperation, which presupposes a strong Romania in political and economic relations, because only such a Romania is a guarantee that it will be able to fulfill its role of guardian on the Dniester and in the mouths of the Danube " 48 . Thus, the memorandum confirmed the anti-Soviet orientation of the Romanian-German military alliance, which was proposed to Germany by Karol. Trying to please Berlin, the king decided to give his rule a national socialist character outwardly. On June 21, the fascist totalitarian "Party of the Nation" was created, headed by Karol II himself. The process of turning Romania into a fascist state, which was especially accelerated with the establishment of the royal dictatorship, ended with the official recognition of the fascist ideology as the spiritual basis of the "new" state.

Thus, even before the Soviet note of Romania of June 26, 1940, the rulers of this country finally went over to the side of fascist Germany, repeatedly put forward proposals for cooperation with the Nazis in all areas, including in the military. The above documents on Romanian-German relations on the eve of the liberation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Soviet Union, which became known in the post-war years, convince us that the Soviet government correctly assessed the situation created as a result of the success of Hitler's Wehrmacht in the West, correctly identified the danger that it posed to the south-western regions of the USSR, for the and Northern Bukovina is a real threat of turning Royal Romania into a satellite of nazi Germany.

In this situation, the Soviet Union could not delay the resolution of the question of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The Soviet note to the Romanian Government of June 26, 1940, emphasized that the quickest resolution of the unresolved issues "inherited from the past" was necessary to "restore justice" and "finally lay the foundations for lasting peace between the countries", i.e., between the USSR and Romania .49 However, the Romanian oligarchy did not care about a lasting peace with its eastern neighbor. Having received the Soviet note, it sought to enlist the help of Germany and Italy in the event of a military conflict with the Soviet Union. However, at the end of June 1940, Germany and Italy were not ready for war against the USSR and advised Bucharest to "concede for the time being" 50 . This promising hint from Berlin and Rome was understood by the Romanian ruling elite. June 29, at

47 Ibid., pp. 459, 460.

48 Ibid., p. 657.

49 Pravda, 29. VI. 1940.

50 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. X. Lnd. 1957, p. 28; Ciano G. Journal politique. 1939 - 1943. Vol. I. Neuchatel. 1946, p. 28.

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On the second day after the liberation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Soviet Union, at a meeting convened in the royal palace, during which Bucharest's course of joining the fascist axis was once again confirmed, one of the royal advisers said: "Romania must be ready to participate on the side of the German troops at the moment when they attack... on the USSR". Another added: "The time is not lost yet. Even if the conflict does not happen soon, it is not far off."51 . On July 2, the King sent a message to Hitler reiterating his desire to cooperate with Germany in all areas and requesting that a military mission be sent to Romania. At the same time, Karol II launched a hackneyed version of the "Russian threat" to Romania .52 To prove his determination to go along with Germany, he put I. Dzhigurta at the head of the government on July 4.

Hitler was in no hurry to formalize a military-political alliance with fascist Romania, knowing that there was no "Russian threat". Meanwhile, he used the insistence of the Rumanian rulers to present himself as a "benefactor" of Hungary and Bulgaria and yoke them to the chariot of German politics. He demanded that Carol II first resolve Romania's territorial disputes with both of its neighbors, warning that this would not be possible without "self-sacrifice." 53
In August and. Gigurtu and Foreign Minister Manoilescu went to Salzburg for talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop. They agreed to territorial concessions to Hungary and Bulgaria with the subsequent exchange of population, but tried to get more favorable conditions for themselves from the Reich rulers. To win Hitler's favor, the Romanian emissaries promised to subordinate the country's economy to Germany's needs, asked for border guarantees, and offered to take on the role of arbiter if negotiations with Hungary and Bulgaria reached an impasse.

The Romanian-Bulgarian negotiations ended with the return of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria. Negotiations with Hungary, which took place in Turnu-Severin from August 16 to 24, 1940, ended in vain. Taking advantage of this, Ribbentrop and Ciano held an August 30 "arbitration" in Vienna in the Romanian-Hungarian territorial dispute, which resulted in Romania losing Northern and Northeastern Transylvania (half of their population was Romanians)54 . Romania was granted the requested Italo-German "guarantees" of territorial integrity within its new borders. After satisfying the demands of Hungary and Bulgaria, these "guarantees", which gave the Nazis a legal opportunity to occupy Romania under the guise of "protecting" it from an external "threat" and turn it into a military bridgehead, were primarily anti-Soviet in nature.

