Grigory Gutner

Science and Christianity: Confrontation of Ways of Thinking

Grigory Gutner - Leading Research Fellow, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Science (Moscow, Russia), goutner@yandex.ru

The article considers the ways of thinking of Science and Christianity in their relationship. The article demonstrates that there are three different aspects in understanding of scientific thinking. The first is based on "dogmatic" tradition of the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. The second considers science in the frame of critical rationality (K.Popper, H.Albert). The third demonstrates the irrational base of science and therefore its closeness to religion. The "ethos" of Scientific and of Christian communities are described in connection with all the three approaches. The article shows that each of these aspects implies the confrontation with the Christian way of thinking.

Keywords: critical rationality, dogmatic rationality, scientific ethos, Christian ethos.

These notes are written as part of a conversation about a possible dialogue between science and religion. In this bottomless and repeatedly spoken topic, of course, you need to highlight something relatively specific. I have chosen to title my reflections "science and Christianity", since the general framework of the discussion involves the consideration of these subjects. However, even in this case, the second subject of the potential dialogue is extremely unclear. I hope, however, that some clarity will arise in the course of this discussion.

An additional limitation imposed on the proposed notes is due to the fact that their author mainly deals with the philosophy of science and epistemology. Therefore, the angle of consideration will be set by scientific thinking. The Christian way

Gutner G. Science and Christianity: the clash of ways of thinking // State, religion, and Church in Russia and abroad. 2015. N 1 (33). pp. 76-94.

Gutner, G. (2015) "Science and Christianity: Confrontation of Ways of Thinking", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 33 (1): 76 - 94.

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think will not be represented explicitly here. It will be considered precisely from the standpoint of scientific thinking, that is, one-sidedly. This one-sidedness can be overcome only by comparing these notes with the point of view of the philosophy of religion, as well as the Christian points of view themselves. These notes are written for the sake of such a comparison.

Christianity and Scientific Metaphysics

We will begin our description with ideas developed in the 17th century. This is done not for the sake of historical completeness of the picture (which is impossible), but for the sake of revealing the real, active way of thinking, which was formed at the birth of mathematical natural science, however, spontaneously or consciously, is still shared by many.

This way of thinking is based on the law of sufficient reason and takes as a model a deductive system, for example, Euclid's geometry. It should be borne in mind that we are not talking about the original (ancient) understanding of this geometry, but about the specific interpretation that it received at the time of the birth of mathematical natural science. It was then that the ideal of scientific knowledge was formed, built by deduction on grounds that are obvious to the intellect. Any statement that claims to be true must have a "sufficient basis", that is, it must be deduced from the original, unquestionable principles.

This ideal of knowledge is closely related to the Cartesian demand for " clarity and distinctness." It expresses the desire for a perfect understanding, which must be achieved by reducing every phenomenon to basic evidence. Since the initial principles have the highest degree of clarity, everything derived from them, although not as simple and obvious as they themselves, is still ultimately understandable and, most importantly, reliable.

Already in the 17th century, an alternative was proposed to this ideal of knowledge, which is commonly called rationalistic. It was that the starting point should not be intellectually transparent truths, but sensory perceptions. However, this alternative preserves two basic requirements for knowledge: "clarity and distinctness", first, and full validity, second. Both should be provided with experience. Everything is built-

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our thoughts should not be based on intellectual intuition, but on sensory intuition. Of course, if knowledge is based not on innate principles grasped by the intellect, but on observations made by the senses, then it cannot claim to be universal and necessary, that is, it cannot be absolutely reliable. However, these observations themselves play the same role for classical empiricism as innate principles do for classical rationalism: reduction to them (or deduction from them) provides the highest possible accuracy.

This way of thinking inevitably comes into conflict with the Christian point of view, since the latter does not meet the two criteria mentioned above. Let us briefly consider the nature of this conflict for both rationalistic and empirical approaches.

Let us first note that the history of thought shows us a whole series of attempts to reconcile this way of thinking with traditional Christianity. However, the conflict I just mentioned made itself felt sooner or later. Attempts at reconciliation themselves turned out to be a kind of time bomb. It is these attempts that reveal the essence of the conflict, and they need to be looked at more closely.

