Századok ("Centuries") magazine, published by the Hungarian Historical Society since 1867., is the central scientific historical journal of the Hungarian People's Republic. It is published every two months. Its pages contain materials on the history of Hungary and world history from ancient times to the present day. Among the regular sections of the journal are articles, reports, reviews, reviews of journals (mostly foreign ones) and chronicles of scientific life. Articles and reports are mostly written by Hungarian authors and are devoted to the problems of the history of both Hungary and foreign countries. These are materials related to the main research topics of individual scientists , often chapters from upcoming monographs. A special section provides information about scientific conferences and other forums of scientists, about the defense of doctoral theses. The category "Historical Literature" is traditionally extensive, consisting of annotations and reviews of books by Hungarian and foreign authors. The "Review" section contains a summary of some of the most interesting articles or an overview of articles published in foreign journals. The Chronicle provides information about the scientific life and activities of the Hungarian Historical Society. Over the past ten years, the journal has occasionally introduced the "Discussions" section, which mainly publishes materials of discussions of Hungarian scientists in connection with the work on the 10 - volume "History of Hungary". A detailed bibliography of scientific works on the history of Hungary and world history is periodically published in the journal.

Among the issues of contemporary Hungarian history that the magazine has been working on for the last decade, there is a topic related to the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919. Several articles and posts were published for her anniversary. I. Romshich's article (1979, No. 2) analyzes the social base and changes in the alignment of class forces in the socialist revolution from March to June 1919. The author shows that its victory had a huge impact on the predominantly agricultural population between the Danube and Tisza rivers, and that agricultural workers and a part of the left intelligentsia unanimously supported the dictatorship of the proletariat. The mainstay of the revolution was also the rural poor, who, however, in view of the refusal of the leadership of the Soviet Republic to divide the land between the peasants, were somewhat passive. By mid-June, the balance of class forces had changed, as a significant part of the middle peasants, due to restrictions on free trade, the introduction of new money and the obligation to hand over surplus grain, actually went over to the side of the counter-revolution. Food shortages have also caused discontent among agricultural workers.

B. Beller's article (ibid.) deals with the popular enlightenment during the revolutions of 1918 - 1919 in Hungary. Already at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the reform of public education began, but it was not completed. After the victory of the Socialist Revolution, schools were nationalized and optional religious instruction was introduced. These political tasks, the author emphasizes, were carried out with great foresight-

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tact and tact, but very energetic. In addition to the compulsory eight-year primary school, attention was paid to the development of a network of secondary schools-gymnasiums (with five-year education) and four-year craft, agricultural, factory and trade schools. The higher school was to be rebuilt in accordance with the Marxist worldview, expanded access to it for working and peasant youth, and raised the level of teaching.

The same range of publications includes the works of K. Schoosh on the participation of the leader of the Hungarian and international labor movement K. Wallis in the revolutions of 1918-1919 and F. Peleshkei (1979, No. 2) on the career of the president of the bourgeois republic M. Karoya. "The political crisis of bourgeois-democratic rule was also his personal crisis," the author writes, "and the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic put him politically before the most difficult test of his life" (p.340). In a situation where the Entente took open pressure on the Hungarian government, he decided to resign. It is interesting to note that Karoyi, in his Memoirs, categorically denies that he signed a statement on the transfer of power to the Hungarian Soviet Republic (although this statement was widely published and distributed in those revolutionary days).

The article by M. Ormos (1979, No. 2) analyzes a note sent to the Hungarian government on March 20, 1919 by the head of the Entente military mission, Wikeom, which contained an ultimatum demand from the Entente countries and the United States to evacuate Hungarian troops from the south-eastern regions of the country. The author seeks to find out the role of French politics in the collapse of the bourgeois - democratic regime in Hungary. Representatives of Hungarian bourgeois historiography exaggerated this role; Hortist historians in the interwar years, on the contrary, laid all the responsibility on Karoyi. Ormoche notes that the Chortists, like French bourgeois historiography, considered his resignation and the fact that he allowed the "transfer" of power to the Soviets to be the main political mistake. At the same time, French historiography portrayed the situation in such a way as if Caroyi had no reason to resign, and Vix's note was misunderstood. Meanwhile, the article notes, modern historiography has already clearly determined that the possibilities of the bourgeois-democratic regime in Hungary in the spring of 1919 significantly narrowed not only for foreign policy reasons, but also as a result of unresolved economic problems, as well as changes in the alignment of class forces within the country.