Trying to justify its capitulatory policy towards Nazi Germany and the betrayal of national interests, the ruling royal clique began spreading rumors about the "threat of a Soviet invasion" in Romania even during the Romanian-Hungarian negotiations in Turnu-Severin. To give them credibility, the Romanian military provoked incidents on the Soviet-Romanian border. On August 17-29, 1940, three notes of protest were presented to the Romanian mission in Moscow .55 In one of them, the USSR, wanting to eliminate all sorts of

51 Cit. by Savu Al. Gh. Dictatura regala (1938-1940). Bucuresti. 1970, pp. 357 - 358.

52 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. X, pp. 90 - 91.

53 Ibid., p. 116.

54 See Lebedev N. I. The Collapse of fascism in Romania, p. 282.

55 WUA of the USSR, f. 125, op. 23, d. 1, ll. 72, 73; Foreign policy of the USSR. Sb. dokl. Vol. IV. M. 1946, p. 522.

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border incidents, proposed the creation of a mixed Soviet-Romanian commission to demarcate the border. But the provocations continued in September. The newspaper Pravda exposed the provocative nature of rumors that the USSR was going to attack Romania and thus forced it to accept the Vienna dictate and accept the German-Italian "guarantees" 56 .

The true purpose of the Vienna "arbitration" is clearly indicated by the secret report on Italian-Romanian relations compiled by the Romanian Foreign Ministry on the instructions of I. Antonescu in 1942, which also thoroughly analyzes the events of the end of August 1940. In particular, it says that Germany " did not pursue the goal of eliminating the conflict between Hungary and Romania by the Vienna arbitration, but first of all to ensure military and economic positions in the preparation of a conflict with Russia."57 . In the report and in the documents attached to it, on the basis of which it is compiled, there is no mention of the" concentration "of Soviet troops, of the note of the USSR to Romania of August 29, 1940, which, according to the falsifiers of history, reflected the alleged "aggressive aspirations" of the Soviet Union, caused Hitler's "concern" for the fate of Romania and the whole world The Balkan Peninsula, and the Romanian rulers were forced to accept the Vienna dictate and accept the Italo-German "guarantees". It is unlikely that a well-informed author of the report could have forgotten about the "Russian threat" to Romania, if it really existed and influenced the Vienna decisions.

Moreover, it was during those August days that the Soviet Government took steps to establish good-neighborly relations with Romania. Gafencu, who at that time was appointed Romanian envoy to Moscow and who can hardly be suspected of sympathizing with the USSR, notes in his memoirs:: "At my first visit to Molotov on August 15, 1940, I was assured in the most categorical terms that the Soviet Union no longer had any claims against the Romanians and that it wished to develop peaceful and good-neighborly relations with Romania." Returning to this idea in the last sections of his book, he writes:: "The zeal with which the Soviet authorities requested the creation of a joint commission to mark the final line of the new border, as well as the hopes that these authorities expressed regarding the possibility of starting negotiations of an economic nature as soon as possible, seemed to confirm these good intentions."58
The establishment of the military legionary dictatorship in early September 1940, led by the fascist General I. Antonescu, ended the process of turning Royal Romania into a satellite of Hitler's Germany. Antonescu, this supposedly reluctant ally of Hitler, according to German diplomats themselves, "preached war against Russia with unprecedented constancy." 59 Fascist Romania began strenuously preparing for war against the USSR 60 . On September 15, 1940, in a conversation with Hitler's General K. Tippelskirch, who was specially sent to Bucharest, Antonescu insisted on sending motorized and air forces of the Wehrmacht to Romania as quickly as possible and on concluding a German-Romanian military alliance. The issue of creating and sending a military "mission" to Romania for the purpose of "reorganizing and arming the army based on the combat experience of the German army"was discussed. In a secret directive that appeared a few days later, signed by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief-

56 Pravda, 9. IX. 1940.

57 IDA, F. Microfilms of Romanian documents. - Dosarul: Italia.

58 Gafenco G. Preliminaire de la guerre a l'Est, pp. 62, 350.

59 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. XIII. Washington. 1964, p. 871.

