Alexey Zygmont

The Concept of Violence in the Russian Orthodox Discourse in the Post-Soviet Period

Alexey Zygmont - PhD Student, Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). az09@mail.ru

The article examines a number of issues related to the link between religion and violence in the discussions and practice within the Russian Orthodox Church in the post-Soviet period. After a short overview of theoretical tools the paper deals with the so-called image of "cosmic war" in the discourse of official representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Orthodox nationalists; the ways this image affects matters of morality, family and parenting; the events of 2012 related to the Pussy Riot "punk prayer" and reaction to it; other examples of symbolic and actual violence. The paper is completed with an analysis of eschatological images of "cosmic conquest" and what can be described as "sacrificial crisis" of the Orthodox parish subcultures. All this allows to explain the manifestations of violence in these subcultures and to engage in a theoretical discussion of the connection between religion and violence.

Keywords: symbolic violence, religious violence, religious symbol, Russian Orthodox Church, Orthodox nationalists, parish environment.

The interdisciplinary scientific direction "religion and violence" is not actually represented in Russian science, while Western researchers have been addressing this issue since the late 60s-early 70s of the XX century. The correlation of these two phenomena has previously occupied anthropologists (for example, A. Hubert and M. Mauss, M. Bloch, N. Jay, E. Skerry), sociologists (E. Durkheim) and philosophers (K. Marx,

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З. Freud, J. Bataille)1. The pioneers of the new scientific direction were American sociologists Charles Glock and Rodney Stark with their research on Christian Antisemitism (1966), as well as, independently of them and from each other, Rene Girard with the famous " Violence and the Sacred "(1972), inspired by the May 1968 events in France, and Walter Burkert with Homo Necans (same 1972)2. Their work was continued by such researchers as R. Schwartz, G. Avalos, D. Stern, R. Appleby, C. Selengut, M. Jurgensmeyer, M. Kitts, M. Jerrison and many others.3
The last quarter of the twentieth century was marked by an escalation of violence around the world, apparently related to religion in one way or another. These are the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978-1979, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the so-called "problems" in Northern Ireland, the sarin attack on the Tokyo subway carried out by Aum Shinrikyo activists on March 20, 1995, etc. All this required thinking. The events of September 2001 (9/11) were a turning point that caused not only a wide public response around the world, but also a new wave of journalistic, theological, philosophical and, finally, academic reflection.

This article is an attempt to analyze a number of phenomena in Russian Orthodoxy in the post-Soviet period (since 1991), linking them to the concept of violence. We will consistently consider the image of space war in the discourse of official representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate and Orthodox nationalists4; problems related to the role of this image in matters of morality, family and upbringing

1. Juergensmeyer, M. and Kitts, M. (eds) (2011) Princeton Readings in Religion and Violence. Princeton University Press, pp. 93 - 216.

2. Glock, C. and Stark, R. (1966) Christian Belief and Anti-Semitism. New York: Harper and Row; Girard R. Violence and the sacred. Moscow: New Literary Review, 2010; Burkert, W. (1983) Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek and Sacrificial Ritual and Myth. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

3. For a brief overview of existing concepts, see Avalos, H. (2005) Fighting Worlds: The Origins of Religious Violence, pp. 75 - 102. New York: Prometheus Books.

4. On Orthodox nationalism, see publications by Alexander Verkhovsky: Verkhovsky A. Ideological evolution of Russian Nationalism: the 1990s and 2000s // Verhi i nizy russkogo natsionalizma [Verhi and nizy of Russian Nationalism], Moscow: Sova Center, 2007, pp. 6-32.: Russian Orthodox Nationalists and Fundamentalists, 1995_2001, Moscow: Sova Center, 2003; Pain E., Verkhovsky A. Civilizational nationalism: the Russian version of the "special way" / / Ideology of the "special way" in Russia and Germany: origins, content, consequences. Moscow: Three Squares, 2010. pp. 171-210.

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children; then we will turn to the events of 2012 related to the Pussy Riot action and the reaction to it; then - to examples of symbolic and personal violence; we will conclude the analysis with eschatological images of cosmic conquest and what can be called the "sacrificial crisis" of the so-called "temple environment" (we will devote a separate paragraph to this last concept).5.

R. Scott Appleby notes that one of the modes of religious existence is "militancy" or" the attitude to struggle", which is actualized in both violent and nonviolent forms - for example, in martyrdom, passion-suffering, peacemaking.6 Any religious tradition is internally pluralistic and to some extent contradictory, revealing in itself the resources for both strategies. Appleby calls this duality "ambivalence of the sacred". Therefore, while recognizing that official documents of the Russian Orthodox Church( Moscow Patriarchate, hereinafter referred to as the ROC - MP), the discourse of Patriarchs Alexy II and Kirill, Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev), and sermons in parishes often voice the position of nonviolence, we believe that it comes from the same resources of religious tradition (for example, the Gospels or the works of the Holy Fathers), as well as the theory and practice of violence. In this article, we will focus exclusively on the second - on the phenomena of violence; however, they should be analyzed with the aforementioned ambivalence of the sacred in mind.

The range of our sources is extensive and includes official documents of the Russian Orthodox Church MP 7, sermons and interviews, news reports, user comments, and even blog and forum entries - in short, both public domain and public domain materials.

5. The concept of the "temple environment" is borrowed from the folklorists A. Tarabukina, E. Levkievskaya and M. Akhmetova. See further in this article, also in: Tarabukina A. V. Folklore and culture of the church circle. Dis... Candidate of Philology, St. Petersburg: IRLI RAS, 2000; Tarabukina A.V. Eschatological stories of "church people" / / Almanac" Kanun": Anthropology of religiosity. Saint Petersburg, 1998; Levkievskaya E. E. Sovremennaya prikhramovaya sreda kak konfliktnoe pole: yazykovye i kul'turnye formy vzrazheniya konflikt [Modern temple environment as a conflict field: linguistic and Cultural forms of conflict expression]. Materials of the conference. Moscow: RSUH. 2011. p. 409_424; Akhmetova M. The end of the world in one particular country. Moscow: OGI, RSUH, 2010.

6. Appleby, R. (2000) The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, p. 28. Carnegie Corporation of New York.

7. Fundamentals of the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church; Fundamentals of the teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church on human dignity, freedom and rights.

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and evidence of "lived religion". Their representativeness is based on a qualitative approach - they are designed to demonstrate the actual patterns of religious consciousness underlying religious violence. We excluded the Christian "new religious movements" (NSD), alternative Orthodoxy (communities of the True Orthodox Church, the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church) and Old Believers from the review, focusing on the ROC MP and two related interfering subcultures-Orthodox nationalists and communities of the "temple environment". To conceptualize the empirical material, we used the works of A. Verkhovsky (including his proposed division of nationalism into ethno-cultural and civilizational)8, N. Mitrokhin, A. Aghajanyan, K. Kostyuk, A. Tarabukina, M. Akhmetova, S. Shtyrkov, Zh. Kormina and others 9.