D. Reti, after studying the archives of Italy, gives a description of its diplomatic documents (mainly materials of the military mission in Budapest) about the Hungarian Soviet Republic (1975, N 3-4). These materials show the attitude of the Italian leadership circles to revolutionary Hungary, reflect the aspirations and political goals of Italy and other Western countries. Even the first reports from Budapest (dated March 23, 1918) emphasized "the Bolshevik character of the revolution in Hungary." Interestingly, a telegram from Budapest dated April 15, 1919, noted that Karoyi "is on excellent terms with the present government" (p.648).

A number of articles published by the magazine are devoted to foreign policy issues. Among them is an article by M. Ormos on the Franco-Hungarian secret negotiations in 1920 (1975, N 5-6), based on recently available documents of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hungary then agreed to grant France a number of economic advantages, which corresponded to the far-reaching plans for establishing French hegemony in Central Europe, directed against Germany and Soviet Russia. Hungary, with the help of France, intended to achieve a partial revision of its borders and get the consent of the victorious countries to increase the size of the army. The position of the French government, which, although it did not make specific commitments, did not reject the requests and proposals of Hungary, played a decisive role in the conclusion of the alliance between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which laid the foundations for the future Little Entente. Under these circumstances, Hungary refused to grant almost all economic concessions to France and switched to a wait-and-see policy.

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Having studied the documents of German, Austrian and Hungarian archives about the attempts to restore the Habsburgs and about Austro-Hungarian relations in 1921, L. Kerekes came to the conclusion that the conservative circles of France supported the Habsburgs, and the governments of the Danube basin countries that emerged from the wreckage of Austria-Hungary strongly opposed the plans to return the Habsburgs to the throne (1976, N 1). The author proves the involvement of France in the two attempts of Karl Habsburg to take the Hungarian throne, shows what impact they had on the settlement of territorial disputes between Austria and Hungary, reveals the reaction of neighboring countries to attempts to restore the monarchy.

The attitude of the United States to the problems of the Danube basin countries in 1919-1939 is the subject of the article. Nagy (ibid.). She notes that the policy of isolation from Europe was at that time the leitmotif of the US administration's foreign policy, although the isolation was not complete. Studying the policy of the United States during the presidency of F. D. Roosevelt, the author analyzes the goals of supporters and opponents of the isolationist course, their contradictions, and comes to the conclusion that although the president was bound by the laws of neutrality and the isolationist position of Congress, yet the United States in those years showed more interest in the countries of the Danube basin than before.

In the article " About. Yasi and the Danube question in 1933-1939 " T. Ronai (ibid.) traces the evolution of the views of the Hungarian bourgeois radicalism theorist. He believed that since the countries of the Danube basin in the past were closely linked by economic, political and cultural ties, the peoples of Austria, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia can only successfully solve their specific problems by joint efforts. In their cooperation and solidarity, Yasi saw a guarantee against the hegemonic aspirations of Germany and Italy, and in the 1930s advocated the creation of the Danube Confederation, in which all participating countries would retain their autonomy, but give up part of their national sovereignty. The article emphasizes that the implementation of this program in the context of increasing aggressiveness of the fascist powers meant the need to fight against the imperialist aspirations of German and Italian fascism. At the same time, the union of the Danube Basin countries in the Yasi concepts was considered as a barrier against the spread of communist ideas in Europe. Despite this, Yasi was not hostile to the USSR in the 30 - 40s. he called for an alliance of the Western powers with our country in the interests of the struggle against fascism. In the final part of the article, it is noted that, according to Yasi, the third Reich, using the contradictions between the countries of eastern Central Europe, tied them to itself politically and subordinated their economy.