60 For more information, see: Kolker B. M., Levit I. E. Uk. soch., pp. 170-192.

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It was stated in the report of the German Armed Forces by W. Keitel that the task of the military mission was to prepare the Romanian army for a joint offensive with the German army in the event of war. 61
In the second decade of October 1940, motorized and armored Wehrmacht troops and air units were sent to Romania. On November 20, 1940, during a visit to Berlin, Antonescu signed a treaty on the annexation of fascist Romania to the aggressive Triple Alliance. During a conversation with Hitler, he stated that the goal of his policy was only to" recover " the territories lost in the summer of 1940 .62 In order to encourage their ally, Hitler and Ribbentrop repeated several times that "world history does not end in 1940", thus making it clear that in an alliance with Germany, Antonescu would be able to carry out his plans. The Fuhrer stressed that the" guarantees " provided to Romania were directed against the USSR. For his part, Antonescu promised to "fight to the end" on the Axis side and "contribute to its victory". In a conversation with Keitel, Antonescu promised to prepare 39 "organized and well-provided divisions" by the spring of 1941, reported "on the measures that he had taken against Russia" and, boasting, agreed to the point that "with two motorized divisions, he could, if necessary, cross the Russian front and advance in the direction of to Kiev " 63 . On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed the Barbarossa Plan , a plan of war against the USSR. It stated:"On the flanks of our operation, we can count on the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia." 64
Romania became the most important military and strategic springboard of the Nazis in South-Eastern Europe. Realizing this, the Antonescu clique decided to raise the stakes for their participation in the aggressive fascist bloc. After visiting Hitler in early 1941, Antonescu submitted a memorandum to the Fuehrer "for consideration", which stated that "Romania is ready, if necessary, to join military operations on the side of Germany", but at the same time, " being connected with Germany by the Danube, Romania also wants to have direct land communication with it in the north and northin the West", and also hopes that "in the new Europe, Germany will recognize Romania's natural role as a regional hegemon" 65 . All this indicated that the Romanian ruling circles were no longer just dreaming of "restoring" the borders of 1940, but of much more.

Instructing his envoys in Berlin and Rome on what territorial demands should be made to the rulers of Hitler's Germany and fascist Italy, Antonescu wrote that the expansion of Romania's borders for land communication with Germany "can be carried out at the expense of Slovakia ... as well as at the expense of Galicia along the Chernivtsi - Lviv - Krakow line. Based on this, we need not only Bessarabia and Bukovina ... but also Pokutye. " 66 South of the Danube, the Romanian Government laid claim to the Yugoslav Banat and the Timokas region. 67 The Nazis with obvious disdain-

61 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. XI. Washington. 1961, pp. 126-128, 144-146; Halder F. Military Diary, vol. 2, Moscow, 1969, p. 149.

62 Memorial Antonesco, le III-е Homme de l'Axe. P. 1950, p. 51.

63 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. XI, pp. 660 - 689.

64 The Nuremberg trials of major German war criminals. In 7 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1958, p. 694.

65 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. XI, pp. 1110 - 1111.

66 Pokutye is a historical region located in the east of the Ivano-Frankivsk region of the Ukrainian SSR. In 1919-1939 it was part of Poland, and since 1939 it has been part of the USSR.