The format of the article did not allow us to include consideration of a number of other issues, such as the role of the anti-cult movement in Russia in the 1990s-2000s of the XX century in the formation of structures of violence (we will consider this concept below), or the problem of divine violence, as it is reflected in the polemics of, relatively speaking, "modernist" There are 10 "anti-modern" groups within the Church. In addition, we deliberately distanced ourselves from legal issues, although this component is able to link empirical material with the analysis of current legislation, for example, through the concepts of religious radicalism and extremism.11
8. See footnote No. 4.

9. Kostyuk K. Three portraits // Continent. 2002. N 113; Mitrokhin N. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkva: sovremennoe sostoyanie i aktual'nye problemy [Russian Orthodox Church: Current state and Actual problems]. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006; Kormina J., Shtyrkov S. Pravoslavnye versii sovetskogo proshlogo: politiki pamyati v ritualakh kommemoratsii // Anthropology of Social Change, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2011, pp. 389-413.

10. Although the concept of "Orthodox modernists" is constructed by their opponents, "antimodernists", its scientific understanding is also possible, see, for example: Aghajanyan A. Reforma i vozrozhdenie v dva moskovskikh pravoslavnykh subculturakh: dva sposobody do pravoslavie sovremennom [Reform and Revival in two Moscow Orthodox subcultures: Two ways to make Orthodoxy modern]/Edited by A. Aghajanyan and K. Rousselet, Moscow: Vse Mir Publishing House, 2011, pp. 255-276. Some idea of "Orthodox modernism" from the standpoint of "antimodernists" can be obtained here: <url>. Orthodox Missionary Encyclopedia "(author-Roman Vershillo) [http://antimodern.wordpress.com/] Orthodox magazine "Holy Fire" [http://www.blagogon.ru/].

11. See, for example: Verkhovsky A. Counteraction to "religious extremism": the Russian state in search of an answer to the challenges of desecularization / / State, Religion, Church in Russia and abroad. 2013. N 2. pp. 134-158.

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Religion and Violence: A theoretical outline

Johan (Johan) Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist, mathematician and founder of peace and conflict studies, proposed to divide violence into cultural, structural (indirect) and personal (direct or actual).12. All these forms are mutually conditioned: cultural violence creates conditions for the manifestation of structural violence, and structural violence - for the manifestation of personal violence. This division is related to Galtung's specific definition of violence: "Violence is understood as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what might have been and what is."13 Violence can only be described as something that can be avoided: for example, death from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century is not a problem. violence, but today, when it is easily treatable, allowing a person to die from tuberculosis is violence. The frame of cultural violence covers those forms of culture-as a "symbolic sphere of existence" - that can be used to legitimize violence, be it religion, ideology, language, art, etc.14
Since we are primarily interested in religion, we will now focus on distinguishing between structural and personal (or actual) violence. The former differs from the latter in the absence of a complete "composition", that is, the subject, object and relation, the act between them; in addition, the former is prefaced to the latter as cause and effect. Here's an example. Orthodox-identified young men who beat up parishioners of the Reconciliation Pentecostal church on April 23, 2006, shouted to them that "Easter is only Orthodox", and they are "sectarians" and"devils" 15. It is obvious that hatred of abstract "sectarians" for them preceded hatred of specific Pentecostals, and that, in turn, preceded an act of personal violence. Alexey Perov, pastor of the Protestant church "Commonwealth of Christ", whose son was the same-

12. Galtung, J. (1969) "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", Journal of Peace Research 6 (3): 170.

13. "Violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is" (Ibid., p. 168).

14. Galtung, J. (1990) "Cultural Violence", Journal of Peace Research 27 (3): 291.

15. Портал-Credo.ru. In Kemerovo Region on Easter beat up members of the Pentecostal church "Reconciliation" [http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/? act=news&id=42 619, accessed from 15.08.2014].

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stoko was beaten up by classmates on Knowledge Day, claiming that the topic of "sectarians" and "traitors" had been discussed in his village for a long time 16. The organizers of the pogrom in the gay club 7 freedays and Abbot Sergiy (Rybko), who approved this pogrom in hindsight, also "knew the enemy by sight": they were "sodomites", that is, members of the LGBT community 17.

Is it possible to say anything about an act of personal violence, such as murder, if it is "naked", that is, if we do not know who was killed or who is the killer? We believe that actual violence itself is meaningless and meaningless, but it takes on content and meaning in the perspective of structural violence that lies beyond it. We have presented three cases above; all of them contain stable structures (for example, religious images of the "enemy") that allow us to identify aggressors as religious actors, and their actions as religious violence. Violence always begins long before the "deed", in the "word and thought", that is, in the "general" and often non-obvious, which can and should be the subject of research.

According to Hector Avalos, religious violence is based on the ability of religious consciousness to generate imaginary limited resources (scarce recourses), including access to the divine will (for example, through the Holy Scriptures), sacred space, group privilege, and salvation. 18 Limited resources should be recognized as structures of violence along with dualistic models of confrontation between light and darkness or the functioning of religious images of the "enemy" ("sodomites", "sectarians", etc.) in the discourse of the religious community. However, to varying degrees, structural violence is inherent in all "all-

16. Slavic Legal Center. A first-grader, the son of a pastor of a Protestant church, was severely beaten as a "sectarian" after an Orthodox prayer service on the Day of Knowledge [http://www.sclj.ru/news/detail.php?SECTION_ID=194&ELEMENT_ID=1508, accessed from 15.08.2014].

17. The pogrom in the gay club 7 freedays and the statement of the priest of the Russian Orthodox Church in support of the action [http://radio.bfm.ru/news/2012/10/15/pogrom-v-gej-klube-7freedays-i-zajavlenie-svjashhenni ka-rpc-v-podderzhku-akcii. html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

18. "...access to the divine will, particularly through inscripturation; sacred space; group privileging; and salvation" (Avalos, H. Fighting Worlds: The Origins of Religious Violence, p. 30).

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comprehensive doctrines, including all religious traditions 19.

On the border of structural and actual violence lies symbolic20. Its act is neither objective nor subjective: it cannot be proved, but is accepted on faith by its subject, object, or both at the same time. For example, the action carried out by members of the punk rock band Pussy Riot in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour (XXC) on February 21, 2012, is an act of violence ("blasphemy") for their opponents and is not such for their supporters. Symbolic violence is a mediated, symbolic act; it contains a symbol (in this case, the sacred space XXC). as a structural element of the sign system, it becomes a mediating link between the subject and the object of violence.

There is a point of view, as expressed, for example, in Regina Schwartz's The Curse of Cain, that identity, and any identity at that, is the fundamental structure of violence. An American researcher writes that "identity as an act of distinguishing and separating from others, as creating a boundary and drawing a line, is the most frequent and fundamental act of violence that we commit. Violence is not only what we do to the Other. [ ... ] The very construction of the Other is violence."21. The philosopher Georges Corme agrees with her, arguing that identity functions as a "reference to the negative pole." 22 Both refer primarily to collective identity, not individual identity. The formation of identity, that is, identification, according to this model, occurs as the establishment of the boundaries of its subject through the opposition of it

19. See: Agadzhanyan A." Plural sovremennosti", rossiiskie" prikryatye voprosy "i nezbyblnost' sekulyarnogo Moderna ["Multiple Modernities", Russian "cursed questions" and the inviolability of secular Modernity]. Gosudarstvo, religiya, tserkva v Rossii i za rubezhom. 2012. N 1. P. 92.