The author of several articles published in the journal on the problems of Hungarian foreign policy in the interwar period is P. Pritz. In one of them, he writes about the foreign policy of the first government of D. Gembes (1932-1935), describing its course towards strengthening Hungarian-Italian relations and the peaceful revision of the Trianon Peace Treaty (1978, No. 1). The author analyzes in detail the preparations for the November (1932) meeting of Mussolini and Gembesch in Rome, the goals of the foreign policy of both countries, the plan of the customs union of Italy, Austria and Hungary, and the differences between them on various issues. The article also notes Gembesch's desire for political rapprochement with Germany.

In another paper, P. Pritz examines the attitude of Hungary to the emerging Berlin-Rome axis (1981, N 5). The author believes that in relation to 1932-1936 it is still impossible to speak about the unilateral orientation of Hungary towards Germany. The German-Hungarian consultative meetings in 1934 and 1936 were intended to dispel Berlin's unfavorable impression of the anti-German Italo-Hungarian protocol signed in Rome in 1932, and to neutralize the negative consequences for Hungary of the proposed German-Czechoslovak non-aggression treaty. Pritz analyzes the process of rapprochement between Germany and Italy at the beginning of the summer of 1935, Hungary's attitude to the idea of a bloc uniting Germany, Italy, Austria, Poland and Hungary, and notes that the Hungarian Foreign Minister K. Kanya understood that the German-Austrian-

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The Treaty of June 11, 1935, led to the occupation of Austria, and therefore called into question the correctness of the foreign policy course carried out under his leadership.

Another article by the same author, based on a rich source material, concerns the circumstances of the Kiel meeting between Hitler and M. Horthy in August 1938 (1974, No. 3). Hitler's invitation to the Hungarian government delegation was intended to conclude a military alliance with it against Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian delegation was received with great pomp. Horthy was the first head of state to visit the Third Reich. Hitler made him a proposal for a simultaneous and joint military action against Czechoslovakia. But it was rejected. The Hungarian side preferred to seek revision of the borders by peaceful means. Hitler, the article notes, "wanted only one thing-the complete elimination of Czechoslovakia... Hungary's position also played a role in the fact that this did not happen at the time" (p.646). The materials presented by the author show that Hungary was given a significant role in Hitler's plans, and that for a long time he could not forget the behavior of the Hungarian delegation at the Yale meeting. The following reproach was made to the Hungarian Foreign Minister Count I. Chaki, who visited Germany in 1939: "If only Hungary had chosen the right path then... then the solution of the whole question could be approached geographically, and then Hitler would not need to discuss with Chamberlain" (p. 678).

The article by M. Koroma (1974, N 4 and 5 - 6) describes Horthy's attempt to lead Hungary out of the Second World War and the policy of the allied powers in this matter. The author reveals the significant changes that occurred in the international situation of Hungary in the late summer and early autumn of 1944, in connection with the withdrawal of the Soviet Army to its borders, describes the preparations in Hungary in September 1944 for negotiations with the USSR on preliminary armistice conditions, analyzes the course of negotiations in Moscow with the Hungarian delegation, the conditions of the preliminary armistice, and the circumstances of its signing on October 11, 1944, characterizes the actions of Horthy and his entourage to fulfill the conditions of the preliminary armistice. The article emphasizes that the Soviet side was sympathetic to Hungary's attempt to get out of the war by breaking off relations with Hitler's Germany. The author believes that for the failure of this attempt, much greater responsibility than previously thought lies with the Prime Minister G. Lakatos and some members of his Government, as well as with the head of the military chancellery of the Regent A. Vattai.

An analysis of the formation of the political views of the Hungarian Communists in the period between the June (1923) plenum of the ECCI and the Fifth Congress of the Comintern is given in the article by B. Kirschner (1980, No. 6). The author shows the attitude of the Communists to the regime that then existed in . They considered this regime counter-revolutionary, while stipulating that at the initial stage it also had some fascist features. The article analyzes the influence of the ideas expressed at the ECCI plenum on the formation of the views of Hungarian Communists in the USSR on the question of the union of the working class and the poorest peasantry in cooperation with the middle peasant.