For the rationalist tradition, the main question is: to what extent can Christian truths be made clear and distinct, that is, reduced to the original intellectual intuitions? However, from the very beginning we are not talking about all such truths revealed in the Christian tradition, but about those that can be called metaphysically significant. The main one is that God exists. The reduction of this truth to principles that are transparent to reason is accomplished by proving the existence of God. The meaning of such a reduction is quite clearly clarified, for example, in the Cartesian proof carried out in the "Third Reflection"1. It is carried out as if in two rounds. First, when I discover in myself the idea of the most perfect being, I come to the conclusion that the prototype of such an idea can only be the most perfect being that exists in reality. Secondly, by thinking about your own

1. Descartes R. Reflections on the first philosophy, in which the existence of God and the difference between the human soul and body are proved. Third reflection: About God - that he exists // Descartes R. Soch. in 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1994. pp. 29-43.

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If I exist as a thinking being, I come to the conclusion that the reason for my existence (that is, both the reason for my appearance and the reason that I continue to exist) can ultimately be only the most perfect being, which, by definition, does not need any external reason for its existence.

This proof is based on three principles that Descartes himself believes to be unquestionable. He discusses the first two in detail earlier (in the two preceding Reflections, as well as in The Principles of Philosophy). They consist in the fact that I exist, and I am a thinking thing. The third principle is the principle of causality, expressed using the well-known formula: nothing appears out of nothing. It is this principle that makes it possible to find both the prototype for the idea of maximum perfection and the original reason for my own existence. Note that Descartes smuggles this principle, saying only that the formula is obvious "in the natural light of reason."

Let us now clarify the concept of reduction introduced earlier. The Cartesian reduction consists in the fact that the idea of God, which was originally very vague, was clarified with the help of several initial ideas that already appeared clear and distinct to us. These ideas are: cause, existence, the thinking thing, and the idea itself (the idea of an idea). All Descartes ' reasoning establishes logical connections between these ideas, which determines their definiteness. Then, with the help of these logical connections, a new idea is constructed from the original (clear and distinct) ideas - the idea of maximum perfection, that is, God. Let's pay attention to this train of thought. It contains, as it were, a backward movement: first an obscure idea that is present in my mind is fixed, then its elementary components are revealed, and then this very idea is constructed from the identified elements. Construction in this case is carried out as a proof of existence.

This allows us to clarify the problem of proof. It doesn't just make sure that God really exists. It allows us to understand what God is, to identify his main attributes. In the course of the proof, an ideal construction of the initially given obscure concept-maximum perfection-is carried out. This concept then becomes the basis for other Descartes ' arguments. In other words, God, in Descartes ' philosophy, is an ideal construction, a legitimation.-

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It uses other intellectual constructions, both in physics and in metaphysics.

Descartes ' example is not the only one. He is just beginning the tradition of Modern continental metaphysics, continued by Spinoza and later by Leibniz and his school. At the same time, metaphysics is positioned as a science that meets the standards of rationality that we described above. On the other hand, this metaphysics claims to be theology. It develops the doctrine of God, as if embedded in the Christian tradition, but at the same time significantly transforming it. As subsequent history has shown, this transformation was quite dangerous for the Christian tradition, possibly disastrous. Nietzsche summed it up by stating the death of God. Let us recall that Heidegger, commenting on the aforementioned thesis of Nietzsche, spoke about the death of the metaphysical God2: sooner or later, a person discovers in him his own rational construction and ceases to perceive him as reality.

Thus, the synthesis of Christianity and science undertaken by continental metaphysics in Modern times proved to be untenable. The same can be said about the British project associated with the names of Hobbes, Locke and Berkeley, who operated in the tradition of empiricism. This trend, while defining its connection with the Christian faith, also had to express the concept of God in terms of initial evidence, that is, in terms of sensory experience. Locke describes this reduction to experience as follows:

From what we experience in ourselves, we acquire ideas of existence and duration, knowledge and ability, pleasure and happiness, and various other qualities and abilities that are better to have than not to have. And when we want to form an idea that best suits the supreme being, we extend each of these ideas by the idea of infinity, and by combining them together we form our own complex idea of God.3
This passage is interesting because Locke suggests performing an operation that Descartes considered impossible: by observing himself

2. See M. Heidegger. Nietzsche's words "God is Dead" / / Voprosy filosofii. 1990. N 7. pp. 143-176.

3.J. Locke The experience of human understanding. Book 2, chapter 23, p. 33 / / Locke J. Soch. in 3 vols. Vol. 1, Moscow, 1985. P. 366.