20. This concept goes back to P. Bourdieu and J.-K. Passron; here we use it in the specified simplified meaning. See, for example: Bourdieu P., Passron J.-K. Fundamentals of symbolic Violence theory // Questions of education. 2006. N 2.

21. "...Identity as an act of distinguishing and separating from others of boundary making and line drawing, is the most frequent and fundamental act of violence we commit. Violence is not only what we о the Other. [...] Violence is the very construction of the Other" // Schwartz, R. (1994) The Curse of Cain: the Violent Legacy of Monotheism, p. 5. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

22. Feed Zh. The religious question in the twenty-first century Geopolitika i krizis postmoderna [Geopolitics and Postmodern Crisis], Moscow: Institute of General Humanitarian Research, 2012, p. 60.

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everything external, alien and alien to her. James Wellman and Kyoko Tokuno push this thesis to its logical limit, presenting identification as "conflict and tension" with "external" reality. "Conflict and tension" here turn out to be the" engine " of collective identity in general and religious collective identity in particular. 23
Can we agree that this is how any identity is built? We believe not. Sociology knows the difference between positive and negative identity, and the above model describes only the latter. Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov notes that negative identity really functions as "self-constitution from the opposite", expressed "in the form of denial of any qualities or values in its bearer" 24. Identity as a negative identity appears as a structure of violence, and with this reservation we believe it is possible to work with this concept.

American religious scholar and sociologist Mark Jurgensmeyer argues that one of the central images of the religious imagination, along with sacrifice, is the "cosmic war", the struggle of sacred order and meaningfulness with profane chaos and meaninglessness.25 Religious identity, in the context of this definition of the situation, consists in identifying "we" with the sacred and "the other" with the profane, and as a consequence, in labeling it as the "enemy" 26. The profane, that is, the "negative pole" of religious thinking, is violence itself,which spreads like a contagious disease, "contagion" (disease), seeks to "devour" the sacred and is personified in the images of the cosmic enemy: the devil, devas, jinns, demons and other "evil spirits in heaven" (Eph 6: 12).

23. Wellman, J. and Tokuno, K. (2004) "Is Religious Violence Inevitable?", Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 43 (3), p. 292.

24. Gudkov L. Negativnaya identichnost ' [Negative identity], Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2004.

25. См. Juergensmeyer, M. (2003) Terror in the Mind of God: the Global Rise of Religious Violence, p. 149. California: University of California Press; Juergensmeyer, M. (1994) The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, p. 159. California: University of California Press.

26. The concept of "determining the situation" is borrowed from the works of I. Hoffman. See, for example: Hoffman I. Representation of oneself to others in everyday life. Moscow: "Canon-press-C", 2000.

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violence, therefore, serves to overcome violence as such, the good separation of the sacred and profane, as opposed to their unwholesome mixing. Rene Girard also uses the vaccine metaphor: less sacred violence is meant to prevent more profane violence. He also hypothesized the existence of "sacrificial crises" - special spatiotemporal and social continua, when this prevention becomes impossible due to the extraordinary intensity of the "contagion", the erosion of all forms of traditional and rational authority, as well as certain social institutions (first of all, the institution of sacrifice).27.

The essence of the "enemy" for religious consciousness is that it is almost always a projection of the cosmic enemy into this - worldly social and political realities. The "enemy" is amorphous, because it is a consequence of two different processes: On the one hand, it is the personification of the cosmic enemy, its association with certain communities, on the other - the deindividualization and dehumanization of individuals and groups.28 These processes explain why members of LGBT co-society are thought of as "demoniacal warriors of the antichrist" 29, why representatives of the "world backstage", "similar to people only in appearance, form a demonic breed of people of a dead soul" 30, and even why the burning of a poster of pop singer Madonna by the head of the Union of Orthodox Banner Bearers (hereinafter-SPH) by L. D. Simonovich-Nikshich ends with the words "the demon is cast out" 31. They demonstrate the futility of trying to understand how different categories of enemies differ from each other, for example, how "Jews" differ from "Freemasons", because they are all shadows of the same formless image. Bo-

27. Girard R. Violence and the Sacred, Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010.

28. Deprivation of personal and human status, respectively. American social psychologist Philip Zimbardo points out the connection between these two processes and the dynamics of violence in his famous "Lucifer Effect". See Zimbardo F. The Lucifer Effect. Why good people turn into villains. Moscow, Alpina non-fiction, 2013.

29. 3rm. Moscow - The Third Rome. NEW ATTACK OF SODOMITES on June 11, at 12 o'clock. Letter to the editor [http://www.3rm.info/36 099-novaya-ataka-sodomitov-ll-iyunya-pismo-v-redakciyu. html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

30. Gracheva T. V. When power is not from God. Ryazan: Zerna-Slovo Publ., 2010, P. 3_4.
31. See [http://www.drakula.org/cgi-bin/galereya.pi?action=see&idbank=25, accessed from 15.08.2014].

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Moreover, the expression "representative of the world behind the scenes" used by us seems to be only a consequence of the lack of linguistic means: "the enemy" as a personification of the chaotic profane always appears simultaneously one and multiple, faceless and many-sided, so that such a designation of "part of the whole" is unthinkable in relation to the sphere of total violence, in which there is no no whole, no parts.

The diversity of images of the "space war"

Turning to the empirical material, we recall that space warfare as a structure of violence can paradoxically lead to the theoretical and practical affirmation of both violence and nonviolence, reconciliation . The discourse of apology, or legitimization of violence, is usually built on the foundation of the discourse of victimhood - understanding oneself as an object of violence. A religious community defines a situation as a conflict in which it itself experiences violence from the "enemy" (or "enemies") and is therefore forced to respond with defensive or defensive-offensive (preventive) violence.

The official position of the Moscow Patriarchate under Patriarchs Alexy II and Kirill is civilizational nationalism - an inclusive version of ethno-cultural nationalism, in which Orthodox civilization opposes internal and external (embodied in the image of the "West") secularism with its heavy artillery of liberal values.32 The confrontation is being waged both at the global level and on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church - in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Patriarch Alexy II described the situation as follows:

We must realize that a well-planned, bloodless war is being waged against our people to destroy them. In Western countries, there is a powerful industry of molestation

32. A. Verkhovsky notes that "Orthodox civilization" in the interpretation of the MP may include representatives of other religions who agree with the hegemony of the Russian and Orthodox. Verkhovsky A. [The ideology of Patriarch Kirill, methods of its promotion and its possible influence on the self-consciousness of the Russian Orthodox Church]. 17.10.2012 [http: //www.sova-center.ru/religion/publications/2012/10/ (d25 570 /, accessed 15.08.2014].