67 IDA, F. Microfilms of Romanian documents. Telegrama cifrata catre legatiunile din Roma $i Berlin, 10.V. 1941.

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They were suspicious of the whetted appetites of their Romanian allies, but at the same time supported their illusions about the creation of a "Greater Romania"in every possible way. On April 23, 1941, in the days when preparations for the war against the USSR were in full swing, Goebbels, in a conversation with the Romanian envoy R. Bossi, said in a patronizing and instructive tone:: "Currently, all borders are still mobile. It is very easy to draw them closer or further away... The better you prove to us that you are a strong and united people, united by common feelings, the more we will be inclined to expand your borders. " 68
Nevertheless, Antonescu managed to get some concrete promises about the territorial reward of Romania from Hitler. During their meeting in Munich on June 11, 1941, at which all issues related to the attack on the USSR were discussed, "Hitler," as Antonescu noted in his testimony, " stressed that Romania should not stand outside this war, since it has no other way to return Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina as soon as you fight on the side of Germany. At the same time, he pointed out that for our help in the war, Romania will be able to occupy and administer other Soviet territories up to the Dnieper."69 But the rulers of fascist Romania were not content with the role of mere administrators. From the statements of Deputy Prime Minister M. Antonescu at a government meeting on August 20, 1941, it is clear that even before the outbreak of war against the USSR, the conductor (as the fascist dictator of Romania I. Antonescu was called) in negotiations with the Nazis also raised the question of Soviet lands east of Diestra, which allegedly have a "huge Romanian population". "Naturally," continued M. Antonescu, " we drew attention to the fact that this population should be included in the Romanian state with a political formulation, which we reserve the right to discuss at the moment when the need for a final decision arises."70 On July 16, 1941, at a secret meeting, Hitler confirmed that "Antonescu should be included in the Romanian state." he wants to get Bessarabia and Odessa with a corridor leading to the west-north-west. " 71
The Romanian reaction, both in power and posing as "opposition" to the Antonescu dictatorship, welcomed Romania's entry into the war against the USSR. False are the claims of some bourgeois authors who, wishing to rehabilitate the king, ministers, leaders of the National Tsaranist Party (NCP), the National Liberal Party (NLP), write that Romania's entry into the war against the USSR was the sole decision of dictator I. Antonescu, and King Mihai was "against war with Russia","did not bear any responsibility for Romania's entry into the war" and that the chairman of the NCP Yu. Mannu was supposedly opposed to the war, or at least opposed the crossing of the Dniester River by the Romanian troops. 72 In reality, everything was different. Regarding his ministers, Antonescu testified: "The ministers fully agreed with my and Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union, and they accepted all my orders and instructions without any discussion." 73 In the early days of the war, Romanian bourgeois newspapers reproduced a telegram sent by King Antonescu, who was at the front, in which Mihai expressed his gratitude for the latter's help-

68 Ibid. Telegrama N 41251, 23.IV.1941. Convorbirea Goebbels-Bossy.

69 The Nuremberg Trials, vol. II, p. 689.

70 TsGA MSSR, f. 706, op. 1, d. 53, l. 55.

71 The Nuremberg Trials, vol. II, p. 583

72 Lee A. G. Against the Sickle. The Story of King Michael of Rumania. Lnd. 1949, p. 31; Floyd D. Rumania. Russia's Dissident Ally. N. Y. - Washington - Lnd. 1965, p. 15; Cretzianu A. The Lost Opportunity. Lnd. 1957, p. 70.

73 The Nuremberg Trials, vol. II, p. 690.

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the joy of the days of former glory 74 . Maniu, in his letters to Antonescu dated July 11 and 18, 1941, called for a struggle for "a greater Romania with all its provinces." He expressed confidence in the victory of the fascist armies and the hope that it would lead to the "fall of the Bolshevik regime." 75 Deputy Chairmen of the NCP and NLP and. Michalake and G. Bratianu, as a sign of approval of the anti-Soviet war, defiantly went to the army as" volunteers".