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to create the idea of a being more perfect than myself. However, as with Descartes, the idea of God is here a construct of the intellect. This attempt to adapt scientific rationality to Christianity is perhaps even less successful than the rationalistic one. It may explain how a person gets the idea of God, but it does not allow us to establish any connection between this idea and reality. The train of thought proposed by Locke was continued by Feuerbach, who, as is well known, considered that such mental operations are a way of producing illusions. Creating the concept of God, a person only fixes his ideal ideas about himself. It turns out that the empirical reduction of the idea of God to experience adapts more easily to atheism than to Christianity.

This story raises the question of the rights and limits of the intellect in its attempts to reason about God. Does the failure of European metaphysics (in particular, the failure of Descartes and Locke) mean that a rational discourse about God is impossible at all? Related to this question is another: is theology possible as a science? We will return to these questions later in our discussion of the relationship between science and Christianity. In any case, the standard of science and rational thinking in general, which was formulated in the philosophy of science of Modern times (perhaps it would be more accurate to say: in the pre-Kantian philosophy of science), seems to be poorly combined with Christianity. However, it was not immediately clear. It took several centuries to identify this incompatibility. The enterprise of European metaphysics can be regarded as a long and unsuccessful experiment. It was only in the nineteenth century that it was summed up, for example, by the aforementioned Feuerbach and Nietzsche.

Christianity and Critical Rationality

The next topic that I intend to discuss here is related to the revision of the standard of rationality just introduced here. The result of this revision is a different image of science and a different view of the relationship between science and Christianity. We will talk about critical rationalism.

We will consider this flow in its classical form, presented by K. Popper and H. Albert. The latter expresses serious objections to the rationality of the type described above. These objections are directed both against the rationalistic-

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and against the empirical version. According to Albert, both intellectualism and empiricism strive for the final justification of the provisions of science, while resorting to the law of sufficient reason. He appeals to the famous "Munchausen trilemma" 4. The latter shows the impossibility of final justification, since an attempt to justify any statement ultimately leads to one of three outcomes: a vicious circle, a regression to infinity, and an interruption of the justification procedure in an arbitrary place. It is clear that the third option is usually implemented. This gives rise to three reproaches. The first reproach is for arbitrariness. Under the guise of basic principles, scientists introduce their own subjective attitudes (dogmas, prejudices, unverified opinions) into the process of cognition. The problem, however, is not that they make them, but that they give them an inappropriate status. A statement that, for some unknown reason, appeals to one or another author is considered as an absolute truth, as a judgment that is subject to unconditional acceptance and does not allow any criticism. The next two reproaches follow from the first. Arbitrary attribution of dogmas to the status of unconditional grounds makes cognition difficult. A researcher who is convinced of the truth of their views may adhere to false theories and will not make any effort to further search for the truth. In addition (and this is the third reproach), dogmatism contradicts human freedom, since it presupposes the imposition of established judgments, forcing us to accept only a strictly defined type of understanding. Based on this, Albert defines both "intellectualism" and empiricism as dogmatic rationalism.

This criticism implies a different type of understanding, which is actually called critical rationality. The scheme of such understanding is given by K. Popper and is based on the hypothetical-deductive method. This model describes the relationship of three elements: the observed phenomenon (A); the individual conditions that lead to its appearance (B); and the general laws (C) that determine the existence of a phenomenon of type A under conditions of type B. Understanding is achieved when A is deduced from B&C.

First of all, we note that the described scheme is a classical scheme of scientific explanation.

4. Albert H. Traktat o kriticheskom razume [A treatise on Critical Intelligence], Moscow: Yeditorialny URSS, 2003. Chapter 1.

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But the essence of critical understanding does not consist in deducing individual phenomena from general laws, but in subsequent critical verification. The originally built explanance (B&C) allows you to make verifiable forecasts. If such a forecast does not come true, it should be rejected on the basis of modus tollens. This means that both B and C are hypotheses that can always be replaced by alternative ones. Thus, understanding is not a single act, but a recurring procedure associated with the verification of explanances. Once an understanding is reached, it can at any time turn out to be false, and the phenomenon, therefore, is misunderstood. On the other hand, repeated verification procedures will deepen our knowledge of the phenomenon. In this renewed critique, there is no definitive understanding to stop at, but rather a process of understanding that is carried out in cycles, that is, when moving from explanatory hypotheses to the phenomenon being explained and back again.