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[ ... ] the activities of which have caused an unprecedented demographic crisis in our country and at an unprecedented pace are leading to the degeneration and extinction of our people [...] We must raise the Russian people to fight for the lives of their children. We do not call for war and pogroms, but we call for the feat of professing the Christian faith in the face of militant evil.33
The discourse of victimhood invariably goes hand in hand with the formation of a dualistic picture of the world, which to a greater or lesser extent includes an understanding of contemporary political realities. The concept of Metropolitan John (Snychev), which is classical for Orthodox ethno-cultural nationalism, is described by him in the book " Autocracy of the Spirit. Essays on Russian Identity", offers a vision of world history as a confrontation between "dark forces" and Holy Russia, embodied in the Orthodox tsar and the collective, "cathedral" personality of the Russian people 34. It is also characterized by a militaristic aesthetic, army and military ideal 35. Publicist and author of the so-called "Letter 500" Mikhail Nazarov writes about the struggle between the forces of Christ and the Antichrist, 36 and Orthodox political scientist Tatyana Gracheva - about two "sacred world centers of confrontation [ ... ] these two imperial cores-one filled with the spirit of Christ, the other-a concentrated embodiment of the spirit of the antichrist" 37. Clearly, the concept of space warfare encompasses all of these models.

Until 2012, the topic of morals and morals, family and child rearing was practically the only one that led Orthodox nationalists to call for violence. At the same time, it was invariably modeled in the categories of space warfare and supplemented by the personal interest of each Orthodox in ensuring that he and his family did not fall victim to the "dark forces".

33. Speech of Patriarch Alexy II at the Moscow Diocesan assembly. DECR message. 15.11.2000.

34. Mitr. John (Snychev). Autocracy of the spirit. Ocherki russkogo samosoznaniya [Essays on Russian Self-consciousness], St. Petersburg: L. S. Yakovleva Publishing House, 1994.

35. Kostyuk K. Three portraits.

36. Nazarov M. How does Russia differ from the West? (About two Christian civilizations-the retaining and apostasy) [http://www.rusidea.org/?а=6033, accessed from 15.08.2014].

37. Gracheva T. V. Svyataya Rus ' vs Khazarii [Holy Russia against Khazaria]. Algorithms of geopolitics and strategies of secret wars of the world behind the scenes. Ryazan: Zerna-Slovo Publ., 2009, p. 8.

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forces "represented, for example, by Sodom and Gomorrah or "juvenile justice", that is, supporters of juvenile justice (JUJ).

The image of Sodom and Gomorrah (or simply "Sodom") It becomes the" semantic center "of the profane, which is opposed to Holy Russia and unites all the "dark forces" with the tag "sex": homosexuals, bisexuals, transgender people, pedophiles, as well as sex educators and youth activists. Accordingly, its characteristics are the same as those of Holy Russia, but with a "minus" sign: it is a superpersonal, that is, not reducible to the sum of its personifications, chaotic (anti-cosmic) structure with indefinite boundaries, which seeks to destroy the Christian cosmos.39 Therefore, " Sodom will not pass!", that is, an attack on an LGBT event, is the most popular" genre " of actual violence among Orthodox nationalists. These are, for example, the beating of journalist Elena Kostyuchenko by a member of the SPH 40, the skirmish after the action "Day of Kisses-2", timed to coincide with the consideration by the State Duma of the law banning propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations 41, the pogrom in the gay club 7freedays mentioned above, and many others.

Homosexuality is at best considered a consequence of the fall-the "Foundations of the ROC social Concept" call it "a vicious distortion of the God-given nature of man" 42-at worst - "a spiritual act of renunciation of God and submission to Satan, in order to make it possible for him [man - A. Z.] to voluntarily join the anti-church of Satan" 43. Specifics the "sodomite" as an image of the enemy is that it expresses

38. The concept of "center" ("semantic center") borrowed from the work of F. S. Nielsen "Eye of the Storm". Nielsen F. Eye of the Storm. St. Petersburg: Aleteya Publ., 2004.

39. Well done P. Pedophilia - a hidden attitude of homosexuality [http://www.pravoslavie.ru/jurnal/54 602.htm, accessed from 15.08.2014]

40. Radio Liberty. What Elena Kostyuchenko defended at the gay pride parade [http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/24209 520.html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

41. Kasparov. <url>. LGBT activists were beaten up by Orthodox Christians after a rally near the State Duma [http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=50FE62l53l 9b5, accessed on 15.08.2014].

42. Fundamentals of the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church [http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/141422.html, accessed from 15.08.2014]. Or, for example: Orthodoxy and peace. Prot. Alexey Uminsky. There is no need to specifically explain the sinfulness of homosexuality [http://www.pravmir.ru/gei-v-cerkvi-est-li-mesto/, accessed from 15.08.2014].

43. 3rm. Moscow - The Third Rome. The" New World " of perverts as a worldwide Sodom anti-church [http://3rm.info/35 836-novyy-mir-izvraschencev-kak-vselenskaya-sodomskaya-anticerkov. html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

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the meaning of the profane as a contagious disease-it is literally "infected" with violence and brings it to the city and the world. This aspect can also be described as demon possession: LGBT events allegedly create conditions for demons to pass from person to person.44 The same meaning of "contagion" was described by Patriarch Alexy II in the above quote as "corruption". It is also noted in the "Fundamentals of the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church".:

Propaganda of vice causes particular harm to the unapproved souls of children and youth... The Church calls on the faithful, in cooperation with all morally sound forces, to fight the spread of this diabolical temptation, which contributes to the destruction of the family and undermines the foundations of society. 45
To. Mikhailov rightly points out that the use of the vague concept of "propaganda of homosexuality" in an official document is first found in Osnovy 46. He believes that this text could have been taken into account both in the first draft law of State Duma Deputy Alexander Chuev on banning "propaganda of homosexuality" in 2003 and in subsequent similar initiatives, which ended in June 2013 with the adoption of the Law "On banning propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors".47. It is noteworthy that this concept also carries the already mentioned meaning of "contagion", which thus passed from religious discourse to secular discourse. Images of the space war became particularly clear in 2012, after the scandals with the clock and the patriarch's apartment, and especially after the Pussy Riot action in XXC on February 21, during the trial of three members of the punk rock band-N. Tolokonnikova, M. Alyokhina and E. Samutsevich. The widespread public response was accompanied by a significant shift in the discourse of the Moscow Patriarchate towards the discourse of victimization.

44. 3rm. Moscow - The Third Rome. NEW ATTACK OF SODOMITES on June 11, at 12 o'clock. Letter to the editor [http://www.3rm.info/36 099-novaya-ataka-sodomitov-ll-iyunya-pismo-v-redakciyu. html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

45. The basic social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church. M.: 2001. P. 80 - 81.

46. Michajlov, K. (2013) "'Propaganda der Sunde': Die ROK und die sexuellen Minderheiten", Osteuropa 63 (Oktober 2013): 87 - 98.