I. Pinter's article (1977, No. 3) analyzes the views of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary (SPD) on fascism. The author notes that in the mid-1930s, when D. Gembes tried to establish a fascist dictatorship in Hungary in the context of increasing anti-fascist struggle in Europe, a significant part of its ruling classes turned away from fascism. The next congress of the SPD was held in September 1935, during the period of the rise of the Hungarian labor movement, which forced the party leadership to speak out more resolutely against the fascist danger. Already in 1933-1935, the pages of social-democratic newspapers and magazines revealed the class character of fascism and its ideology, which was associated with the Soviet Union.-

1 There are various assessments of the khortyst regime in the literature. For more details on the nature of Horthy's power at certain stages of the interwar period, see: Fascism and Anti-democratic regimes in Europe, Moscow 1981; Crisis of the political system of capitalism in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, Moscow 1982.

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social base, economic policy and the mechanism of power. Under the influence of this" ideological offensive " of the Social Democrats, the struggle against fascism in general was revived, and the process of strengthening the left wing began in the SPD.

I. Pinter devoted another article to the problems of the working-class movement (1975, No. 2). It analyzes: the formation of the anti-fascist unity of the Hungarian workers in 1933-1935. The author notes that the cooperation of Communists and Social Democrats, in addition to ideological differences, was hindered by differences in the legal status of their parties: the SPD was legal, represented in parliament, and the CPV was illegal. The article shows the complex internal struggle in the CPV on this issue, reveals the influence of the international movement on the Hungarian one. Analyzing the policies of the Communists and Social Democrats, the author concludes that at the end of 1935-beginning of 1936, the principles that, despite the resistance of the reformists, became the basis for cooperation between the two workers ' parties were defined in general terms.

The formation of a new SDP course is the subject of J. Molnar's article (1978, N 3). It was formulated at an expanded meeting of the party leadership in 1945. The author examines the background of the new deal in the interwar period. The actual preparation of the new course began with the XXXII Party Congress (1939), which came out in defense of national independence, against the expansion of Hitlerite Germany, for the preservation of peace, and proclaimed the need to unite the workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the progressive part of the national bourgeoisie. However, the right wing of the party leadership in 1939-1940 interpreted these principles in its own way and did not notice the danger associated with the forced expansion of the Hungarian borders established by the Treaty of Trianon (1920). Although the party continued to criticize the government's policy of rapprochement with Germany, the XXXIII Congress of the SPD (1942) had already accepted the refusal party leadership depends on the principle of national independence. The right-wing Social Democrats hoped that the government of M. Kallai would be able to lead the country out of the war at the cost of the Anglo-American occupation. At the end of 1943, a draft of the SPD program was developed, but the issue of power was ignored. The new political course of the party was finally formulated by its left forces (headed by A. Sakashich) in February-May 1945; it focused on strengthening the unity of the working class (which was to lead to the creation of a unified workers ' party), on supporting a coalition policy in the interests of democratic demands, and on recognizing the liberation mission of the Soviet Union.

Several articles published in the magazine are devoted to domestic political problems of the interwar period. Among them is article Z. Bakshai (1978, No. 5) on unemployment from 1920 until its elimination in the mid-1950s. The author analyzes the growth of the number of unemployed, the situation of their families, the structure and activity of the labor exchange, the impact of inflation on unemployment, the struggle of trade unions against unemployment, and, finally, the measures taken by the people's Democratic government to eliminate it after the liberation of the country.

Questions of the national policy of the Khortyist regime in 1923-1929 were reflected in the article by B. Beller (1973, No. 3). It examines the national composition of the Hungarian population and legislation on national minorities. When developing it, the government of I. Bethlen was guided by the principles laid down in 1868 when concluding an agreement with the Habsburgs. However, the 1924 law on national minorities was still a step backwards from the 1868 law, although it was quite liberal. In addition, at first, the government faced resistance from the administrative authorities and the Church in implementing it. In the context of the economic crisis that unfolded in the early 1930s, the government's "national consolidation policy" failed.