Critical rationality implies a different interpretation of understanding from dogmatic rationality. The critical approach, according to Albert, includes two components: construction and criticism.5 We will return to the topic of construction later, but now we will note that understanding in this view is a becoming process: we can never say that we have already understood, but we understand all the time. The dogmatic approach, on the contrary, presupposes a certain completion, a complete understanding, which, apparently, can be considered as a kind of intellectual intuition. By reducing the phenomenon once and for all to its original postulates, we have understood it in the sense that we have reached a complete ideal construction, contemplated by a single act of the intellect. Critical rationalism, if it does not exclude such intuition, does not stop at it. He suggests not understanding, but understanding, constantly revising the foundations and rebuilding the resulting ideal structures.

It is clear that it is critical, not dogmatic, rationality that is truly rational. It is precisely this information that should be present in scientific research, since it claims to be rational knowledge. Such knowledge is never final and does not claim to be fully justified,

5. Albert H. A treatise on Critical Reason, p. 80.

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not for absolute truth. A rational person expresses only hypotheses that he is ready to defend, but which he is ready to abandon in the event of a reasonable refutation.

The most important feature of critical thinking is its recognition of alternatives. Every proposition made, however plausible it may seem, must have an alternative. A critical thinker, no matter how deeply they believe in something, never loses sight of the possible alternatives to their beliefs. Even if these alternatives seem unlikely, they cannot be discarded. It is possible that something that now seems to be true will be rejected in the course of critical verification, and then you will have to turn to alternative judgments.

The commitment to this approach is based on the recognition of two core values. The first is the pursuit of truth. Truth is unattainable in its entirety, but it is the duty of the scientist to approach it as closely as possible. The rejection of criticism means the rejection of the movement towards truth, the cessation of the progress of knowledge. The second value is the dignity of a person as a free-thinking being. In this case, the rejection of criticism is equivalent to the rejection of such dignity. I have already mentioned the main reproaches expressed against dogmatism. To take something beyond criticism is to make it a dogma, to insist on irrational recognition. The demand for such recognition is a violation of the human mind, an attack on the right to think freely.

All of this makes us take a very tough stance towards Christianity and any religion in general. It is interesting that Albert's reproaches of Christianity are essentially identical to his reproaches of classical ("dogmatic") rationalism. It should be noted that he is not talking about Christianity in general, but about its rather late versions, which originated mainly in Protestantism. These versions are characterized by a constantly declared claim to rationality. Albert writes about theologians who are willing to relate their faith to both the achievements of natural science and critical analysis of biblical texts. In other words, it is an attempt to theologize rationally, using the logical construction of theological concepts and subjecting these concepts to critical testing.

However, according to Albert's observation, every theologian leaves out a fragment in his concepts that arbitrarily gives a certain value.

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a kind of immunity. The provisions included in this fragment are not subject to any criticism. Moreover, this fragment is the core of the concept. There are provisions that no Christian, no matter how rational and critical he may appear, will refuse under any circumstances. These propositions cannot be considered hypotheses. They have no alternative, or rather, any alternative to them must be rejected a priori. First of all, the statement that God exists has this status. It is "immunized" by any, even the most rational theologian.

Having the core of a theory protected from criticism also makes the whole theory irrational. But irrationality inevitably turns out to be arbitrary. Non-critical provisions are left to everyone's subjective discretion. They are not supposed to be accepted or rejected in the course of rational criticism. This can only be done arbitrarily. Therefore, every theologian acts as a dogmatist, that is, with an arbitrarily expressed claim to the truth. Such a claim primarily blocks real progress towards the truth. In this sense, theology is close to dogmatic rationalism.