47. Air Force. Russian service. The State Duma adopted the law on "non-traditional relations" [http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2013/06/130 611_duma_gay_propaganda. shtml? print=1, accessed 07.10.2014].

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Public opinion is sharply divided. 48 The "clerical" side has repeatedly called the situation an "anti-church campaign", an " information war "or simply a" war", pointing out that this is a violation of the boundaries of the sacred and a war against the sacred, which can manifest itself in other" traditional religions " of the Russian Federation. Prot. Vsevolod Chaplin claimed that " at one time there were crimes related to the desecration of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries, mosques, the burning of the Koran and other acts of vandalism and insults based on religious feelings. In all these cases, the traditional religious communities of Russia supported each other and showed solidarity. " 49 Some marginal groups have indeed committed acts of symbolic violence against the Russian Orthodox Church: these include, for example, the cutting down of a cross of worship at the construction site of the Church of St. Tatiana in Moscow50, the actions of FEMEN activists51, and the destruction of four more crosses in Arkhangelsk and the Chelyabinsk region by the Narodnaya Volya movement52. These and many other acts of violence have been described as" blasphemies " as proof of the reality of the war against the sacred 53.

The discourse of Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) was emphatically peaceful, and the images of the "enemy" in their speeches were amorphous, but quite worldly: "anti-church forces", "organizers of provocations","ill-wishers"54. Prot. Dimitri Smirnov spoke more harshly:

48. For more details, see: Uzlaner D. Delo "Pussy Riot" i osobennosti rossiiskogo postsekulyarizma [The Pussy District case and features of Russian post-secularism]. Gosudarstvo, religiya, tserkva v Rossii i za rubezhom [State, Religion, Church in Russia and abroad]. 2013. N2. pp. 93-133.

49. Nezavisimaya gazeta. Patriarch won't let go of Pussy Riot's sin [http://www.ng.ru/po Htics/2012 - 03 - 26/2_rpc. html, accessed 15.08.2014].

50. Vzglyad. Poklonny cross cut down in Moscow [http://www.vz.ru/news/2013/3/26/6 26 051.html].

51. Reedus. FEMEN activists sawed down a cross over Maidan Nezalezhnosti [http://www.ridus.ru/news/42804/, accessed from 15.08.2014].

52. Vzglyad. In Arkhangelsk and Chelyabinsk Region cut down four poklonny crosses [http://vz.ru/news/2012/8/25/595 085.html, accessed from 15.08.2014]; Vzglyad. The Narodnaya Volya movement took responsibility for cutting down the crosses [http://vz.r u/news/2012/8/28/595 403.html, accessed on 15.08.2014].

53. Orthodoxy and the world. Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin: An information war is being waged against the Church [http://www.pravmir.ru/informacionnaya-vojna-video/, accessed from 15.08.2014].

54. Orthodoxy ru. His Holiness Patriarch Kirill: the information war against the Church has united the faithful [http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/58 456.htm, accessed from 15.08.2014].

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The attacks against the Russian Orthodox Church that we are now witnessing are the beginning of a war against the Church. The beginning of the persecution. [ ... ] The manifestations of this war are obvious. These are everyday remarks, and the reaction of defenders of the blasphemous actions of a punk band, all this vile attack on His Holiness the Patriarch, various statements on all sorts of occasions and without in the media space. Everything is very clear. And the horns are sticking out! It is clear that this is what the Antichrist is doing. [ ... ] It is clear that these are two poles: on the one hand, anti - Christian debauchery, the destruction of the individual, and on the other hand, Christian values [... The people who are now promoting anti-church campaigns want to get Sodom and Gomorrah instead of Christian culture.55
The quote demonstrates both the demonization of specific social forces and the dualistic opposition of Sodom and Gomorrah to Holy Russia. Lawyers for the XXC security guard, whose religious feelings were offended by Pussy Riot's performance, make this associative complex even clearer, claiming that there is a "mystical component" to this action and that it is connected with the 9/11 terrorist attack by "Satan who is engaged in destruction" 56. Orthodox journalist Alexander Shchipkov called the action in XXC a "terrorist attack" and wrote that "a systematic project to discredit Orthodoxy has been launched since 2011" and that "a cold war has been declared on the Russian Orthodox Church." 57 He describes the letter to the Patriarch of the Orthodox initiative group dated June 19, 2012, asking for "grieving" for the Pussy Riot members before the authorities as a schismatic "ultimatum" and writes that " in fact the authors of the letter directly declared war on their Primate and indirectly on the entire Church, since the ultimatum is presented by one of the belligerents. And the strong - weak " 58. The goal of this cold war, at best , is to remove the patriarch

55. Orthodox News Agency Russkaya Liniya. Archpriest Dimitri Smirnov: "The attacks against the Russian Orthodox Church that we are now seeing are the beginning of a war against the Church, the beginning of persecution" [http://rusk.ru/newsdata.php? idar=54133, accessed on 15.08.2014].

56. Moscow news. "Tolokonnikova's group is better off being punished on earth than in heaven." Lawyers of the victim in the Pussy Riot case are sure that the girls should be additionally charged with inciting inter-religious hatred [http://mn.ru/society/20120719/323221 969.html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

57. Shchipkov A. Territory of the Church. Information Attack on the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in 2011-2012, Moscow: Indrik, 2012, pp. 67, 99.

58. Ibid., p. 100.

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At worst, the destruction of the institution of the patriarchate. Maksim Shevchenko, a conventionally Orthodox journalist, also used vague, militant images when he claimed that the Pussy Riot action was "an invasion of the inner life of millions of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Georgians, and Armenians by advanced detachments of liberal-Western civilization."59
The war against the sacred is also associated with the physical destruction of the clergy, as stated by the same Archpriest. Dimitri Smirnov. It is characteristic that Damir Mukhetdinov, Deputy Chairman of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European Part of Russia, also expresses this point of view, claiming that "the root cause is one - godlessness, aggressive Satanism"60. Later, Pskov Region Governor Andrey Turchak spoke about the murder of the famous preacher Fr. Paul Adelheim's statement that "the murder of a priest is a challenge to society, a mockery of the very foundations of morality, morals and faith" 61. This statement seems to us representative: from the point of view of religious consciousness, the murder of a priest is really a challenge to the sacred (in this case, society), that is, order in itself.

The meaning of violating the boundaries of the sacred is also reflected in the new version of Article 148 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which establishes criminal liability for "insults to religious feelings". "Insulting religious feelings" is equated to desecrating sacred objects revered by believers.62 This concept has been repeatedly criticized, but ROC lawyers point to its presence in the Federal Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations", and claim that it is a sense of "a person's reverent attitude to what, in accordance with his religious beliefs, is sacred to him"63. We believe that this concept is based on the concept of religious freedom and religious associations.

59. M. Shevchenko Voina Bl*d*y / / LJ Maxim Shevchenko, 21.02.2012 [http://shevchenko-ml.livejournal.com/5544-html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

60. It is noteworthy that Damir Mukhetdinov's comment was published, among other things, on the website Religare (Church Territory: Orthodox Human Rights Center) [http://www.religare.ru/2_102 035_l_l56.html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

61. RIA Novosti. Protodeacon Kuraev: the murdered priest did not seek reasons to criticize the Russian Orthodox Church [http://ria.ru/society/20130806/954542 354. html#ixzz2bOLkyXpT, accessed 15.08.2014].