A number of articles written by L. Tilkovsky concern the German minority in Hungary (1973, N 1; 1978, N 1; 1981, N 5-6). They show the formation and development of his national movement, which was not only national and cultural, but also closely connected with the political circles of Germany. Although her official policy on this matter was restrained, it did not interfere

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Berlin should influence this movement through the "Union of Germans Abroad" and some cultural and educational organizations. This" Union " through the leaders of the German national movement in 1944 gave Berlin advice about the occupation of Hungary, instigated the replacement of its government by the power of the Nilashists.

The characteristics of the bourgeois liberal opposition in the years of the global economic crisis are given in the article by Zh. Nagy (1978, No. 3). The opposition criticized not only the policy of the Bethlen government, but also bourgeois parliamentarism and private capitalist economy. The beginning of the opposition's clash with the government was the question of responsibility for the country's developing economic crisis, which the liberals blamed on the government, its autarkic policy and its alliance with Italy. The government, in turn, considered the Trianon Treaty, which broke the traditional economic ties between the parts of the Habsburg Monarchy, to be the basis of all the country's economic troubles. The liberals, whose social base was the petty-bourgeois strata of the city, accused the government of unilaterally representing the interests of industrial capital. On the other hand, they feared that in the form of industrial cooperatives and public utilities, the Government was creating the germ of "state socialism."

A number of articles in the journal concern the political structure and socio-political struggle in Hungary after its liberation. M. Korom devoted one of his articles (1982, n. 2) to the election of deputies to the Provisional National Assembly of the country in December 1944. At the beginning of December 1944, a delegation of representatives of the Hungarian democratic forces left for Moscow to find out the possibilities of creating a new government of the country. After receiving the consent of the allied Powers to form a new democratic Government, the delegation returned to the liberated territory of Hungary, in Debrecen, on December 12, 1944. There were members of the delegation that participated in the signing of the armistice in Moscow, Hungarian officers who had crossed the front, and a group of communist emigrants who had returned from the USSR. A preparatory committee for the elections was established. They were held in the liberated areas of the country. The author analyzes the election results, the social and party composition of deputies elected to the Provisional National Assembly, noting that it corresponded to the balance of political and social forces in the Hungarian National Independence Front.

Another article by M. Koroma (1976, No. 4) examines the Debrecen session of the Provisional National Assembly and the creation of the Provisional National Government headed by B. Miklos on December 22, 1944. The author compares the composition of the new government and the parliament. Unlike the parliament, the left-wing, consistently democratic forces did not have a majority in the government formed on a broad anti-fascist base. But the creation of such a government met the objectives of the Hungarian patriotic forces in both foreign and domestic policy. The article examines the activities of the Political Committee of the Provisional National Assembly, the circumstances of the international recognition of the new Hungarian Parliament and Government. With their creation, the author notes, there was a turn in the history of Hungary, thanks to which in 1944 it managed to break the alliance with Hitler's Germany, and in early 1945 to conclude an armistice with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

An article by L. Izhak (1980, No. 6) was devoted to the political collapse of the conservative-liberal bourgeois opposition in 1947-1949. It describes the results of the elections to the State Assembly on August 31, 1947 and the attempts of the bourgeois opposition to use them in their own interests, shows the tactics of the Communist Party in relation to the bourgeois opposition. The author notes that in the conditions when economic problems came to the fore, the influence of the bourgeois opposition significantly decreased, despite the organizational regroupings of its constituent parties and the support of the Catholic Church for them. The author analyzes the results of the State Assembly elections of May 15, 1949, and reveals the reasons for the significant success of the bloc of parties of the Hungarian National Independence Front (95.6% of all votes), which first came out with a single list in the elections.

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The articles discussed in this review give an idea of the directions and problems of research on the recent history of Hungary conducted in this country. It is interesting to note that during the years under review, the journal did not cover the history of socialist construction in Hungary and its foreign policy at this stage.

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