The ethos of science and the ethos of religion

This, however, is not the only reason for criticism. But to understand Albert's other rebuke, we'll look at a different aspect of scientific and religious thinking and talk about what Robert Merton called ethos. By the latter, I mean a system of norms and preferences that determine the nature of communication and are closely related to forms of thinking. Ethos supports a certain way of thinking. Now we will try to model the scientific and Christian ethos based on the ways of thinking that we have just described. I will make a reservation right away that these will be precisely theoretical models, partly constructed on the model of Max Weber's ideal types. They may not fully reflect the real life of the scientific or Christian communities. They present only one aspect of this life, which nevertheless needs to be clearly described. The point here is not to give a complete portrait of each community, but rather to identify, first, something that is truly inherent in it and, second, something that significantly affects their relationships. In other words, we will try-

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I want to describe the direction that these communities are turning towards each other.

The scientific ethos, correlated with the idea of critical rationality, was considered by the just-mentioned R. R. Tolkien. Merton 6. All of his (ethos) structure is determined by the selfless pursuit of scientific truth. All other characteristics follow from this. Since progress toward truth requires constant rational criticism, no statement made in the scientific community can be defended , either by authority or tradition. Any member of this community, regardless of status or academic merit, must behave in accordance with three standards: (1) openness to criticism from other members of the community; (2) a critical attitude towards other people's statements and accepting them only after sufficient verification; (3) constant self-criticism, that is, the search for possible refutations of one's own statements.

This means that the scientific community consists of free and equal people who are in a critical and at the same time benevolent communication. Freedom here means first of all freedom of thought and freedom of research.7 Equality means equality before the truth and equal right to criticism. It should be noted that here (as in general in theories tending to liberal ideas) equality does not imply sameness at all. Members of the scientific community differ in their scientific achievements, qualifications, and talents. However, all this does not violate their equality, which is a necessary condition for rational communication. This is expressed in the very fact of argumentation. One scientist cannot address another "from top to bottom". The latter would mean giving an order, demanding unconditional trust and / or obedience. Argumentation implies an appeal to an equal, to someone who can object and demand justification. When I use argumentation, I mean that the other person is free to agree or disagree with me.

An important characteristic of the scientific ethos is related to the status of consent in the community. First of all, the existence of disagreements

6. Mirskaya E. Z. Ethos of Science: Ideal Regulations and Everyday Realities // Ethos of science/Edited by L. P. Kiyashchenko, Moscow, 2008, pp. 122-143.

7. The concept of "freedom" underlying critical rationality can be developed in more depth, but this does not seem necessary in the context of the present notes.

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it should be recognized as normal. These disagreements, on the one hand, stimulate criticism and promote progress towards the truth. On the other hand, disagreements do not undermine the unity of the community. They generate discussion, but not hostility. Since there is always a critical attitude towards both others and one's own opinion, no disagreements are fundamentally irreconcilable. A proponent of any point of view is always ready to reject it if the criticism of his position turns out to be sufficiently convincing. Consent is established only through discussion and voluntary acceptance of the arguments of the opposite side. It, in turn, cannot be absolute and eternal. A breach of consensus between members of the community cannot be regarded as treason, betrayal, or division. In such a community, agreement is replaced by disagreement, and disagreement is replaced by consent. Therefore, the scientific ethos implies tolerance, a tolerant attitude to other views.

This, of course, does not mean that it is easy to give up your beliefs and accept other points of view. Being open to criticism does not preclude perseverance in defending your claims. Only a convincing refutation can be the basis for their revision.

If we now try to describe the ethos of the Christian community, we will get something like the negative of the image just proposed. What is meant here is not the search for truth, but its actual presence. Statements made by reputable members of the community claim to proclaim this truth, and therefore are not subject to criticism. Accordingly, there can be no equality in such a community. There are those who proclaim and those who listen, pastors and the flock. No arguments are required from the preacher and the pastor. He communicates something revealed to him (or revealed by another authority), which must either be understood by the listeners as a kind of revelation, or accepted out of trust.

In such a community, disagreements are undesirable. Its unity implies unanimity. There can be no discussion with the preacher and the pastor. What they say can be either accepted or rejected. The latter means a serious conflict, possibly a split, which is not resolved by rational discussion of the problem. Therefore, serious clashes and irreconcilable positions are possible in the Christian community, which exclude a tolerant attitude to a different point of view. Religious community-

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society in general is much more prone to conflict than science. The attitude expressed by the well-known phrase "I'm standing here and I can't help it" excludes the possibility of ever admitting that I'm wrong. Consequently, schisms are inevitable, accusing opponents of heresy, and stopping communication with those who think differently.