62. See the Official Internet Portal of Legal Information [http://pravo.gov.ru/].

63. Newsland. The Russian Orthodox Church commented on the law on insulting the feelings of believers [http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/1212293/. accessed on 15.08.2014].

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It is intended to reflect in secular legislation the concepts of "sacred" and "boundaries of the sacred" that are not typical for it: we have already pointed out above that the concept of religious discourse is borrowed by secular discourse (in connection with the concept of "propaganda of homosexuality"). This was explicitly noted, for example, by the well-known traditionalist Heydar Cemal 64.

Analogies, that is, projective comparisons in the discourse of victimhood, allow you to "get to the very essence" of the situation and give it a certain scale, going beyond its limits. The central analogy in the discourse of the "clerical" side was the persecution of the Church in the Soviet Union, and first of all, the repressions of the 20s and 30s of the XX century. Prot. Vladimir Vigilyansky, the former head of the Patriarch's press service, compared the rhetoric of his opponents to that of the early twentieth century and wrote that " we are indeed facing the horror of the real persecutions that we had under the Bolsheviks." 65 Similar allusions were made by the Archpriest. Vsevolod Chaplin during a meeting with students of the Moscow State University Television Faculty, claiming that in the 1920s believers had to respond to the Bolsheviks by force of arms 66.

The discourse of victimization of the Moscow Patriarchate was developed in the apology or legitimization of violence, namely, in the idea of protecting Orthodox shrines by the forces of Cossack squads and Orthodox activists, such as the Russian Orthodox Movement "Holy Russia" by Ivan Otrakovsky. 67 In August 2012, he announced that "if we find persons committing blasphemous acts against Orthodox shrines, insulting the Orthodox faith, or showing aggression towards priests, we reserve the right to take appropriate measures." 68 The initiative to create Orthodox squads is supported by the Russian Orthodox Church.-

64. MK.ru. Protodeacon Andrey Kuraev found a problem with feelings in the law on protecting the feelings of believers [http://www.mk.ru/politics/article/2013/07/08/880 670-protodiakon-andrey-kuraev-nashel-v-zakone-o-zaschite-chuvstv-veruyuschih-problemu-s -chuvstvami. html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

65. V. Vigilyansky, prot. Spring anti-Christian aggravation: What was that? Moscow: Russian House Publishing House, 2012, p. 134.

66. Kasparov. roo. Like a true Christian. Archpriest Chaplin considers it possible to defend the faith by force of arms [http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4F6A05 048AEF0, accessed on 15.08.2014].

67. Official website of the People's Cathedral movement [http://www.narodsobor.ru/, accessed from 15.08.2014].

68. Facets. roo. "Holy Russia" starts patrolling the streets of Moscow [http://grani.ru/Society/Religion/rn. 199 902.html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

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sting prot. Vsevolod Chaplin, prot. Vladimir Vigilyansky and Patriarch Kirill 69. It was followed by more extravagant projects, such as the creation of the "vladychny regiment" of the Patriarch's guards, which, however, remained unrealized.70 There were also acts of personal violence by individuals associated with vigilantes, such as the attack on the Museum of Erotic Art on Arbat 71. One should also point out the extraordinary catalysis of online violence discourse. Here are a number of radical statements by people who identify with Orthodoxy: "It was necessary to drag the b*d*sch out of the temple by the hair and put all the scum on a stake, so that they would not dare to mock the Russian Orthodox faith"; " ... do not be offended if next time you break your legs. Christians get tired of being weak"; " Burn these prostitutes at the stake!!!!"; "I hope they will still be convicted. Although it would be more merciful to just strangle them quietly so that they don't suffer, because biomusor. And the children - to the monastery " 72.

The idea of protection formed the basis of Orthodox actionism( or Orthodox activism), which later took shape in the Orthodox social movement "God's Will". Born in the Orthodox youth community as a reaction to Pussy Riot's performance, Orthodox actionism mirrored the actions of various art groups in the 1990s and 2000s. Its leaders are Dmitry "Enteo" Tsorionov, D. Pimenov and A. Kaplin.

The activity of the "God's Will" movement, which includes both violent and nonviolent forms, is marked by the popularization of symbolic violence as a separate "genre", which is still known from the "banner-bearing auto-dafe" of the Union of Orthodox Banner Bearers. Analysis of the actions of "God's Will" and SPH allows us to conclude that only some of these actions are performances that are more or less oriented

69. However, the Patriarch's rhetoric was considerably more restrained than that of Chaplin and Vigiliansky. See Orthodoxy and the World. Patriarch Kirill urges Orthodox squads to avoid aggression [http://www.pravmir.ru/patriarx-kirill-prizval-pravoslavnye-druzhiny-izbegat-agressii/, accessed from 15.08.2014].

70. Air Force. Russian service. Moscow will be patrolled by Orthodox activists [http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/society/2012/08/120 821_church_activist_squads. shtml, accessed 15.08.2014].

71. RBC. Defenders of Orthodox shrines "stoned" erotic museum [http://top.rbc.ru/incidents/29/08/2012/666 883. shtml, accessed 15.08.2014].

72. For a selection, see: The blasphemers who blasphemed Putin and Gundyaev are caught. [http://cinik-ru.livejournal.com/74 095-html, accessed on 15.08.2014].

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the audience and the media; others, on the contrary, are held in a chamber setting. The former include, for example, the "Prayer stand against the anti-Madonna" 73, during which her image was pierced with a stake, and the "Russian auto-dafe" in Kuzminki 74, and the latter-the burning of an effigy of Elton John 75 and the fact that the portal Credo.ru restrainedly designated as a symbolic hunt for gays 76, and he SPH, with its characteristic expression - "Spiritual oprichnina, or" Death to p*d*rastam! ""77. From the events of "God's Will", we pay attention to the "Fire of Repentance" 78 and "Enteo set fire to the Earth" 79. SPH tools - fire and cold weapons (bow and arrow, knife, "aspen stake"); actionists are limited to fire. All this is used to destroy anything that is associated with the" enemy": the attack is directed not only at the" enemy", but also at its" vrazheskost", that is, the profane abstracted from it. Before and after the burning of the image of the Madonna, L. D. Simonovich-Niksic stated that "we are not against people, we are against sin" and "she went to hell. The demon is cast out " 80. During the "Fire of Repentance" campaign, A. Kaplin and D. Enteo painted masks on the asphaltPussy Riot (balaclavas), and then laid out combustible materials on the drawings and set them on fire. It is characteristic that the alternative name of the action is "Andrey Kaplin and Dimitri Enteo burn Pussy Riot": the image of the " enemy "and the" enemy " itself are identical according to the principle of sympathetic magic. The purpose of the ritual is to exorcise the demon.-

73. This refers to the American pop singer Louise "Madonna" Ciccone [http://www.drakula.org/cgi-bin/galereya.pl?action=see&idbank=25, accessed from 15.08.2014].