When the German-Romanian troops reached the Dniester, the king and the leaders of the "historical" parties, intoxicated with victorious reports, fully approved of the Antonescu government's policy of continuing the war against the USSR. By royal decree of August 21, 1941, the conductor was awarded the rank of marshal, and in the decree on awarding him the Order of Mihai Vityazu, it was noted that it was given to him "for special merits" in leading battles in the territory "between the Dniester and Bug", "for continuing the holy war", which led to the " liberation of the trans-Dniester population"76 . This emphasized that the monarch supports the aggressive policy of the Antonescu dictatorship. The same position was taken by the leaders of the" historical " parties. In a letter on November 8, 1941, addressed to Antonescu, Maniu stated that he approved of the action to "liberate" not only Bessarabia and Bukovina, but also "the Romanian element on the other side of the Dniester." 77
Only the Romanian Communist Party (CPR), which was in the underground, acting in a climate of terror and continuous persecution, waged a relentless and consistent struggle against the dictatorship of Carol II, and since September 1940 - against the Antonescu clique, exposed their anti-national policies, and persistently promoted the ideas of peace and friendship with the USSR. The Communist Party sharply opposed the anti-Soviet war, condemned the atrocities of the fascists on Soviet soil. The Communists led the struggle of the Romanian workers against the military-fascist dictatorship and the German invaders, for Romania's exit from the criminal war, for freedom and democracy .78
Having captured the right-bank regions of the Moldavian SSR, Chernivtsi and Izmail regions of the Ukrainian SSR, the Antonescu government officially announced their inclusion in the Romanian state. The Soviet territory between the Dniester and the Southern Bug, called "Transnistria" by the occupiers, was not formally part of the Romanian state. In accordance with the German-Romanian agreement signed on August 30, 1941 in Bendery, fascist Romania received only a German mandate to carry out temporary "administration and economic exploitation" of the territory between the Dniester and the Southern Bug and at the same time "security", i.e., to perform punitive functions in the territory between the Southern Bug and the Dnieper .79
Hitler did not make any proposals to Romania about annexing "Transnistria", contrary to the statements of some foreign authors, and, accordingly, did not receive any refusal from Antonescu. The Fuhrer had his own plans for the "development" of the occupied Soviet territories. As it appears from his speech at a secret meeting on July 16, 1941, he did not intend to share what he had captured with his junior partners in the robbery. Pointing out that you should not disclose "your goal settings to the whole world in advance", but keep in mind that "from these settings, you should not disclose your goals to the whole world".-

74 Timpul, 24.VI.1941.

75 See Lebedev N. I. The Collapse of fascism in Romania, p. 400.

76 Timpul, 25.VIII.1941.

77 Procesul marii tradari rationale, Bucuresti, 1946, p. 16.

78 See Lebedev N. I. The Collapse of fascism in Romania, p. 236 - 238, 289 - 291, 322 - 332, 378 - 396 etc.

79 TsGA MSSR, f. 706, op. 1, d. 9, ll. 65-69.

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As for Romania, Hitler said: "At present, our relations with Romania are good, but no one knows how these relations will develop in the future. We need to take this into account, and we need to arrange our borders accordingly. One should not make oneself dependent on the benevolence of third States. Based on this, we must build our relations with Romania. " 80
Having received no official assurances from Germany about the future of "Transnistria", doubting even whether Bukovina 81 could be retained, the Antonescu clique nevertheless openly and strenuously carried out ideological and practical preparations for the annexation of Soviet territory between the Dniester and Southern Bug. Back in late July 1941, in the midst of the Red Army's defensive battles on the Dniester, the propaganda machine of military-fascist Romania once again started talking about Romanian "rights" to the Trans-Dniester lands. The publication of the Transnistria newspaper began, and in the editorial of its first issue, the newspaper's goal was formulated as follows:"To assert our eternal rights to this ancient region." The former slogan "From the Dniester to the Tisza" was declared obsolete, and one of the articles in the first issue was entitled "From the Tisza to the Bug". The President of the Romanian Academy, I. Simionescu, undertook the "scientific" justification of Romania's" historical rights " in this area. In the pages of the Timpul newspaper, of which Gafencu was the founding editor, the aforementioned Smokine stated:: "Even Odessa was created by the Romanians" 82 . The Bucharest newspaper Viata stated in an editorial: "Dacia extended not only to the Dniester River, as previously believed, but to the mouth of the Dnieper", hence, "Romanians have ancient rights to the trans-Dniester territories, older than other peoples living there:" 83 . All these great-power rants were accompanied by calls for the destruction of communism.