I would like to note once again that these are not empirical portraits of real communities, but ideal constructions created on the basis of given mental schemes. These schemes are defined primarily by the point of view of critical rationalism, which is essentially irreconcilable with all religiosity.

Let's go back to Albert's book again. His critique of theology (and Christianity in general) leads to far-reaching conclusions. He believes that the dogmatic spirit inherent in religion is incompatible with the spirit of academic freedom that the scientific community needs. Any theologian (even a very liberal one) is shadowed by the inquisitor. Therefore, in particular, theology has no place in the university. It cannot be considered a science, despite all attempts to present it as a rational activity.8
Of course, the authors mentioned here (Popper, Albert, and Merton) are wrong in attributing all these ideal features to the scientific community. The situation is not so good, and I intend to discuss this in more detail below. In contrast, things are not so bad in Christian communities (with the possible exception of some more or less marginal groups). Of course (this is an empirical fact!), and there are rational discussions, differences of opinion and criticism in them. Therefore, Christian communion is also often characterized by those features that we have found in the scientific ethos. Yet what we have just said about the religious ethos cannot be considered a caricature. First, these features are more or less inherent in the Christian community. Secondly, this raises a question that is very important to discuss both for the dialogue between Christianity and science, and for Christians ' own self-awareness. This is a question of attitude to truth. It arises from the distinction noted above, which often seems to exist between science and Christianity. Let's formulate it again. Science is engaged in the search for truth, but it never claims to possess it. Christianity, on the other hand, presupposes the real presence of truth, its manifestation in the Church. What a scientific attitude to truth means (at least ideally), we have already described here.

8. Albert H. A treatise on the Critical Mind. Chapter 5.

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But what does the Christian attitude to truth mean? In the actual practice of different churches (and not just in the ideal constructions of the Christian ethos), there is often an unshakeable confidence in the correctness of their judgments, as well as conflicts and divisions provoked by this confidence. To what extent and under what circumstances is such a position ("I stand here and cannot do otherwise") really Christian? How can we distinguish between the actual presence of Truth in the Church and the possession of truth by Christian churches and / or communities?

Let us not forget, however, that the image of science presented here is also an ideal construction. The theme of the dialogue between Christianity and science requires, in my opinion, to consider another approach to science, which will allow us to form a completely different image of it. This approach is developed in M. Polanyi's classic work "Personal Knowledge". There is no point in detailing Polanyi's ideas, which have long been well-known. I intend only to focus on certain points that are important in the context of what has already been said and allow us to see additional touches in this topic.

Polanyi contrasts explicit rules of scientific activity and, more broadly, all knowledge fixed by language with implicit knowledge. The latter includes, first of all, a variety of scientific skills that cannot and do not need to be expressed explicitly. They are acquired in the course of training, transmitted as a result of communication between scientists, and form an unconscious (or not fully conscious) layer of scientific knowledge, which is much deeper and richer than anything recorded in texts and expressed in speeches.

This means that the rational discourse in which scientific results and methods of obtaining them are considered is always secondary to the activities aimed at obtaining these results. It represents only the tip of the iceberg. What is said explicitly and has become the subject of rational criticism is only a partial expression of implicit knowledge and can only be truly understood in the context of implicit knowledge. That is why the meaning of a scientific text always exceeds what is explicitly expressed in it. The text allows the reader (if he, of course, has sufficient scientific qualifications) to update layers of his own implicit knowledge and "read" what is not explicitly written. It is clear that these updated layers will be expressed not only and not so much in words, but in the subsequent one

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scientific activity in general. Moreover, the very possibility of such an expression, that is, establishing a connection between the text and its own implicit context, also arises due to implicit knowledge. Such a correlation is non-formalized, it arises due to a skilful knowledge of all scientific practices. The fact that the fullness of knowledge is inexpressible in speech correlates with the inability to anticipate all the implications of the utterance: the text or utterance of one person, falling into the field of implicit knowledge of another, can lead to a not entirely predictable result.

It is important to keep in mind the communicative nature of implicit knowledge. It is formed as a scientist enters the scientific community. Here, both personal experience and constant interaction and training are essential. A scientist's own "personal" knowledge is also of a social nature, since it includes samples of scientific activity accepted in the community. These patterns are learned implicitly, in the course of practice, and not from lectures or books. In other words, the formation of implicit knowledge means entering into a tradition, becoming familiar with the collective experience of the community.