74. Gallery Drakula.org. Russian auto-dafe [http://www.drakula.org/cgi-bin/galereya.pi? action=see&idbank=26, accessed 15.08.2014].

75. Atheist website of Belarus. "Banner-bearing auto-dafe": Orthodox burn effigy of Elton John [http://www.a-theism.com/2012/05/blog-post_2692. html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

76. Лортал-Credo.ru. Photo Gallery: Gay Hunting [http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=84 450&type=view, accessed from 15.08.2014].

77. Spiritual Oprichnina, or "Death to p*d*rastas!" [http://www.drakula.org/sv_horugv/7/29-shtml, accessed from 15.08.2014].

78. See the video "Andrey Kaplin and Dimitri Enteo burn Pussy Riot" [http://www.zakrest.ru/].

79. Neskuchny Sad. Enteo set fire to the Ground [http://www.nsad.ru/articles/enteo-podzheg-zemlyu, accessed from 15.08.2014].

80. Портал-Credo.ru Banner-bearers burned portraits of Madonna on the throne and Pussy Riot dancing near the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour [http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/? act=news&id=94 399&type=view, accessed from 15.08.2014].

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et members of the punk rock band "take off the masks and become God's slaves Mary, Nadezhda, Catherine": his actions are aimed at ensuring that the "enemy" is no longer there, whether he disappears with or without girls. Enteo's actions, according to him, are invariably included in the context of the fight against infernal forces, that is, in the space war 81. Symbolic violence, in contrast to actual violence, allows you to act in the legal field, which is noted by both L. D. Simonovich-Niksic 82 and Enteo 83.

Actual religious violence can be organized or unorganized: there is a difference between regular events in the spirit of "Sodom will not pass!", during which Orthodox nationalists confront LGBT activists, and the spontaneous beating of a conscript parishioner of the Orthodox Church of the Mother of God Derzhavnaya ("Bogorodichny Center") an employee of the military enlistment office, A. Malykhin, who shouted that "we have a different god, a different church, and this is something wrong with you, so we will save you" 84. It is important that both are preceded by the same structures, in particular, the images of the "enemy" - respectively, "sodomite" and "sectarian": attacking them becomes not just an act of defense against them, but also a sacred duty85. These two "enemies" are most often the objects of personal violence on the part of believers.

The sacred can not only restrain the onslaught of the profane who" devours "it, but also carry out its violent conversion, "devour" it in turn. This meaning of conversion is reflected in the above case with A. Malykhin and a member of the"Bogorodichny Center". It should be recognized that conversion can also be nonviolent, based on preaching and teaching.-

81. The Symbol of Faith. Activist Dmitry Enteo became a" style icon " of Orthodox actionism [http://simvol-veri.ru/xp/aktivist-dmitriie-enteo-stal-ikonoie-stilya-pravoslavnogo-akcionizma . html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

82. Портал-Credo.ru. Media monitoring: Orthodox radicals will subject the "Tsar" to an auto-dafe. The Union of Orthodox Banner Bearers intends to oppose the upcoming premiere of Pavel Lungin's film "The Tsar" [http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/? act=news&id=73,993&type=view, accessed from 15.08.2014].

83. Dmitry Enteo: people wouldn't care if their Mother was being bullied [http://www.nsad.ru/articles/dmitrij-enteo-lyudyam-bylo-vse-ravno-chto-nad-ih-materyu-izde vayutsya, accessed from 15.08.2014].

84. Information and analytical center "Sova". In the Moscow military enlistment office, a conscript was beaten up as a "sectarian". Январь 2008 [http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/20o8/oi/d12 503/, доступ от 15.08.2014].

85. Appleby R. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, p. 81.

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However, "sodomites", in contrast to "sectarians", are often dehumanized to such an extent that this approach is unacceptable.86
The "sacrificial crisis" of the temple environment

Having considered the images of space war among Orthodox nationalists and their influence on symbolic and actual violence, we can move on to refract these images in the rhetoric and practices of the church environment. The concept of a "temple environment" is extremely difficult to conceptualize due to the complexity of its texture. Conventionally, it can be defined as an ethno-confessional external subculture (i.e., a peripheral cultural code opposed to the central cultural code), which consists of many small communities that exist on a temporary or permanent basis and are united by a common worldview, mythology (a library of "objects of faith"), dualistic historiosophy and actual eschatology, which also exploits this definition a situation like a "sacrificial crisis", and suggesting the end of the world during the lifetime of the current generation 87. If the situation of Orthodox nationalists represents the normal dynamics of space warfare, then the situation of the church environment has a number of differences. They are connected with the perception of the present moment as a space-time "failure" that opened up after the execution of the royal family, which marked the end of the old Russia and the coming to power of the Bolsheviks. 88 In this "failure" there is no time, and the profane inexorably, hour by hour, "devours" the sacred, mixing with it and replacing its content with its own emptiness. Since the late 1990s, the monarchical

86. Dmitry Enteo: "We preached in a riot van packed with revolutionaries, on a bus full of homosexuals... Right now, working with the liberal public is an important area for us. Under the walls of the court, we talked to Pussy Riot supporters about God, and one activist was almost persuaded to repent right on the spot." Persons. Dmitry Tsorionov (Enteo) [http://grani.ru/people/1513/, accessed from 15.08.2014].

87. Tarabukina A.V. Folklore and culture of the church circle. Dis... Candidate of Philological Sciences, St. Petersburg: IRLI RAS, 2000; Akhmetova M. The end of the world in one separate country, Moscow: OGI, RSUH, 2010.

88. Kormina J., Shtyrkov S. Orthodox versions of the Soviet past: memory policies in the rituals of commemoration // Anthropology of Social Change, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2011, pp. 389-413.

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In the "wing" of the church environment, tsarobozhie is spreading, that is, the doctrine of the divine status of the Russian tsar, and the idea of the present moment as liminal is also associated with the actual absence of the monarch in Russia as a personification of Holy Russia.89 The renewal of the sacred cosmos is associated with the restoration of the monarchy by the eschatological returning redeemer tsar-the Coming Tsar who will purge Russia of its enemies and expel or kill the Antichrist 90.

The progressive mixing of the sacred and profane as a "cosmic conquest" is expressed in eschatological catastrophes (natural and environmental disasters, famine, war, desecration of former sacred loci, untruthfulness of the bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church), and in the near future should end with the gift of the seal of the Antichrist 91. The seal of the Antichrist becomes an image of absolute "contagion", a conversion into the totality of violence, which condemns a person to eternal damnation (that is, eternal violence). Its adoption is not a single act, but a process mediated by the adoption of its equivalents. A person, according to an anonymous author of the conservative Orthodox portal "Moscow - the Third Rome", does not renounce Christ immediately, but gradually, step by step, accepting a voucher, Russian passport, TIN, insurance certificate, bank card, biometric passport 92. With the adoption of the seal, a person becomes his own enemy, deindividualized and dehumanized, dissolving into a gray mass of non-human beings. He will "lose his "I", in the words of Hieroschemist Raphael (Berestov)93.