Officially, representatives of the then Romanian government still refrained from making public statements, but in a narrow circle they repeatedly discussed aggressive plans. On December 16, 1941, at a government meeting, the Governor of Transnistria, G. Alexeanu, addressing Antonescu, said: "We, Mr. Marshal, are working there with the idea that we have a firm and final hold on this area." Warning the members of the government that" he cannot make any political statement regarding Transnistria right now, " Antonescu said at the same time: "Act there as if the power of Romania has been established in this territory for two million years." The delighted governor exclaimed," That's exactly what I wanted to hear from you! " 84 At a government meeting on January 23, 1942, M. Antonescu outlined the reasons for the inexpediency of changing the legal status of "Transnistria"at that time. He emphasized two of them: first, "it is not yet known what will happen to Russia," he said, "it is very difficult to know how far "Transnistria" extends, in other words, he was afraid that he might lose out by setting the boundaries of this area in advance. The ministers approved this line; secondly, the Antonescu clique feared that the annexation of "Transnistria" would not be seen as compensation for Romania's loss of Northern Transylvania. "You are absolutely right, - said the Minister of Culture and Cults I. Petrovich, - but we should conduct propaganda, because so many Romanians ask what we are looking for in Odessa... Now,

80 The Nuremberg Trials, vol. II, p. 582.

81 See Levit I. E. Participation of fascist Romania in aggression against the USSR, pp. 246-249.

82 Timpul, 1.VIII.1941.

83 Viata, 24.VIII.1941.

84 TsGA MSSR, f. 706, op. 1, d. 560, l. 272.

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when we have the opportunity to expand, we need to do it. This is a sign of vitality. " 85
The annexation of Soviet territories, according to the Antonescu clique, was to be accompanied by mass extermination and resettlement of local residents and the settlement of land by Romanian colonists. In Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, these operations were already actively carried out, and they began to be carried out in "Transnistria". At a government meeting on February 26, 1942, I. Antonescu stated:: "It's no secret that I'm not inclined to let go of what I've acquired. Transnistria will become a Romanian territory, we will make it Romanian and expel all the non-national population from there. " 86 During the summer offensive of the Nazis in 1942, the annexationist appetites of the rulers of fascist Romania were further inflamed. The Governor of" Transnistria " Alekseanu, in a letter to I. Antonescu dated July 30, 1942," justified " economically and historically the need to raise before the Reich the question of expanding the borders of the "governorate" by including new regions of Ukraine located east and north of the demarcation line previously agreed with Germany .87
The number of press articles, books and pamphlets inspired by the Government about the "historical area of Romanians", which were not lacking before, has increased even more. Each time, the boundaries of this area moved further to the east. One of the ideologists of Romanian fascism, the editor-in-chief of the chauvinist newspaper Porunca vremii ("The Dictates of Time"), I. Radulescu, was so confident of victory over the USSR that he openly wrote about Romania's aggressive goals in the war. He titled his collection of articles: "For Romanian imperialism". An ardent supporter of racist "theories", Radulescu believed that Romania should seek "living space" "only in the East" 88 . And these were not isolated statements of just one Romanian fascist. Similar statements were also found in the "works" of persons with professorial and academic titles. So, Professor of the University of Iasi E. Diaconescu, whose opus entitled " Eastern Romanians. Transnistria", was carried out, according to the author, "with the support" of Governor Alexeanu, also complained about the fact that the "education of the Romanian people" was incorrectly carried out, who were taught that the border of Romania should run "only" along the Dniester, and "argued" that it should be moved further to the east. .

These are the real reasons for the participation of fascist Romania in the aggression against the USSR, which reactionary bourgeois historiography ignores and distorts. The facts irrefutably show that the anti-Soviet war, which was declared "preventive" and is still portrayed as such by many bourgeois authors, was actually prepared and planned long before June 22, 1941. It was not the" Soviet threat "or concern for the" liberation of their brothers", but aggressive goals, dreams of" regional hegemony", fierce hatred of the Country of Soviets and communism that pushed the ruling circles of fascist Romania to ally with Hitler's Germany and participate in the war against the USSR. This was the logical conclusion of the anti-Soviet policy pursued by the ruling classes of bourgeois-landowner Romania since the birth of the Soviet state.

85 Ibid., l. 236.

86 Ibid., d. 568, ll. 166-167.

87 Ibid., d. 46, l. 329.

88 Radulescu I. Pentru un imperializm romanesc. Bucuresti. 1942, pp. 7 - 8.

89 Diaconescu E. Romanii din Rasarit. Transnistria. lasi. 1942, pp. 232, 236.

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