Given the personal nature of this experience, intersubjective elements are very significant. Their development makes a scientist "one of our own" in the scientific community. The community controls its members based on past experience and tradition. Its (community's) implicit resources are available to an individual only in some (possibly quite small) part.

It is necessary to focus on one more topic discussed by Polanyi. This is a novelty theme. Polanyi also uses the concept of implicit knowledge to understand scientific discovery. Here, however, the personal aspect comes to the fore. The main thing that Polanyi draws attention to is the non-formalized nature of the action interpreted as a scientific discovery. It is, in Polanyi's phrase, "irreversible"9 in the sense that it cannot be traced back in steps and reproduced. The explication of the discovery in the text is also only secondary and does not convey what actually happened. Polanyi calls the description of a scientific discovery in the literature a legal form, which is necessary, in particular, for patent examination. The very same discovery is characterized by " logical

9. Polani M. Lichnostnoe znanie [Personal knowledge]. Blagoveshchensk, 1998. p. 180.

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the gap" between the initial situation (data analysis, problem statement, description of the difficulty to be overcome) and the solution to the problem that the scientist found. This decision is not determined by the initial situation and cannot be deduced from it.

The explication of the discovery does not express the substance of the case. Even the most well-reasoned presentation of a scientific result appeals to an implicit context, without which no argument is convincing. Therefore, all texts describing new results and methods of obtaining them should ideally be addressed to initiates who have the same context. But since such a situation is rare (or impossible), any linguistic representation of a scientific result is risky. It may be misunderstood or put in the wrong context.

That is why Polanyi attaches great importance to faith. In itself, the explication of a scientific result is an expression of the scientist's confidence in the truth of his propositions. At the same time, he relies (apparently unconsciously) on the trust of his colleagues. Without such trust, no arguments will be convincing. There are no purely formal methods of persuasion. It is necessary to believe what is stated. When a scientist addresses the community with a testimony about his discovery, he is like a religious preacher trying to convert his listeners to his faith. Faith precedes knowledge-here Polanyi shows complete solidarity with the Beatitude. Augustine 10.

In the context of what has been said, T. Kuhn's remark about the esoteric nature of normal science seems quite justified. Mastering complex patterns of scientific activity, acquiring implicit knowledge that corresponds to the level of the community, requires many years of work, personal communication with the carriers of knowledge, that is, a kind of initiation. Scientific knowledge becomes closed to the uninitiated, science takes on the features of magic.

If such features of scientific thinking are recognized, then it is necessary to change the idea of the scientific ethos. In short, it is practically indistinguishable from a religious ethos. It is characterized by authoritarianism, a hierarchy of scientific merit (degrees, titles, positions), and a very rigid institutionalization-

10. Polani M. Lichnostnoe znanie [Personal knowledge]. P. 277-278.

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the irreconcilable struggle of schools. In the context of the dominance of a certain paradigm, the scientific community is very dogmatic. Having learned certain prerequisites and patterns of problem solving, it considers deviations from the established one at best with doubt, and at worst with bitterness and aggression. A scholar who has reached a high status is regarded as the bearer of truth, authorized to proclaim it in the assembly of the uninitiated.

We emphasize that even in this case, our conclusions are not the result of empirical observations of the scientific community. This, as in the previous case, is the result of an ideal construction based on a certain concept of scientific thinking.

So, we have two opposite descriptions of the scientific ethos. Clearly, each of these idealizations reflects some reality. It is natural to assume that the real life of the scientific community is characterized by both. The same can be said about the Christian community. How does this circumstance affect the possibility of dialogue between both communities?

I think that the prospect of dialogue is connected with the expansion of the sphere of critical rationality in both communities. On the one hand, such an extension creates conditions for dialogue. On the other hand, the dialogue itself will inevitably lead to expansion. Both communities can help each other to some extent by stimulating the development of undisclosed resources of rationality, first, and defining the boundaries of rationality, second.