89. For arguments in favor of raising the question of the divine status of the tsar in tsarebozhia, see A. Zygmont. O fenomene tsarebozhiya v sovremennoi religioznoi kul'tury Rossii [On the phenomenon of tsarebozhia in the modern religious culture of Russia]. Series " Cultural Studies. Art history. Museology". 2012. N 11. pp. 138-145.

90. Chistov K. Russkaya narodnaya utopiya (genezis i funktsii sotsial'no-utopicheskikh legendi) [Russian folk utopia (genesis and functions of socio-utopian legends)]. SPb.: "DMITRY BULANIN", 2011; Arkhipova A. The Last tsar-deliverer: Soviet mythology and folklore of the 20-30s of the XX century. - 30.

91. Akhmetova M. The end of the world in one particular country. p. 89.

92. 3rm. Moscow is the Third Rome. The mousetrap snapped shut? UEC (Biometric passport) - final renunciation [http://3rm.info/27 337-myshelovka-zahlopnulas-uek-biometricheskiy-pasport-okonchatelnoe-otrechenie-ot-hrist a-dalee-zombirovanie-i-pechat. html, accessed from 15.08.2014].

93. Hieroschemist Raphael (Berestov). On the acceptance of Antichrist documents and inscriptions [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LrjmTe52iDE&feature=related, accessed from 15.08.2014].

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All this-the space-time "failure", eschatological catastrophes, the threat of the "seal" and the increasing concentration of" dark forces "to the maximum of personification (Antichrist) - can be described as a" sacrificial crisis", in which the conduct of a normal space war is impossible due to the extraordinary intensity of violent"contagion". If supernatural forces are the engine of eschatological progress, man is powerless - he can only run or stay. Both are connected with the popular practices of desocialization in the Orthodox subculture: "church people "from time to time move to the village or to holy places to" cultivate their garden " there, and /or refuse money, documents and achievements of technological progress. Asceticism for them becomes a" self-purification", a preparation for the renewal of the cosmos and at the same time the last tool for asserting identity.

The eschatological context of human powerlessness in the face of total violence creates a framework for alienating sacred violence, that is, rejecting it in favor of superhuman, divine forces. Only Christ or the Coming King can defeat the "enemy" and purge the world of "contagion"; man can only pray, fast, and wait. The opposite of alienating violence is its appropriation on the principle of " who, if not us?". If we compare I. Otrakovsky's speech at the Russian March 2013, which begins with the words " What should we do?"94, and texts in. Kuznetsov or R. Sergiev (pseudonym S. Romanov), who alienate violence in favor of the Future Tsar 95, the difference will become obvious. However, there is a third option - deferred assignment. For example, the authors are " oprich-

94. This speech was published exclusively on the social network Vkontakte [http://vk.com/rpd_rus?w=wall-32 880 263_1389. accessed from 15.08.2014].

95. Cf.: "The Lord has chosen the future Tsar [ ... ] First of all, He will restore order in the Orthodox Church [as its head], remove all untrue, heretical and lukewarm bishops. And many, very many, with a few exceptions, almost all will be eliminated, and new, true, unshakeable bishops will take their place. It should be noted that along with the untrue and heretical bishops, all lukewarm priests will be removed, as well as those who are not truly "theologizing" deacons (meaning Andrey Kuraev-A. Z.) [ ... ] Given all this, it can be argued that the antichrist will be killed, and Satan will be bound-until the Second Glorious Coming of Jesus Christ at the command of the Most High. That is why" even the Antichrist himself will be afraid of the Russian Orthodox Tsar", knowing what awaits him " / / Sergiev R. Lev is an Anointed one, preserved by the Almighty! [http://www.ic-xc-nika.ru/texts/books/sergiev_roman/lev/main. htm, accessed on 15.08.2014].

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niki", such as A. Makeev, A. Eliseev and N. Kozlov, postpone violence until the time of overcoming the "sacrificial crisis" and represent the "oprichnina" fraternities as an angelic host, companions of the Coming Tsar, who "will drown the Antichrist in his own blood" 96 However, due to the multiplicity of forms within this Orthodox subculture the division of its relations with violence into "appropriation", "alienation" and "deferred appropriation" is conditional and has a probabilistic rather than necessary character.

Conclusion

Let's sum up the results. Violence goes far beyond physical impact and can be structural, topical, and symbolic, with the possibility of actual and symbolic violence arising from the underlying structures. We have suggested that actual violence itself is "naked" and meaningless, gaining meaning only in the horizon of the structure of violence, the specifics of which allow us to define it as specifically religious.

Violence in the religious consciousness, based on our material, appears as a "lesser evil", a "vaccine", violence aimed at ensuring that there is no more violence. Therefore, it is usually described as defensive or defensive-offensive (preventive), and the "channel" of violence in the discourse of any religious community is built from the discourse of victimization (positioning oneself as an object of violence) to the discourse of apology or legitimization of violence (affirming the possibility or need to respond with violence to violence). Negative religious identity as a fundamental structure of violence is translated into images of cosmic war or cosmic conquest (on the eve of a situation of "sacrificial crisis"), which build a link between this world and the other, social and political realities and the supernatural world.

96. See, for example: Makeev A. Alpha and Omega of the Russian Autocracy [http://www.scritube.com/limba/rusa/72814 locj.php, accessed from 15.08.2014]; Eliseev A. Oprichnaya eschatologiya Grozny Tsar [Oprichnaya eschatology of the Terrible Tsar]. http://rossia3.ru/ideolog/nashi/oprich eshatolog, accessed 15.08.2014], Website of the Orthodox Oprichnina Brotherhood [http://oprichnina.chat.ru/].

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We have shown that "space war" is a valid definition of the situation for the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate, Orthodox nationalists and some communities of the church environment. However, the paths of these three segments of church life diverge further. Among church leaders, the calls of Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) for peace and harmony - based on the ambivalence of the sacred - are juxtaposed, for example, with the aggressive rhetoric of the Archpriest. Vsevolod Chaplin and prot. Dimitri Smirnov. Certain groups of Orthodox nationalists consistently "appropriate" violence, both in theory and in practice, taking the "attitude to struggle" as a guide to action; the same applies to cases of spontaneous violence against "enemies" - "sodomites", "sectarians", etc. The " sacrificial crisis "of the temple environment forces its representatives to" alienate "violence in favor of the divine forces or" postpone "it until the time of overcoming the conquest and crisis, as the ideologists of the" oprichnina " fraternities do.

Research in the field of religion and violence can clarify the essence of violence-related phenomena, based on the logic of homo religiosus, that is, from the point of view of the subject, not the object of violence. This is their difference from the legal or human rights discourse, which is built exactly the opposite and proceeds from the fact of violation of someone's rights (that is, from the object, and not the subject of violence). In this article, we have only outlined approaches to the problem of violence in modern Russian Orthodoxy and believe that this topic needs further research.

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