I will try to concretize what has been said. I believe that it is vital for modern science to extend criticism to the discussion of values. Rational criticism in science is now mainly focused on scientific results, i.e. theories, hypotheses, and research methods. There is, however, the task of identifying and criticizing the value premises of science. "Classical" critical rationalism considers progress toward truth to be the main (perhaps only) task of science. This premise is accepted without any criticism not only by philosophers of science who share this approach, but also by a significant part of scientists. Meanwhile, such an attitude to scientific truth is hardly justified now in connection with the gigantic opportunities that science receives in transforming the life world and human nature itself. This is especially noticeable in the field of biotechnology, but it also applies to other areas of science. The problem is related to the fact that modern scientific knowledge is not separated from the scientific community.-

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depends on its apps. Knowledge arises when implementing large-scale projects, which inevitably have both a theoretical and technological component. This situation did not just arise: the Manhattan project also involved solving research problems, and its implementation led to a significant increase in knowledge. But now the boundary between research and applied tasks has become even less visible.

This leads to the question of whether the progress of knowledge should have any limits. However, if such boundaries are to be established, they cannot be imposed on the scientific community from the outside. Their discovery may be the result of "self-criticism", that is, a rational and critical discussion of ethical and axiological problems by the scientific community. On the other hand, such a discussion cannot be confined to the scientific community alone. In the course of this discussion, areas should be identified that do not fall within the competence of science, but are inevitably affected by scientific research. Work in such" borderline " areas should be carried out jointly, and the Christian community should play a significant role here. I would venture to say that Christianity could help science become more rational, since science very often invades the human life world without any rational criticism.

However, the Christian community itself, by engaging in such discussions, should become more rational. Here arises the most difficult problem of attitude to truth, which I have already mentioned. Science has long encouraged Christianity to engage in a kind of self - criticism-this concerns primarily the Christian view of Creation in connection with the development of cosmology and evolutionary biology. You can also point out other questions that require a theological response to the progress of science. Here, however, I think it is necessary to discuss the ontological and epistemological problems concerning, as I have already said, the relation to truth. It is important for Christians (and not just theologians) to understand what the truth of Christian teaching means. It is hardly possible to conduct a dialogue with science (or indeed any dialogue at all) without subjecting one's original views to critical review. But there is still something that cannot be revised. In particular, the Church cannot change its teaching every time the scientific picture of the world changes. But this is just a particular thing. In general, in my opinion, a serious understanding of the con itself is required-

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the concept of truth in relation to the Christian faith. It seems that this is one of the most difficult tasks.

Bibliography/References

Albert H. Traktat o kriticheskom razume [A treatise on Critical Intelligence], Moscow: Yeditorialny URSS, 2003.

Descartes R. Reflections on the first philosophy, in which the existence of God and the difference between the human soul and body are proved. Third reflection: About God - that he exists // Descartes R. Soch. in 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1994.

J. Locke Opyt o chelovecheskom razumenii [The experience of human understanding]. Locke J. Soch. v 3-kh vol. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1985.

Mirskaya E. Z. Ethos of Science: Ideal Regulations and Everyday Realities // Ethos of science/Edited by L. P. Kiyashchenko, Moscow, 2008, pp. 122-143.

Polani M. Lichnostnoe znanie [Personal knowledge]. Blagoveshchensk, 1998.

M. Heidegger. Nietzsche's words "God is Dead" / / Voprosy filosofii. 1990. N71 P. 143-176.

Albert, H. (2003) Traktat o kriticheskom razume [An Essay on the Critical Reason, translated from German]. Moscow: Editorial URSS.

Descartes, R. (1994) "Razmyshlenia o pervoi filosofii" [Meditation on the First Philosophy, translated from Latin]. Moscow.

Heidegger, M. (1990) "Slova Nietzsche 'Bog mertv"' [Nietzsche's Words: "God is Dead", translated from Germen], Voprosy Filosofii 7: 143 - 176.

Locke, J. (1985) Opyt o chelovecheskom razumenii [An Essay about Human Understanding, translated from English]. Moscow.

Mirskaya, E.Z. (2008) "Ethos nauki: idealnye reguliativy i povsednevnye realii" [Ethos of Science: Ideal Regulatives and Everyday Reality], in Ethos Nauki, pp. 122 - 143. Moscow.

Polyany, M. (1998) Lichnostnoe znanie [Personal Knowledge, translated from English]. Blagoveshcensk.

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